Women and Justice: Keywords

Article 74 of the Family Code of Ukraine establishes rules governing property division in “civil marriages,” meaning that a woman and a man live together as a family but are not legally married to each other or to anyone else. Any property acquired by a couple in a civil marriage while living together is their joint property that will be shared or divided equally after the marriage ends, unless otherwise defined in a written agreement. Thus, in theory, the legal status of the property acquired by persons in a civil marriage is the same as the legal status of the property of the spouses. However, it is not always clear how to prove the existence of a valid civil marriage, which often leaves women without property rights protection when such relationships end. For example, a civil husband or wife claiming property rights based on civil marriage must establish when the civil marriage began in order to determine the property acquired during its existence, but the legislation does not clearly define the terms “cohabitation” or “living as a family.” Most often, cohabitation is proven by testimony of witnesses and documents (for example, documents confirming expenses for joint property).

Стаття 74 Сімейного кодексу України встановлює правила поділу майна у "цивільному шлюбі", тобто, коли жінка та чоловік проживають однією сім’єю, але їх шлюб офіційно незареєстрований між собою чи з кимось іншим. Будь-яке майно, придбане подружжям у цивільному шлюбі під час спільного проживання, є їхньою спільною власністю, яка буде поділена порівну після припинення шлюбу, якщо інше не визначено письмовим договором. Таким чином, в теорії правовий статус майна, набутого особами у цивільному шлюбі, збігається з правовим статусом майна подружжя. Однак, не завжди зрозуміло, як довести наявність дійсного цивільного шлюбу, що часто залишає майнові права жінок незахищеними після припинення таких відносин. Наприклад, цивільний чоловік або дружина, який/яка претендує на майнові права на підставі цивільного шлюбу, має встановити час виникнення цивільного шлюбу, але законодавством чітко не визначено поняття "спільне проживання" чи "проживання однією сім’єю". Найчастіше спільне проживання підтверджується показаннями свідків і документами (наприклад, документами, що підтверджують витрати на спільне майно).

Articles 60-61 state that any property acquired during marriage shall be jointly owned by the spouses regardless of whether either spouse did not make their own income for a valid reason (studies, household matters, children care, sickness, etc.). Unless proven otherwise, every item acquired in marriage other than individual-use items shall be deemed to be jointly owned by the couple. Article 62 states that if a spouse’s property has significantly grown in value during the marriage (term “significantly grown in value” is subject to an evaluation comparing the value of the property before and after improvements due to joint labor or monetary expenses of the second spouse), the court may find that such property is jointly owned by the spouses. Articles 63-65 determine that the spouses shall have equal rights to own, possess, use, and manage any belongings owned jointly by them unless they agree otherwise.

У статтях 60-61 встановлено, що будь-яке майно, набуте за час шлюбу, є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя незалежно від того, що хтось із подружжя не отримував власних доходів з поважних причин (навчання, побутові справи, догляд за дітьми, хвороба тощо). Якщо не буде доведено інше, кожна річ, придбана у шлюбі, крім речей особистого користування, вважається спільною власністю подружжя. Стаття 62 визначає, що якщо майно подружжя за час шлюбу істотно збільшилось у вартості (термін "істотне збільшення вартості" підлягає оцінці, шляхом порівняння вартості майна до та після поліпшень, внаслідок спільної праці чи грошових витрат другого з подружжя), суд може визнати таке майно спільною сумісною власністю подружжя. Статті 63-65 визначають, що подружжя має рівні права власності, володіння, користування та управління будь-яким майном, яке є їх спільною власністю, якщо вони не домовилися про інше.

The appellant sued his ex-wife, the respondent, regarding the division of property acquired during the marriage as the ex-spouses’ joint property. The appellant noted that during their marriage, the spouses accumulated funds that were kept in the respondent’s bank account. However, immediately after the divorce, the respondent independently managed the funds and bought an apartment. The appellant’s main argument was that, according to Ukrainian family law, the dissolution of marriage does not terminate the right of joint co-ownership of property acquired during the marriage. When the spouses’ jointly owned property is divided, each spouse shall receive an equal share, unless otherwise envisaged by the marriage contract. Thus, the appellant argued that half of the money belonged to him. The respondent claimed that the money was her private property because it was a gift from her friend from the Slovak Republic. The first-instance court satisfied the appellant’s claim, noting that, according to Ukrainian legislation, the deed of gift agreement should have been, but was not, notarized, rendering it null and void. Consequently, the money was the joint property of the spouses. The Court of Appeal overturned this decision. The Supreme Court also supported the position that the court of first instance erroneously satisfied the husband's claim because, as a gift from a citizen of the Slovak Republic, the Ukrainian courts should apply Slovak law, which does not require notarization of the deed of gift agreement. Thus, the Supreme Court concluded that the money was the woman's personal property and could not be divided.

Скаржник звернувся до суду з позовом до своєї колишньої дружини (відповідача) про поділ майна, нажитого за час шлюбу як спільної сумісної власності подружжя. Скаржник зазначив, що за час шлюбу подружжя накопичило кошти, які зберігалися на банківському рахунку відповідача. Проте, одразу після розірвання шлюбу, відповідач самостійно розпорядилась коштами та придбала квартиру. Основним аргументом скаржника було те, що відповідно до сімейного законодавства України розірвання шлюбу не припиняє права спільної сумісної власності на майно, набуте за час шлюбу. При поділі майна, що є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя, вважається, що частки кожного із подружжя є рівними, якщо інше не встановлено домовленістю між ними або договором. Таким чином, скаржник стверджував, що половина грошей належить йому. Відповідач стверджувала, що гроші є її приватною власністю, оскільки це подарунок її друга із Словацької Республіки. Суд першої інстанції задовольнив позов скаржника, зазначивши, що відповідно до законодавства України договір дарування мав бути (проте не був) нотаріально посвідчений, що робить його нікчемним. Отже, гроші були спільною власністю подружжя. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення. Верховний Суд також підтримав позицію про те, що суд першої інстанції помилково задовольнив позов чоловіка, оскільки щодо подарунку громадянина Словацької Республіки українські суди мають застосовувати законодавство Словаччини, яке не вимагає нотаріального посвідчення договору дарування. Таким чином, Верховний суд дійшов висновку, що гроші є особистою власністю жінки і не підлягають розподілу.

In this case, the Supreme Court articulated its view of the nature of marriage and how the value of the contributions of the spouses should relate to property entitlements under Irish law. Referencing the Family Law (Divorcer) Act 1996, the Supreme Court noted that the legislature had not made any mandatory requirements regarding the division of assets in divorce and judicial separation cases; discretion had been left to the court to consider what would be the best and most just resolution of the case at hand. Appellate courts should, to a certain degree, give latitude to the discretion of the trial judge in these matters. The parties had a “turbulent” marriage. During the marriage, the respondent-wife: sold her pre-marital home (the proceeds of which were used as marital property), significantly pulled back from her career as a general practitioner focus on the marriage and couple’s children, and worked as a receptionist for her husband’s medical practice to save him money. The applicant-husband had affairs with multiple women, then filed for divorce when he had a child with another woman and decided to marry her. He transferred the family’s house, including some of the art and furnishings, to the respondent and paid about ₤400 per week in child support, which the High Court ordered increased to ₤800 per week. The Court stated that courts should incorporate the value of a spouse’s work performed at home as well as the factors listed in the Family Law Act (including but not limited to income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources, any physical or mental disability of either spouse, past and future contributions each spouse has made – or is likely to make – to the family welfare, and the conduct of the spouses). In this case, the applicant-husband had assets of at least ₤14 million and a current salary of about ₤210,000. The respondent-wife had about ₤1 million and uncertain salary; she requested between 33-50% of the applicant’s assets and a pension adjustment order. The High Court granted the respondent ₤5 million to be paid over 18 months and 55% of the applicant’s pension. On appeal, the applicant asked the Court to give greater weight to, among other factors, the facts (i) that he transferred 30% of his assets to the respondent when the marriage broke down and (ii) that he would have new responsibilities in his next marriage. The Court was of the view that ‘equality’ did not apply in this context, but that the courts are obliged to make ‘proper provision’ for both spouses having regard to the circumstances. In this case, the Court affirmed that the respondent was entitled 38% (approximately ₤5 million) of the total net assets, but revised the pension adjustment to 49-51% in favour of the respondent.

This Supreme Court case is notable for solidifying the “Jurisprudence of Equality” doctrine as predominant in determining the sharing of marital property upon divorce. Following the termination of the marriage, the wife was granted by the High Court of Accra in May 2010 (i) custody of the children; (ii) ownership of a house and a “half share of the ‘storey building’; and (iii) a half share of ‘the shops at Weija, Accra. The husband appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal set aside and replaced the orders of the High Court. The wife appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court restored the decision of the trial judge in its entirety and noted that its decision was based on the marriage equality principle delineated in Article 16 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. The Court affirmed the principle that property acquired during marriage is a joint property and that the sharing of spousal property should no longer be dependent on the substantial contribution principle.

The petitioner filed for divorce and sought an equal share of assets acquired during the marriage. At the time of marriage, neither party owned any property. During their marriage, the plaintiff assisted in building their business and managed their shop while her husband continued to work for the Controller and Accountant General's Department. The plaintiff also advised the respondent on property investments. The respondent denied that the petitioner contributed to the business and claimed that she embezzled money from him, and therefore should not be considered an equal holder of marital assets. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that she was a joint owner of the property and was therefore entitled to an equal share of the marital assets. The Supreme Court affirmed. Previous case law denied a wife a share in property acquired during the marriage unless the wife could show that she had made a "substantial contribution" to the acquirement of these assets. Yet, because more recent cases supported the "equality is equity" principle in the division of marital assets, the Supreme Court concluded that "the death knell has been sung to the substantial contribution principle, making way for the equitable distribution as provided for under Article 22 (3) of the Constitution 1992." Thus, the court held that even if it determined that the petitioner did not make a substantial contribution to the acquisition of marital property, she would still be entitled to a share of the property. To further support its decision, the Supreme Court referenced Article 1 and Article 5 of CEDAW, in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emphasize equality between the sexes.

This case concerned the determination of what constitutes relationship property in a divorce proceeding and how trusts may affect this determination (e.g. if a sham trust is implemented to hide assets, therefore affecting a woman’s economic rights in a divorce). The term “relationship property” is defined in the Property Relationships Act of 1976, the principles of which focus on the equality of spouses and that at the end of a relationship, any economic divisions should reflect equal contributions made by the couple during the relationship. However, any property constituting “trust property” is not available for division under the PRA. In this case, the parties had been married for 17 years with two daughters. During the marriage, the respondent-husband had become a successful business owner and set up several discretionary trusts. The trusts ostensibly related to the business he had established. The appellant-wife had assisted with her husband’s business ventures and was the main childcare provider during their marriage. The Court concluded that, in this case, the powers under a trust deed constituted “property” under the PRA. In applying the two-stage approach of section 182, the Court concluded that one of the discretionary trusts settled during the Clayton’s marriage constituted a nuptial trust under §182 of the Family Proceedings Act 1980 because of its connection to the marriage. The court found that the “nature of the assets is not determinative of whether the settlement is nuptial or not,” and that a settlement “made for business reasons” and containing business assets can be a nuptial settlement. The New Zealand Women’s Law Journal described this as a “decision that provided a much-needed step towards a more equal recognition of the traditional economic disadvantages faced by women.”

This case established a precedent for property rights of a widow when her husband dies intestate. On appeal, the Supreme Court excluded from probate ten acres of land to which Ms. Williams claimed title. Ms. Williams’ husband died intestate and the executor of his estate, appointed by the Probate Court, included all real and personal property from the marriage in determining the assets of the estate. Ms. Williams claimed that she held title to ten acres of property that her husband had purchased through a third party, with title vesting in the wife. The executor argued, and the trial court held, that all property acquired through the husband could be made liable for his debts. The trial court relied upon the Constitution of Liberia, which states “The property of which a woman may be possessed at the time of her marriage and also that of which she may afterwards become possessed, otherwise than by her husband shall not be held responsible for his debts.” The court reasoned that this clause implies that property acquired through her husband could be held liable for his debts. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that if a husband acquires property in the name of a third party, who becomes the medium through which title vests in the wife, the wife has an absolute right in that property and is not liable for the claims of the husband’s creditors. The court failed to apply this holding to personal property of the marriage, however, stating that instead personal property procured and owned by the deceased for the common use of the household is an asset of the estate.