Women and Justice: Topics: Trafficking in persons

The 1996 Act targets sex tourism. It provides that, where an Irish citizen or a person “ordinarily resident” in Ireland (a) commits an act in another country involving a child (person under the age of 17), and (b) the act constitutes an offence under the law of that country and would constitute an offence in Ireland, then the person will be guilty of the offense under Irish law (Section 2(2)). Other offences include attempted offences (Section 2(3)); procuring, aiding or abetting, and conspiring in an offence (Sections 2(4)–2(6)); transporting persons to enable such offences (Section 3); and publishing information likely to promote offenses (Sections 4). The Act also provides for offenses committed by corporate bodies (Section 5). Penalties are up to a maximum of a £10,000 fine and 5 years imprisonment on conviction on indictment, or up to 12 months’ imprisonment on summary conviction (Section 6).

In addition to abolishing the offence of buggery (sodomy) between adults, this Act codifies the law relating to sex work (referred to as ‘prostitution’), with the starting point being that it does not make prostitution itself illegal. However, the Act does not define ‘prostitute’. Section 1(2) defines ‘prostitution’ as occurring where “a person solicits or importunes another person for the purpose of obtaining that other person’s services as a prostitute,” or where they solicit or importune another person on behalf of a third person for the purposes of prostitution. Section 7A criminalizes paying for sexual favors from any person, and payment can include contracting with another for cash, barter, or other consideration. Section 9 criminalizes living off prostitution in the form of ‘pimping’, providing for an offence where a person controls, organizes, compels, coerces, or directs the activities of ‘a prostitute’ in respect of prostitution for gain. Section 10 further criminalizes living of the earnings of ‘the prostitution of another person.’ Section 11 makes brothel-keeping and management an offence.

The Human Trafficking Amendment Act amends the Criminal Law (Human Trafficking) Act 2008 (available here) and the Child Trafficking and Pornography Act 1998 (available here). The Act of 2008 defined human trafficking and exploitation for the purposes of trafficking. It also contains specific provisions for the trafficking of children. The Human Trafficking Amendment Act of 2013 amends the 2008 Act by (a) expanding the definitions of “labour exploitation” to include forced begging and of “exploitation” to include forced participation in criminal acts for profit (in line with the EU Human Trafficking Directive) and (b) adding aggravating factors (e.g., where a public official trafficks for sexual or labor exploitation).

The Illegal Immigrants Act makes it an offense for a person to organize or knowingly facilitate the entry of a person whom the person knows or has reasonable cause to believe to be an illegal immigrant or a person who intends to seek asylum into Ireland. The offence is punishable with fine of up to £1,500 or imprisonment up to 12 months or both on summary conviction; or, a fine or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 10 years or both on conviction on indictment (Section 2(1)). This applies to acts or omissions both inside and outside of Ireland (Section 2(3)). However, it does not apply (a) to “anything done by a person otherwise than for gain,” or (b) to “anything done to assist a person seeking asylum by a person in the course of his or her employment by a bona fide organization if the purposes of that organization include giving assistance to persons seeking asylum” (Section 2).

Article 149 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides criminal liability for trafficking in human beings, as well as recruitment, movement, concealment, transfer, or receipt of a person committed for the purpose of exploitation, coercion, abduction, fraud, blackmail, material, or other dependence of the victim, their vulnerable condition or bribery of a third-party controlling victim, to obtain consent for their exploitation. A person who commits such socially dangerous acts shall be punished by imprisonment for a term of three to eight years. Article 149 defines exploitation of a human being as including, among other things, all forms of the sexual exploitation, forcing someone to work in the pornography industry, forced pregnancy or forced termination of pregnancy, forced marriage, etc. The Article also provides an explanation of a person's “vulnerable state” (i.e., physical or mental properties or external circumstances, that eliminate or limit the ability to realize their acts (omission) or to control them, to take independent decisions, to resist the violent or other unlawful actions, the coincidence of difficult personal, family, or other circumstances).

Стаття 149 Кримінального кодексу України передбачає кримінальну відповідальність за торгівлю людьми, а так само вербування, переміщення, переховування, передачу або одержання людини, вчинені з метою експлуатації, з використанням примусу, викрадення, обману, шантажу, матеріальної чи іншої залежності потерпілого, його уразливого стану або підкупу третьої особи, яка контролює потерпілого, для отримання згоди на його експлуатацію. Особа, яка вчинила вищезгадані суспільно небезпечні діяння, карається позбавленням волі на строк від трьох до восьми років. Згідно примітки до цієї статті під експлуатацією людини, серед іншого, розуміються всі форми сексуальної експлуатації, використання в порнобізнесі, примусову вагітність або примусове переривання вагітності, примусове одруження тощо. У примітці також надається визначення поняття "уразливий стан особи" (тобто це зумовлений фізичними чи психічними властивостями або зовнішніми обставинами стан особи, який позбавляє або обмежує її здатність усвідомлювати свої дії (бездіяльність) або керувати ними, приймати за своєю волею самостійні рішення, чинити опір насильницьким чи іншим незаконним діям, збіг тяжких особистих, сімейних або інших обставин).

This law prevents and punishes human trafficking perpetrated in Paraguayan territory and abroad, in any of its forms. It also protects and assists victims by strengthening public actions as a response against this crime. The law criminalizes with eight years of imprisonment any conduct intended to capture or transport victims with the purposes of sexual exploitation, slavery, or organ trafficking. The years of imprisonment could increase when aggravating circumstances are present. In case of conviction, the law also allows courts to set any compensation for the victim, at the expense of the convicted.

Esta ley previene y sanciona la trata de personas perpetrada en el territorio paraguayo y en el exterior, en cualquiera de sus formas. También protege y asiste a las víctimas fortaleciendo las acciones públicas como respuesta a este delito. La ley tipifica con ocho años de prisión cualquier conducta tendiente a la captura o transporte de víctimas con fines de explotación sexual, esclavitud o tráfico de órganos. Los años de prisión podrán aumentar cuando concurran circunstancias agravantes. En caso de condena, la ley también permite que los tribunales fijen alguna indemnización para la víctima, a expensas del condenado.

The Trafficking in Persons Act provides for the prevention and elimination of human trafficking, in addition to establishing the National Coordination Committee against Trafficking in Persons which serves to coordinate and manage related issues in Malawi (the “Committee”). The Act applies to offenses committed at least partly in Malawi (or in contemplation of committing a crime inside Malawi), committed by a citizen of Malawi, or involving the trafficking of a citizen of Malawi. The Committee is responsible for coordinating and overseeing investigations and prosecutions under the Act, as well as formulating policy, educational programming, and recommendations with Malawi on the topic, amongst other responsibilities. The Act provides the Committee with affirmative responsibilities to trafficked persons, including access to adequate health care and shelter, protection from discrimination, and legal support. The Act criminalizes the trafficking of other persons, punishable up to 14 years of imprisonment. The Act provides a list of aggravating factors that can extend the punishment by life imprisonment, including if a trafficked person becomes pregnant or is forced to terminate a pregnancy. There are additional penalties associated with trafficking in children, including a maximum sentence of 21 years imprisonment, as well as for benefiting from exploitation or trafficking and providing support for trafficking offenses. The Act further regulates international transportation organizations, and provides specialized investigatory and judicial mechanisms for the enforcement of the Act.

The Penal Code distinguishes and applies different penalties in accordance with the age of the minor. Pursuant to article 192, the prohibition of the perpetration of a sexual act with a minor under 14 years old or leading that minor to practice such acts with a third person is punished with up to 12 years in prison. Again, the law makes a distinction whether the act involved penetration, in which case the maximum punishment increases to 15 years. If the minor is under the age of 16, pursuant to article 193, the perpetration of a sexual act leads to a maximum penalty of five years, which increases to eight years if there was penetration. Article 194 provides penalties for cases in which the minor is in the perpetrator’s custody.. Article 198 punishes the crime of child pornography with up to five years of imprisonment and is defined as to 1) promote, facilitate, or allow minors to participate in any kind of obscene interaction (including films, photographs, talks, recordings, etc.); 2) using minors in pornographic tapings or photos; or 3) giving such tapings, recordings, or pornographic instruments to a minor. The maximum penalty is increased to 10 years in prison in case the child pornography is produced with the intent to be spread through information systems or if the agent offers, makes available, or transmits such child pornography through information systems. An individual who acquires, obtains, or facilitates the access to child pornography is punished with up to five years of imprisonment and, if such agent practices such acts as means of profession, the maximum penalty is increased to 10 years.

O Código Penal distingue e aplica penalidades diferentes de acordo com a idade do menor. De acordo com o artigo 192, a proibição da perpetração do ato sexual com menor de 14 anos de idade ou a orientação ao menor para praticar tais atos com uma Terceira pessoa é punível com até 12 anos de prisão. Novamente, a lei faz uma distinção se o ato envolve penetração, caso em que a punição máxima aumenta para 15 anos. Se o menor tem menos de 16 anos de idade, de acordo com o artigo 193, a perpetração do ato sexual leva a uma penalidade máxima de cinco anos, que aumenta para oito anos se houve penetração. O artigo 194 prevê penalidade para casos em que o menor está sob custódia do perpetrador. O artigo 198 pune o crime de pornografia infantil com até cinco anos de prisão e é definido como 1) promover, facilitar, ou permitir que menores participem de qualquer tipo de interação obscena (incluindo filmes, fotografias, falas, gravações, etc); 2) usar menores em vídeos ou fotos pornográficos; ou 3) dar tais vídeos, gravações, ou instrumentos pornográficos a menores. A penalidade máxima aumenta até 10 anos na prisão no caso em que a pornografia infantil é produzida com a intenção de ser divulgada por meio de sistemas de informação ou se o agente oferecer, disponibilizar, ou transmitir tal pornografia infantil por meio de sistemas de informação. O indivíduo que adquire, obtém, ou facilita o acesso a pornografia infantile é punido com até cinco anos de prisão e, se esse agente pratica tais atos como meios profissionais, a penalidade máxima aumenta para 10 anos.

Article 163 punishes sexual coercion – to coerce someone to practice a “relevant sexual act” – with imprisonment from one to eight years. Article 164 punishes forcible intercourse (“violação”) with imprisonment from one to six years. Article 168 punishes artificial procreation without a woman’s consent, with imprisonment from one to eight years. Articles 171 and 172 punish sexual abuse of minors of 14 years with imprisonment from 1-10 years. Article 173 punishes sexual acts with adolescents (individuals between 14 and 16 years old) with imprisonment up to three years. Article 174 punishes the practice for “relevant sexual acts” with a minor between 14 and 18 years), upon payment or other type of consideration with imprisonment up to three years. Article 175 punishes facilitating the prostitution of minors with imprisonment from 1-8 years. The term of imprisonment rises to a minimum of two and a maximum of ten years if the crime is committed by means of violence or threat, fraud, authority abuse, or with the intent to profit, or if the victim is vulnerable or mentally incapable. Article 176 punishes child pornography with imprisonment up to five years. The term of imprisonment rises to a minimum of one and a maximum of eight years if the crime is committed by means of violence or threat or with the intent to profit. Article 176-A punishes the act of befriending a minor online with the intent to commit sexual abuse with imprisonment of up to one year. If the act of online befriending effectively leads to an encounter, the conduct is punishable with imprisonment of up to two years. Article 176-B punishes the organization of sexual tourism with imprisonment of up to three years.

O artigo 163 pune a coerção sexual – ato de coagir alguém a praticar um "ato sexual relevante" - com prisão de um a oito anos. O artigo 164 pune as relações sexuais forçadas (violação ou estupro) com prisão de um a seis anos. O artigo 168 pune a procriação artificial sem o consentimento da mulher, com prisão de um a oito anos. O artigo 169 pune a exploração econômica da prostituição por terceiros. Entretanto, a prostituição em si não é um crime em Portugal. O artigo 176-B pune a organização do turismo sexual com pena de prisão de até três anos. Artigos 171 e 172 punem o abuso sexual de menores de 14 anos com prisão de um a dez anos. O artigo 173 pune atos sexuais com adolescentes (indivíduos entre 14 e 16 anos de idade) com prisão de até três anos. O artigo 174 pune a prática de "atos sexuais relevantes" com um menor entre 14 e 18 anos, mediante pagamento ou outro tipo de contraprestação, com prisão de até três anos. O Artigo 175 pune a facilitação da prostituição de menores com prisão de um a oito anos. A pena de prisão é aumentada para um mínimo de dois e um máximo de dez anos se o crime for cometido por meio de violência ou ameaça, fraude, abuso de autoridade ou com a intenção de lucro, ou se a vítima for vulnerável ou mentalmente incapaz. O artigo 176 pune a pornografia infantil com prisão até 5 anos. A pena de prisão é aumentada para um mínimo de um e um máximo de 8 anos, caso o crime tenha sido cometido por meio de violência ou ameaça ou com a intenção de lucrar. O Artigo 176-A pune o ato de fazer amizade com um menor on-line com a intenção de cometer abuso sexual com pena de prisão de até um ano. Se o ato de fazer amizade on-line levar efetivamente a um encontro, a conduta é punível com prisão de até dois anos.

This section outlines the punishments for prostitution. Anyone who promotes or facilitates prostitution by a woman is subject to one-two years in prison, but anyone who promotes another’s prostitution through violence, fraud, abuse of authority, or exploitation of the other’s situation is punishable with two-eight years in prison. Whomever habitually partakes in prostitution with someone under the age of 18 can be imprisoned from two-eight years or be fined for up to one year.

Essa seção estabelece as sanções para prostituição. Aquele que promove ou facilita a prostituição de uma mulher está sujeito a um-dois anos de prisão, mas aquele promove a prostituição de outra pessoa por meio de violência, fraude, abuso de autoridade, ou exploração da situação alheia é punido com dois-oito anos de prisão. Quem habitualmente realiza prostituição com uma pessoa menor de 18 pode ser preso de dois-oito anos ou sofrer multa até um ano.

Law No. 350-3 defines human trafficking and sets out measures to prevent human trafficking and related crimes. These include identifying victims of trafficking, educating, and providing information to citizens on related issues. The law further sets out measures for the protection and rehabilitation of victims of trafficking, including ensuring their safety, providing temporary accommodation, legal, medical, and psychological assistance, among others. The law provides that persons guilty of trafficking in persons or related crimes are punishable in accordance with the legislative acts of the Republic of Belarus and the victim's "unwillingness or inability" to change his or her "anti-social behavior" caused by the trafficking does not eliminate or mitigate the offender's liability.\

Art. 166 of the Criminal Code defines rape as “sexual intercourse against the will of the victim with the use of violence” or threat of such violence against the woman or her relatives, or using the woman’s helpless state. Rape is punishable by restraint on liberty for a term of up to four years or imprisonment for a term of three to seven years. Rape in aggravating circumstances, including repeated rape, rape by a group of people, or rape by a person who has previously committed sexually violent acts, is punishable by imprisonment for a term of five to thirteen years and knowing rape of a minor or rape that causes grave consequences (e.g., death, bodily harm, or HIV infection) is punishable by imprisonment for a term of 8-15 years. Art. 167 likewise prohibits violent acts of sexual nature, such as “sodomy” or “lesbianism” against the will of the victim with the use of violence or threat of such violence, or using the victim’s helpless state. The punishments for committing an Art. 167 crime in aggravated circumstances are the same as those for rape. Art. 168 prohibits sexual intercourse and other acts of a sexual nature with a person below the age of 16. This crime is punishable by, in case there are no signs of criminal acts set out above, restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up to four years, with a fine. The punishment, in case the offender has previously committed the crimes described above, has duties owed to the victim, or the crime is committed by a group of persons, is imprisonment for a term of three to ten years. “Depraved acts” committed against a person below the age of 16 are punishable by imprisonment for a term of up to six years under Art. 169. Art. 170 criminalizes the compulsion to commit acts of a sexual nature by means of blackmail, threat of destruction of property, or by using the dependence (workplace, monetary, etc.) of the victim. The crime is punishable by restraint on liberty or imprisonment for a term of up three years, with a fine and prohibition to occupy certain offices. Such a crime knowingly committed against a minor is punishable by imprisonment for a term of three to six years. Arts. 171 and 171 prohibit the organization, use, or creation of conditions for prostitution, including by removing the victim outside of the country; such crimes are punishable by up to ten years of imprisonment.

The Human Trafficking Prevention Act (the “HTPA”) was enacted to prevent human trafficking and to safeguard the rights of victims. The HTPA defines “human trafficking” and related offenses, including “improper debt bondage,” specifies the responsibilities of the competent authorities at the central government, city, county, and municipal levels (including for cooperation among such competent authorities and with international governmental bodies and NGOs to eradicate human trafficking). It also governs matters including the prevention and identification of offenses; the protection and sheltering of victims as well as protection of witnesses; the treatment of victims who are not Taiwanese citizens and do not have valid resident or visitor permits (including the issuance of temporary visitor permits as well as the timing and conditions for repatriation); the confidentiality of victims’ identities (with financial penalties for unauthorized disclosures); and criminal procedure (including use as evidence of victim statements made outside of judicial proceedings). Persons found to have committed criminal offenses under the HTPA are subject to imprisonment for up to seven years or (for certain offenses) for periods in excess of seven years as well as to fines up to N.T. seven million, depending on the nature of the offense. The HTPA further provides that any property or profit from assets acquired from human trafficking is to be confiscated regardless of its ownership except the part to be returned to victims. Additionally, the HTPA provides for suspension or revocation of the licensing of any Taiwanese vessel, aircraft or other means of transportation whose owner, operator, captain, pilot, or driver has been engaged in transporting trafficked persons, as well as revocation of the professional licenses or qualifications of the captain, pilot or driver. The HTPA applies on an extraterritorial basis outside of Taiwan for the crimes specified in the legislation. English translation available here.

The Criminal Code defines rape and the persecution of a person based on his or her sex as a crime against humanity (Article 172). It also includes rape or forcible prostitution under threat to a person’s life or limb and/or the threat to the life or the limb of a loved one as a crime of war (Article 180). English translation available from ILO and LegislatiOnline through External URL.

This law sets out the measures for protecting women’s rights, promoting gender equality, development of women (including physical, mental, educational, and professional and skills developments), eliminating gender-based discriminations, and preventing crimes, such as human trafficking and domestic violence, against women. Article 17, Equal Rights in the Family, mandates that women and men have equal rights in all matters concerning family relationships, including equal rights in matrimonial property and inheritance. Part IV, The Protection of Women and Children against Trafficking and Domestic Violence, sets out measures to assist and protect women and children victims of trafficking and domestic violence; duties and obligations of governments and officers, social organizations, individuals, doctors, social workers, or other organizations that discover or receive information concerning a victim; and criminal procedures relating to offenders. Unofficial English translation available from the ILO here.

The “Prostitution Act” criminalizes various activities associated with sex work. The criminalized activities include (see Sections 5 to 13): soliciting oneself in a public place, associating with another in a sex work establishment for the purpose of prostitution, advertising oneself or another for the purpose of sex work, procuring a person for the purpose of prostituting that person, a parent who connives in the prostitution of their child who is under the age of 18, being an owner/manager/supervisor in a prostitution establishment or other controller of sex workers in a prostitution establishment, and detaining a person or threatening in any manner to compel engagement in sex work. The Prostitution Act only criminalizes individuals involved with selling sex, but carries no criminalization or consequences for a customer buying it unless the sex worker is under the age of 18. The penalty for involvement in prostitution ranges from a fine up to a term of imprisonment for life depending on the offense committed. A sex worker could be charged with a fine not exceeding 1,000 Baht and imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month. Over the past few years, police have been conducting raids, sometimes violently, on prostitution establishments. It has been noted that those who exploit women in prostitution are rarely prosecuted and women working in the entertainment sector are often presumed guilty and subject to humiliating treatment following arrest. There are also reports to widespread corruption and official complicity in prostitution and trafficking cases.

English translation available here.

A person who takes, hides, or imprisons a pregnant woman in order to force the woman or a third party to do, not do, or tolerate something against his or her will is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. A person who kidnaps or hides a pregnant woman to obtain a ransom is subject to imprisonment of between 10 to 25 years. If perpetrator obtains the desired gain, the minimum penalty will be raised to eight years.

La persona que toma, esconde o encarcela a una mujer embarazada con el fin de obligar a la mujer o a una tercera persona a hacer, no hacer o tolerar algo en contra de su voluntad está sujeta a pena privadora de libertad de 10 a 25 años. La persona que secuestra u oculta a una mujer embarazada para obtener un rescate está sujeta a una pena de prisión de entre 10 y 25 años. Si el agresor obtiene la ganancia deseada, la pena mínima se elevará a ocho años.

Articles 342 to 345 relate to abortion as a crime, other than an abortion under any of the conditions established by Law No. 21,030 of 2017. The penalty varies considerably depending on the circumstances and motives for the abortion, including, for example, whether the abortion was performed by the mother or a third party, whether it was done with or without the consent of the mother, or whether it was done to hide any shame (deshonra). Article 390 of the Criminal Code provides that the killing of a woman who is or used to be in a relationship with the murderer is murder (spousal) (femicidio), the penalty for which is imprisonment from 15 years and one day to qualified perpetual imprisonment. Article 400 increases by one degree penalties for crimes committed in the context of domestic or family violence. Article 411 prohibits acts done with the purpose of promoting or facilitating the entry or exit of individuals who perform sex work within or outside the Chilean borders. The penalty is imprisonment from three years and one day to five years, plus a fine. Article 411 also prohibits acts of violence, coercion, or taking advantage of vulnerability of persons in order to obtain the consent of a person to be sexuality exploited, such as in pornography, slavery, or forced labor. The penalty is imprisonment from five years and one day to 15 years, plus a fine.

Los Artículos 342 al 345 regulan aborto como delito, distinto del aborto en cualquiera de las condiciones establecidas por la Ley N ° 21.030 de 2017. La sanción varía considerablemente según las circunstancias y motivos del aborto, incluyendo, por ejemplo, si el el aborto fue realizado por la madre o una tercera persona, ya sea con o sin el consentimiento de la madre, o para ocultar alguna vergüenza (deshonra). El Artículo 390 del Código Penal establece que el homicidio de una mujer que está o solía estar en relación con el asesino es homicidio (conyugal) (femicidio), cuya pena es de prisión de 15 años y un día a prisión perpetua calificada. El Artículo 400 aumenta en un grado las penas por delitos cometidos en el contexto de violencia doméstica o familiar. El Artículo 411 prohíbe los actos realizados con el propósito de promover o facilitar la entrada o salida de personas que realizan trabajo sexual dentro o fuera de las fronteras chilenas. La pena es de prisión de tres años y un día a cinco años, más una multa. El Artículo 411 también prohíbe los actos de violencia, coacción o aprovechamiento de la vulnerabilidad de las personas para obtener el consentimiento de una persona para ser explotada sexualmente, como en la pornografía, la esclavitud o el trabajo forzoso. La pena es de prisión de cinco años y un día a 15 años, más una multa.

This Act consolidates the laws relating to children. It provides an overview of children’s rights, delineates the broad requirements concerning child maintenance and adoption, regulates child labor and apprenticeship, and discusses other ancillary matters concerning children generally. Part 1, Sub-Part 1 specifies several children’s rights and parental duties such as the right to parental property, education and well-being, social activity, and opinion. This Sub-Part also protects children from exploitative labor, torture, degrading treatment, and forced betrothal, dowry, or marriage. The penalty for any violation of these rights is imprisonment not to exceed one year or the payment of a fine not to exceed 5 million currency points or both. Section 14 of this Sub-Part sets the minimum age for any marriage at 18. Part IV of the Act then outlines the adoption process and gives jurisdiction to the High Court, Circuit Court, or Family Tribunal in the area where the adopter or adoptee resides at the time of the application. It further states that only a minor (a child under the age of 18) can be adopted by husband and wife jointly; father or mother alone or jointly with the spouse; a relative of 21 years; or a single person of 25 years and at least 21 years older than the child to be adopted. Finally, Part V of the Act delimitates the employment of children and prohibits any type of work before 13 years old.

Article 279.01 defines and prohibits human trafficking. The penalty for trafficking including aggravated assault, aggravated sexual assault, or death is five years to imprisonment for life or for any other case, four to fourteen years imprisonment.

On June 21, 2018, the NSW Parliament passed the Act to supplement existing criminal legislation both at the NSW (e.g., Crimes Act 1900 and Human Tissue Act 1983) and Commonwealth levels (e.g., the Criminal Code Act 1995). The Act defines “modern slavery” as “any conduct involving the use of any form of slavery, servitude or forced labour to exploit children or other persons taking place in the supply chains of government agencies or non-government agencies.” The Act provides for an Anti-slavery Commissioner and establishes a Modern Slavery Committee.

The Charter aims to protect and promote the human rights set out in Part 2, including property rights and freedom from forced work (slavery), as well as the right to enjoy those human rights without discrimination. With respect to any proposed new law, the Victorian Parliament must prepare a “statement of compatibility,” which must examine the proposed law’s compatibility (or incompatibility) with the human rights protected in the Charter. While this statement has no effect on the validity of any law, it furthers the purpose of the Charter in promoting human rights. Further, under section 32 of the Charter, all statutory provisions must be interpreted in a way that is compatible with human rights (to the extent it is possible to do so consistently with their purpose). The Charter also allows the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission to intervene in any court or tribunal proceeding in relation to the Charter.

The Special Comprehensive Law for a Violence-Free Life for Women (Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia) (“LEIV”) establishes a framework for prosecuting and preventing acts of violence against women, and for providing assistance and support for victims of gender-based violence. The law establishes 11 new crimes that aim to sanction various aspects of gender-based violence in various forms: physical (femicide, aggravated femicide, obstruction of justice, induced or assisted suicide); psychological (inducement and promotion of sex acts through electronic media; unlawful dissemination of information, dissemination of pornography); economic (breach of duty of economic assistance, theft of birthright, theft of profits of economic activity); and speech (violent speech against women). Rape is prosecuted through the Penal Code. The Salvadorean Institute for the Advancement of Women (Instituto Salvadoreno para el Desarollo de la Mujer) (“ISDEMU”) is tasked with overseeing the implementation of the law and with establishing women’s shelters and other programs designed to help victims of domestic and gender-based violence.

La Ley Especial Integral para una Vida Libre de Violencia para las Mujeres (LEIV) establece una avenida para enjuiciar y prevenir actos de violencia contra las mujeres, y para brindar asistencia y apoyo a víctimas que hayan sufrido violencia por razón de género. La ley establece 11 nuevos delitos que tienen como objetivo sancionar varios aspectos de la violencia de género en diversas formas: física (femicidio, femicidio agravado, obstrucción de la justicia, suicidio inducido o asistido); psicológica (inducción y promoción de actos sexuales a través de medios electrónicos; difusión ilegal de información, difusión de pornografía); económica (incumplimiento del deber de asistencia económica, robo de derechos de nacimiento, robo de beneficios de la actividad económica); y discurso (discurso violento contra la mujer). La violación es procesada por el Código Penal, el cual es el código penal criminal. El Instituto Salvadoreño para el Adelanto de la Mujer ("ISDEMU") tiene la tarea de supervisar la implementación de la ley y establecer refugios para mujeres asi como otros programas diseñados para ayudar a las víctimas de violencia doméstica y de violencia en base de género.

The Swedish Penal Code includes regulations that defines and prohibits various sexually and/or physically motivated crimes against people. The penalty for kidnapping with intent to injure a person, to force a person into service or to practice extortion is imprisonment for at least four years and at most eighteen years, or for life. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is six years. The penalty for human trafficking is imprisonment for 2-10 years. When a crime is less serious, the highest imprisonment term is four years. If a crime is in violation of liberty and peace or a sexual offense and it was committed by a man against a woman with whom he had a close intimate relationship (marriage or cohabitation), then the man will be sentenced for gross violation of a woman’s integrity and imprisoned for at least nine months and at most six years, as opposed to being sentenced for each individual crime committed. This crime was introduced in the Swedish Penal Code in 1998 and the construction of it is unique because several individual criminal offences together can constitute a gross crime. Perpetrators of rape shall be imprisoned for at least two and at most six years. If the rape is considered less aggravated, the sentence drops to at most four years. In the event the rape is “gross”, the sentence is extended to at most 10 years. The penalty for sexual intercourse with a child under 15 years of age (or an act comparable to sexual intercourse) is at least two and at most six years. If the crime is “gross”, the penalty is extended to at least five years and at most ten years. The penalty for sexual coercion is at most two years of imprisonment. Notwithstanding, if the sexual coercion is “gross”, the sentence is extended from at least six months to at most six years. The penalty for intercourse with an offspring is imprisonment for at most two years and for intercourse with a sibling is at most one year. The penalties for crimes of exploitation of a child for sexual posing, purchase of a sexual ct from a child and sexual molestation are sentencing to a fine or imprisonment for at most two years. Except for gross exploitation of a child for sexual posing where the sentence is at least six months and at most six years imprisonment. The penalty for purchase of sexual service is a fine or imprisonment for at most one year. Purchase of sexual service has occurred when a person obtains a temporary sexual relation in return for payment. This also applies if the payment was promised or given by another person. Selling sexual services in Sweden is not criminalized. The penalty for someone who promotes or improperly financially exploits a person’s engagement in temporary sexual relations in return for payment (procuring) is at most four years. In the event the procuring is “gross”, the sentence is 2-10 years. As of 2018, the Penal Code defines rape as any sex without consent, either with words or clear actions. Before the amendment, crimes of rape required the intent to rape someone through violence or threats, or that the victim was in a particularly vulnerable position. Furthermore, the 2018 sex crime reform of the Swedish Penal Code introduced criminal liability for negligent rape (Chapter 6 Section 1a) and negligent sexual abuse (Chapter 6 Section 3). Gross negligence is required for liability under the new regulations, rather than intention, as required for regular rape and sexual abuse in Chapter 6 Section 1 and 2. The penalty for negligent rape or negligent sexual abuse is at most four years.

The Law on the Prohibition of Discrimination introduced a systematic basis for general anti-discrimination protection in Serbia. It includes a general prohibition on discrimination in addition to specific articles covering hate speech, harassment, and other more severe forms of discrimination such as slavery and trafficking. (English translation available here.)

Article 7 of the Constitution of Kosovo states that Kosovo’s constitutional order is based on principles including equality, respect for human rights, non-discrimination, and social justice. The article further declares that Kosovo ensures gender equality as a fundamental value for the democratic development of the society, providing equal opportunities for both female and male participation in the political, economic, social, cultural, and other areas of societal life. Article 24(2) prohibits discrimination on grounds of gender and sexual orientation. Article 28(1) stipulates that no one shall be held in slavery or servitude, and paragraph (3) specifically forbids trafficking in persons. Article 37 declares that everyone enjoys the right to marry based on free will. It mandates that marriage and divorce be based on the equality of spouses. Article 71(2) stipulates that the composition of the Assembly of Kosovo shall respect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 101(1) stipulates that the composition of the civil service shall take into account internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 104(2) stipulates that the composition of the judiciary shall reflect internationally recognized principles of gender equality. Article 108(2) charges the Kosovo Judicial Council to ensure that the Kosovo courts follow the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (4) requires proposals for appointment of judges to reflect principles of gender equality. Article 109(4) stipulates the State Prosecutor shall respect the principles of gender equality. Article 110(1) charges the Kosovo Prosecutorial Council to ensure that the State Prosecutor reflects the principles of gender equality. Paragraph (2) requires that proposals for appointments of prosecutors shall reflect principles of gender equality. Article 114(1) requires the composition of the Constitutional Court to respect principles of gender equality. (Unofficial English translation available here.)

The Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Enforcement and Administration Act, originally passed in 2003 and amended in 2005 and 2015, criminalizes human trafficking and related abuses. The Act provides trafficked persons with access to adequate health services and protection against discriminatory treatment. The Act establishes a National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons (Part II), establishes Agency Transit Shelters for rescued trafficked persons, and establishes a Victims of Trafficking Trust Fund to provide compensation for victims (Part X). The Act provides protections against discriminatory treatment, barring discrimination on account of gender or sex or on the basis of the victim "having worked in the sex industry." Part IX, Section 61(a). The Act serves as implementing legislation for Nigeria’s international obligation under the Trafficking in Persons Protocol Supplementing the Transnational Organized Crime Convention (TOC), to which Nigeria became a signatory on December 13, 2000. Part Two available here.

This Act prohibits human trafficking and establishes protective measures for the victims of human trafficking. It establishes a Human Trafficking Prohibition Committee to oversee the implementation of the Act and calls for the establishment of centers for victims and the creation of a victims’ fund.

The law defines and prohibits human trafficking. The penalty for human trafficking is 16 - 20 years imprisonment. Longer prison sentences are recommended when the victim is a woman or a child. The law provides that victims can benefit from witness protection measures and other forms of assistance, such as medical services and counseling.

The Offences against the Person Act lists acts recognized in law as punishable offences and details the ways in which the law deals with the offenders under the said acts. Child stealing is recognized as a felony and any person convicted for child stealing shall be imprisoned for a term not exceeding seven years. Kidnapping is recognized as a felony and any person convicted shall be liable to imprisonment for life. Attempts to procure abortion (by virtue of the pregnant woman unlawfully administering any substances to terminate her pregnancy by whatsoever means) is recognized as a felony and shall be liable for imprisonment for life. Infanticide (the act by which a woman willfully causes the death of her child under the age of twelve months) is a punishable offence recognized as the offence of manslaughter of a child.

El Decreto de Ley de Delitos contra la Persona enumera los actos reconocidos por la ley como delitos punibles y detalla las formas en que la ley trata a los que la violan en virtud de dichos actos. El robo de niños se reconoce como delito grave y toda persona condenada por robo de niños será encarcelada por un período no superior a siete años. El secuestro se reconoce como delito grave y cualquier persona condenada será condenada a cadena perpetua. Los intentos de obtener un aborto (en virtud de que la mujer embarazada administre ilegalmente cualquier sustancia para interrumpir su embarazo por cualquier medio) se reconocen como un delito grave y serán sancionados con prisión perpetua. El infanticidio (el acto por el cual una mujer causa intencionalmente la muerte de su hijo menor de doce meses) es un delito punible reconocido como el delito de homicidio involuntario de un niño.

The Sexual Offences Act specifically outlaws many sex-based crimes, including rape, sexual assault, marital rape, sexual touching or interference, inducing or encouraging the violation of a child, indecent assault, violation of persons suffering from mental or physical disabilities, forcible abduction, procuration, unlawful detention with the intent to have sexual intercourse, and living on earnings of prostitution. It also amended certain laws and standards regarding consent. It abolished the common law presumption that a boy under fourteen years of age could not commit rape, and further noted that consent is “immaterial” in any offences involving a child. The Act restricts evidence that can be brought at rape trials, specifically preventing the complainant from being asked about his or her sexual history. It preserves the possibility of anonymity for persons bringing claims under the Sexual Offences Act. Finally, it creates a sex offender registry and mandates registration for persons convicted of sexual offences.

El Decreto de Ley de Delitos Sexuales prohíbe específicamente muchos delitos basados ​​en el sexo, incluyendo la violación, la agresión sexual, la violación conyugal, el contacto o la interferencia sexual, la inducción o el fomento de la violación de un niño, la agresión indecente, la violación de personas que padecen discapacidades mentales o físicas, el secuestro forzoso, procuración, detención ilegal con la intención de tener relaciones sexuales y vivir de las ganancias de la prostitución. También modificó ciertas leyes y normas relativas al consentimiento. Abolió la presunción de derecho consuetudinario de que un niño menor de catorce años no podía cometer una violación y señaló además que el consentimiento es "inmaterial" en cualquier delito que involucre a un niño. La ley restringe las pruebas que pueden presentarse en los juicios por violación, específicamente evitando que se le pregunte al denunciante sobre su historial sexual. Preserva la posibilidad de mantener el anonimato para las personas que presenten demandas en virtud de la Ley de delitos sexuales. Por último, crea un registro de delincuentes sexuales y ordena el registro de personas condenadas por delitos sexuales.

Provides for a criminal penalty of not less than five years for any person who commits certain specified offenses as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, including (1) assuming and exercising a right of ownership over a person, in particular in the form of trafficking in persons, sexual exploitation or forced labor; and (2) raping a person of the female gender or, after she has been forcibly made pregnant, confining her unlawfully with the intent of affecting the ethnic composition of a population, forcing a person to tolerate a sexual act of comparable severity or forcing a person into prostitution or to be sterilized. Unofficial English translation available here.

Art. 182 provides for criminal penalties of imprisonment or a monetary penalty for any person who as a supplier, intermediary or customer engages in the trafficking of a human being for the purpose of sexual exploitation, exploitation of his or her labor or for the purpose of removing an organ. If the victim is a minor or if the offender acts for commercial gain, the penalty is imprisonment for not less than one year. In every case, a monetary penalty must also be imposed. The statute also provides that the soliciting of a person for these purposes is equivalent to trafficking, and that any person who commits the act abroad is also guilty of an offense. Unofficial English translation available here.

Article 66a provides that a foreign national shall be expelled from Switzerland for a period of five to 15 years if they are convicted of, among other things, female genital mutilation (Penal Code Art. 124, para. 1), forced marriage or forced registered partnership (Penal Code Art. 181a), trafficking in human beings (Penal Art. 182), sexual acts with children (Penal Code Art. 187, para. 1), sexual coercion (Art. 189), rape (Art. 190), sexual acts with persons incapable of judgement or resistance (Art. 191), encouraging prostitution (Art. 195), aggravated pornography (Art. 197, para. 4, second sentence – pornography containing genuine sexual acts with minors), genocide (Art. 264), crimes against humanity (Art. 264a), serious violations of the Geneva Convention of 1949 (Art. 264c), and other war crimes (Art. 264d and 264h). Unofficial English translation available here.

Division 270 of the Criminal Code Act prohibits slavery and slavery-like offenses. Section 170.1A defines these offenses and related terms including coercion, forced labor, and forced marriage. Section 270.2 specifies that slavery offenses are unlawful, whether committed inside or outside of Australia. Section 270.4 criminalizes servitude offenses, 270.6A criminalizes forced labor offenses, section 270.7B criminalizes forced marriage offenses, section 270.8 criminalizes slavery-like offenses, 271.2 criminalizes trafficking in persons, 271.4 criminalizes trafficking in children, and 271.5 criminalizes domestic trafficking in persons. Section 270.11 clarifies that for all above offenses it is not a defense that a person consented to or acquiesced to prohibited conduct.

The Sexual Offences Act recognizes in its preamble that women are particularly vulnerable to becoming victims of sexual offences, particularly adult prostitution. The Act prohibits prostitution, the operation of brothels, and other activities related to prostitution and brothel-keeping.

Seksuele Oortredings Wet (1998)

Seksuele teistering, Seksuele geweld en verkragting, Mensehandel​

Die Seksuele Oortredings Wet erken in die aanhef dat vrouens veral kwesbaar is om slagoffers te word vir seksuele misdrywe, veral volwassenes prostitusie. Die Wet verbied prostitusie, die bedryf van bordele, en ander aktiwiteite wat verband hou met prostitusie en bordeelhouding.

This law makes it a felony to knowingly engage in, or benefit from, knowing participation in recruiting, enticing, harboring, transporting, providing, or obtaining by any means another person, intending or knowing that the person will be subjected to forced labor in order to commit a commercial sexual activity. The statute also mandates the creation and composition of a council on human trafficking to provide victims services, analyze human trafficking in Rhode Island, conduct a public awareness campaign, coordinate training on human trafficking prevention and victim services for state and local employees. It creates an affirmative defense to prostitution charges for victims of human trafficking, enumerates aggravating factors, and outlines criminal procedure details.

The Italian Penal Code prohibits domestic violence (art. 572), female genital mutilation (art. 583), personal injury aggravated by permanent deformation or scarring of the face (art. 583 quinquies), harassment (art. 612 bis), the crime of illicit diffusion of sexually explicit images or videos without the consent of the persons represented (so-called revenge porn) (art. 612 ter). Punishable crimes against a person's freedom also include slavery and forced prostitution (art. 600), human trafficking (art. 601), sexual acts coerced through violence, threats, or abuse of authority (art. 609 bis) and group sexual assault (art. 609 octies). Sexual acts with a minor of 14 year old is always a crime (art. 609 quarter). Aggravating factors in sexual violence are: when the perpetrator is a relative, a parent or a guardian, when the sexual act is committed against a pregnant woman, when the victim is under 18 years old, and when the perpetrator uses a weapon (art. 609 ter). Sexual acts with a minor are not punishable when (1) both parties are minors, (2) the minor is at least 13 years old, and (3) the age difference between the two is no more than four years (art. 609 quater). Moreover, the Italian Penal Code prohibits the crime of coercion or induction into marriage (art. 558 bis) and the violation of the order for removal from the family home and of the prohibition to approach the places frequented by the victim (art. 387 bis). Finally, the Italian Penal Code prohibits crimes against pregnancy. In particular, under article 593-ter, anyone who causes the termination of a pregnancy without the woman’s consent shall be punished by imprisonment from four to eight years. Consent that is extorted by violence or threat, or that is obtained by deceit, shall be considered as not having been given. Aggravating factors in crimes against pregnancy include a woman under 18 years of age.

This law criminalizes the act of human trafficking and sets out minimum and maximum sentencing standards (up to 15 years) for its various permutations, such as in assisting or abetting such a crime. It also states that Indonesia will cooperate with regional and international authorities in order to thwart any actions relating to human trafficking and sexual exploitation.

Peraturan ini mengkriminalisasikan tindak pidana perdagangan orang dan menetapkan standar hukuman minimum dan maksimum (maksimal 15 tahun) untuk berbagai bentuknya, seperti dalam membantu dan bersengkongkol tindak pidana tersebut. Peraturan juga menyatakan bahwa Indonesia akan bekerja sama dengan otoritas regional dan internasional untuk menggagalkan setiap tindakan yang berkaitan dengan perdagangan manusia dan eksploitasi seksual.

The Ethiopian Criminal Code criminalizes most forms of violence against women and girls including physical violence within marriage or cohabitation (Article 564), Female Genital Mutilation/ Circumcision (Articles 565-6), trafficking women (Article 597), rape (Articles 620-28), prostitution/exploitation of another for financial gain (Article 634), and early marriage (Article 648). The Criminal Code outlaws abortion, except in cases of rape or incest, risk to the life of the mother or fetus, severe or incurable disease or birth defect, a mother who is mentally or physically incapable of raising a child, or “grave and imminent danger” that can only be addressed by terminating the pregnancy.

Art. 124: A person who seriously injures a female’s genitals can be sentenced to up to 10 years in prison or fined. A person may be punished for causing such injuries abroad if the person is not extradited.

Art. 181a: The statute provides that anyone who coerces someone to marry or register a same-sex partnership by the use of force or threats can be punished by sentence of custody of up to five years. The statute applies even if the marriage occurred outside Switzerland if the person has not been extradited.

Art. 187: A person can be punished by up to five years in custody or a fine for (1) committing a sexual act with a person under 16 years old, (2) inciting a child under 16 to commit a sexual act, or (3) involving a child under 16 in a sexual act.

Art. 190: A person can be sentenced to between 1 and 10 years in custody or a fine for using violence, threats, or psychological pressure to force a female to engage in a sexual act, or for making her incapable of resisting.

Art. 195: A person can be sentenced to 10 years in custody or fined for (1) inducing or encouraging a minor to engage in prostitution for financial gain, (2) inducing a person into prostitution by taking advantage of their dependency, (3) restricting a prostitute’s freedom to act by controlling his or her work as a prostitute, or (4) making a person continue as a prostitute against his or her will.

Art. 198: A person may be fined for offending someone by performing a sexual act in the presence of another who is not expecting it or sexually harassing someone through physical acts or indecent language.

The Penal Code (the “Code”) covers Japanese criminal law and sentencing. The relevant provisions with respect to gender justice issues in the Code are Rape, Gang Rape, Forcible Indecency, and Inducement to Promiscuous Intercourse. Rape was initially classified as a crime only involving female victims, but was amended to include men in 2017. The Code states that a person who commits one of more of the listed crimes shall be punished by imprisonment with work for life, or for a definite term corresponding to the gravity of a crime. Further, based on the “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime” adopted by the United Nations, the Code was amended in 2005 to include the crime of Human Trafficking. Under the amendment, selling or purchasing a human is a crime, with the criminal punishment being more severe in cases with the purpose of profit, indecency, or marriage.

刑法は、犯罪と刑罰を規定している法律である。刑法の中で、ジェンダー・ジャスティスに関連する条項は、強姦、集団強姦、強制わいせつ、淫乱性交誘引が含まれる。強姦は当初、女性の被害者のみを対象とした犯罪として分類されていたが、2017年に男性も対象とされるよう刑法が改正された。同法では、列挙された犯罪の1つ以上を犯した者は、終身刑または罪の重さに応じた有期懲役に処される。 さらに、国連の「国際的な組織犯罪の防止に関する国際連合条約を補足する人（特に女性及び児童）の取引を防止し、抑止し及び処罰するための議定書」に基づき、2005年に刑法が改正され、人身売買が追加された。本改正により、人身売買が犯罪となり、営利目的、わいせつ目的、結婚目的で人身売買した場合は刑事罰がさらに重くなる。

The intention behind the Rome Statute of 2002 (“Rome Statute” or “Statute”) in establishing the International Criminal Court (“ICC”) is to prosecute the most serious crimes of international concern and to end impunity. The Rome Statute is significant in being the first international criminal law instrument that recognises forms of sexual violence, such as rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, and enforced sterilization, as distinct war crimes. This legal instrument is also novel in prescribing gender-based crimes as the basis of war crimes or crimes against humanity committed during armed conflicts. In particular, the Statute gives the ICC jurisdiction over gender-based crimes if they constitute acts of genocide. In this case the crimes, such as rape, can be an integral part of the destruction inflicted upon the targeted groups and may be charged as genocide. The Prosecutor must further apply and interpret the Statute in line with internationally recognised human rights, including women’s human rights and gender equality. The States Parties should also consider the need to appoint judges with legal expertise on violence against women or children.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.

Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої ​​частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.

The defendant appealed from a lower court decision (Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Viseu) convicting him to nine years of imprisonment, for human trafficking and human trafficking of minors (persons under the age of 18 years old), with the intent of sexual exploitation. In his appeal, the defendant argued that the victim was living with him of her own free will and thus his actions did not fit the crime of human trafficking. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra partially granted the appeal to the extent the description of some facts was erroneous. With respect to the crimes committed, the Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, concluding that defendant had continued to commit the crime of human trafficking even after the victim turned 18 (the victim started to live with the defendant when she was a minor, ran away, then went back to living with defendant after turning 18 years old). All of the elements of the crime were present at all times in which the victim lived with defendant: physical and psychological threats, domestic work without remuneration, intent to sexually exploit the victim, and imposition of restrictions of the victim’s personal liberty. As for the crime of human trafficking, it is important to clarify that, as of 2007, there was a broadening of the criminal type, which is now considered a crime against personal freedom, similar to quasi-slavery.

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instancia pela Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Viseu, o qual o condenou a 9 anos de prisão, em razão dos crimes de tráfico de menor de 18 anos e de pessoas, com o intuito de exploração sexual. Em seu Recurso, o Defendente alegou que a vítima vivia com ele por vontade própria, de modo que o tipo penal de tráfico de pessoas não estava caracterizado. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra conheceu parcialmente do Recurso em razão da descrição equivocada de parte dos fatos trazidos nos autos. No tocante aos crimes cometidos, o Tribunal confirmou a decisão proferida em 1ª instância, concluindo que o Defendente continuou a cometer o crime de tráfico humano mesmo após a vítima ter completado 18 anos de idade. Nesse aspecto, ressalta-se que a vítima começou a viver com o Defendente quando ela era menor de idade, tendo fugido e retornado a viver com o Defendente após completar a maioridade. Ainda, o Tribunal concluiu que todos os elementos dos crimes estavam presentes durante a convivência entre o Defendente e a vítima: ameaça psicológica e física, realização de trabalhos domésticos não-remunerados, intenção de exploração sexual da vítima e imposição de restrições a liberdade pessoal da vítima. Importa, por fim, esclarecer que em 2007, houve um alargamento do crime de tráfico de pessoas, o qual passou a ser considerado crime contra a liberdade pessoal, semelhante a uma quase escravidão.

In this interpretation, the Taiwan Constitutional Court upheld a criminal penalty provision of the Child and Juvenile Sexual Transaction Prevention Act (subsequently amended and retitled as the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act, or “CYSEPA”) that provided for imprisonment and monetary fines for parties publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise spreading information that may by any means induce a person to engage in an unlawful sexual transaction. The Court cited its earlier precedents holding that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was not absolute and that lawmakers may impose restrictions through clear and unambiguous laws. With regard to the Constitution’s Article 23 proportionality principle, the Court addressed the broad scope of the criminal penalty provision, which did not require that the information in question specifically involve or result in underage sexual transactions or inducement of children or juveniles to engage in sexual transactions. The Court noted that children and juveniles are still in danger of becoming objects of sexual transactions because of the wide distribution of such information and, therefore, distribution of such information constitutes a crime. The Court held that the criminal penalty provision in question was a rational and necessary means of achieving the significant state interest of protecting children and juveniles from becoming objects of sexual transactions and therefore was consistent with the principle of proportionality. The Court nonetheless directed competent authorities to design a “classified management system” so that readers and viewers of such information “can be strictly differentiated in light of the technological developments so as to comply with the principle of proportionality.” The current version of this criminal penalty provision, as reflected in the CYSEPA, has a narrower scope and applies to “messages that are deemed to be sufficient to seduce, arrange, suggest, or cause a child or youth to be subjected” to sexual exploitation. English translation available here.

This was an appeal from convictions for violations of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995, which generally prohibits forced labor. The two appellants, a married couple, ran various brothels in Sydney where five Thai women were sex workers. Four of the Thai women, while still in Thailand, signed contracts agreeing to provide sexual services in Australia. The contracts obligated each of them to repay approximately AUD 45,000 before they could keep any of their earnings. Four of the five women paid the AUD 45,000, and then continued working at the brothels. There was no dispute that the women worked in the brothels; the dispute was whether they had been subjected to sexual servitude. Following a trial, the defendants were convicted of conducting a business involving sexual servitude and sentenced to five years’ and four years’ imprisonment, respectively. Both appealed their convictions on the basis that the verdicts were unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence, that the trial judge erroneously instructed the jury on the fault element of the offense, and that their sentences were excessive. The Court of Criminal Appeal affirmed the convictions.

The plaintiff (under the pseudonym ‘Jane Doe’) brought proceedings to enforce the judgement of a United States district court against her former employers, Mr. and Mrs. Howard. The claims against them included involuntary servitude, forced labour, and human trafficking. Mr. Howard did not contest the claim and had since died. Mrs. Howard disputed the claim but failed to comply with court orders, then moved to Victoria and participated no further in the proceedings. The U.S. district court had found that the plaintiff was raped, sexually abused, and forced to work 80 hours or more per week, and entered a default judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Howard in the amount of US $3,306,468. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that all criteria for enforcing the U.S. judgment were satisfied. The fact that the U.S. judgment was a default judgment that could theoretically be set aside did not prevent it from being “final and conclusive.” While Mrs. Howard argued that the default judgment was procured by fraud and should not be enforced in Victoria, the Supreme Court found that Mrs. Howard had “no reasonable prospect of establishing” her defences, and entered summary judgment against Mrs. Howard for the equivalent of US $3,306,468, plus interest.

In the prosecution of an international human trafficking ring, B.D., a nightclub owner, was charged with Facilitating Prostitution in violation of Article 201 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, for recruiting and organizing 16 Moldovan women for prostitution. His co-defendants B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were immigration officials charged with Abusing Official Position and Smuggling of Migrants in violation of Articles 339 and 138 of the Criminal Code, for enabling 35 illegal immigrants – mostly Moldovan women – to enter Kosovo, including by issuing fake identification documents to them, with the motive of obtaining unlawful material benefits for themselves. B.D. was found guilty by the District Court, while B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were acquitted. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the District Court based B.D.’s guilt exclusively on text messages sent to his mobile phone asking to make reservations to meet with various individuals identified only by nicknames. The challenged judgment did not clarify the identities of the persons behind the nicknames and did not assess whether they were indeed the alleged victims identified in the indictment. The lower court’s decision also made no reference to the statements of the alleged victims, particularly whether the statements corresponded to and corroborated the contents of the text messages. The court further held that the District Court’s judgment did not contain sufficient reasoning a proper assessment of the evidence regarding B.J., M.G., and S.Z’s alleged enabling of illegal immigration. The tribunal also faulted the lower court for failing to determine the complete facts, including the immigration registration system, movements of large sums in the defendants’ bank accounts, and transcripts of intercepted communications between the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court annulled the District Court’s verdict and remanded for retrial. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was convicted of trafficking in persons for the purpose of prostitution after the lower court found that he lured the victims from Hungary into Austria under the false pretext that they could work as cleaners in an Austrian Hotel and then threatened them with injury or death to force them to work as prostitutes. The Austrian Supreme Court upheld the conviction on appeal. The Regional Court of Vienna’s decision from May 25, 2011 [021 Hv 8/11i-48] was not available at the time of publication.

Der Beschwerdeführer wurde u.a. wegen grenzüberschreitenden Prostitutionshandels verurteilt. Das Landgericht Wien stellte fest, dass der Beschwerdeführer seine Opfer unter Vorspiegelung falscher Tatsachen von Ungarn nach Österreich gelockt hat, indem er ihnen versprach, eine Anstellung als Putzkraft in einem österreichischen Hotel zu erhalten. Nach Ankunft in Österreich hat er die Opfer mit Gewaltanwendung und sogar dem Tod gedroht und sie hierdurch zur Prostitution gezwungen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof hat die Verurteilung aufrechterhalten.

The defendant was convicted for the crimes of human trafficking and association to commit crimes on May 15, 2014 in the state of Nueva Esparta. In its decision, the lower court said that in cases of rape and trafficking of persons, anyone who has been accused of having a relationship or knowledge of such crime could be deprived of liberty during trial, if it is deemed appropriate by the authorities. In the defendant’s case, he was accused of seducing and luring the female victim into the island of Margarita, where she was subjected, tortured, drugged, and raped. The defendant appealed the decision, alleging that it violated his right to be judged in freedom. The Court of Appeal for Violence Against Women on January 8, 2016 dismissed the appeal action and ratified the decision of the lower court and determined that the apprehension of the accused before his conviction did not represent a violation of the law. The appellate court ratified the criteria of the lower court according to which those defendants who are linked to the act of people trafficking and gender violence can be arrested before issuing a conviction decision, if deemed appropriate by the authorities.

A federal grand jury convicted the defendant-appellant of child sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. A minor victim testified that she started dating the defendant when she was 17 years old but had told him and others that she was 19 years old. She insisted that the defendant was only living off her income as a prostitute and was not a pimp facilitating prostitution. However, the prosecution introduced videotaped statements in which the defendant repeatedly implored Doe to make money for him and threatened her when she failed to deliver the money. Following a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of two counts of sex trafficking of a minor. On appeal, the Second Circuit considered the construction of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(c), an evidentiary provision added by the William Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (“TVPRA”), which provides that “[i]n a prosecution . . . in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe [the victim], the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.” The Second Circuit affirmed the judgment of the district court, holding that this provision imposes strict liability with regard to the defendant’s awareness of the victim’s age and relieves the government’s usual burden to prove knowledge or reckless disregard of the victim’s underage status under § 1591(a). The Second Circuit rejected the defendant’s challenges to this provision as lacking merit and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The plaintiff-appellant, an Albanian citizen who entered the United States on a non-immigrant visa, fled her home country after facing three attempted kidnappings that she believed would have led her into forced prostitution. After escaping the third attempt, her uncle arranged for her to obtain a fake passport to enter the United States. After she applied for asylum with the Immigration and Nationalization Service, she was notified that she was subject to removal as an alien not in possession of valid entry documents. Both an immigration judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals denied her application for asylum. The Sixth Circuit affirmed these denials, finding that the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate that she was a member of a persecuted social group and unable to show that the Albanian government was unwilling or unable to protect her.

The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) filed charges of human trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors against the defendants, “B” and “C” (names omitted from public record). Evidence demonstrated that B and C would transport women and minors from Italy to Portugal and hold them against their will to work as prostitutes at adult entertainment facilities. The Lower Court found B and C guilty on charges of both human trafficking and sexual exploitation of minors, which constitute separate crimes under the Portuguese Penal Code. B appealed to the Appellate Court, arguing that she could not be sentenced twice for the same conduct. The Appellate Court affirmed the Lower Court’s decision, and held that the crimes of human trafficking and of sexual exploitation of minors violate different rights of the victims, which warrants the stacked sentences of both crimes as provided under Sections 160 and 175 of the Penal Code.

O Ministério Público apresentou acusações de tráfico humano e exploração sexual de menores contra os réus “B” e “C” (nomes omitidos do registro público). Provas demonstraram que B e C transportavam mulheres e menores de idade da Itália para Portugal e mantinham elas contra as suas vontades para trabalhar como prostitutas em locais de entretenimento adulto. O Tribunal da Relação considerou B e C culpados em ambas as acusações de tráfico humano e exploração sexual de menores, que constituem crimes separados sob o Código Penal Português. B apelou para o Tribunal da Relação, argumentando que ela não poderia ser sentenciada duas vezes pela mesma conduta. O Tribunal da Relação afirmou a decisão da Corte Inferior, e considerou que os crimes de tráfico humano e exploração sexual de menores violam diferentes direitos das vítimas, o que justifica as sentenças conjuntas de ambos os crimes como previsto pelas Seções 160 e 175 do Código Penal.

The defendant, X., procured women for the purpose of prostitution from a recruiter operating in Thailand. She deliberately chose women from poor and disadvantaged backgrounds because of their greater vulnerability and their perceived inability to resist demands made by X. On February 14, 2000, the Zurich District Court convicted X on charges relating to the promotion of prostitution of others under Article 195(3) of the Penal Code (Switzerland), but found the defendant not guilty in relation to trafficking in persons, assault, and other prostitution related offenses. Her conviction resulted in a sentence of two-and-a-half years of imprisonment and a fine of CHF 10,000. On January 24, 2001, the Zurich Court of Appeal, found X. guilty of multiple counts of trafficking in human beings (under Article 196 of the Criminal Code), promotion of prostitution (under Article 195(3) and (4) of the Criminal Code), and for offenses relating to bribery (Articles 288a and 305). X.’s prison sentence was increased to four and a half (4.5) years and the fine of CHF 10,000 was affirmed. X. appealed to the Supreme Federal Court for the annulment of the decision made by the Zurich Court of Appeal. The Supreme Federal Court confirmed the decision of the Zurich Court of Appeal, adding that any consent that may have been given by any of the trafficked women after they had been trafficked and were present in Switzerland would have been irrelevant.

In 2002, Nermin Ćupina (“Ćupina”) recruited two underage girls and one woman and forced them, through threats of violence to them and their family members, to provide sexual services for money. Each day, the victims were forced to earn KM 400 through prostitution, all of which Ćupina kept. The Court of BiH sentenced Ćupina to 12 years’ imprisonment, which it added to Ćupina’s four-year prison sentence from the Cantonal Court in Mostar, resulting in a single sentence of 14 years’ imprisonment after credit for time served. In addition, in accordance with Article 110 of the Criminal Code of BiH, the Court of BiH confiscated the material gain Ćupina acquired through his criminal enterprise. The court, relying on the findings of an expert, established that Ćupina made at least BAM 100,000 in 2002 by prostituting the victims. The court also concluded that because neither Ćupina nor his wife had regular income during 2002, the construction of an apartment valued at BAM 61,481.55 was financed entirely from Ćupina’s criminal enterprise. The Court of BiH confiscated the apartment and ordered Ćupina to pay the remainder of the estimated material gain, BAM 38,518.45.

Decision available in English here.

Between 2006 and 2007, Čedo Markelić recruited two minors for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Markelić promised the girls he would give them money and help them with school-related problems if they provided sexual services to him and his acquaintances. In May 2010, the Court of BiH found Markelić guilty of Trafficking in Persons (minors) in violation of Article 186(2) of the CC BiH and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment. The trial court, in determining whether Markelić had exploited the victims, took into consideration not only the girls’ age at the time of the crimes (15 and 16 years old), but also that, due to the victims’ “insufficient emotional development,” they did not have the capacity to consent to sexual acts. Furthermore, the court held that under Article 186(4) of the CC BiH, whether a victim of human trafficking “consents” to the exploitation is irrelevant, particularly if the victim is a minor. On appeal, Markelić argued that one of the three elements of human trafficking – the act of perpetration – was lacking in his case. Specifically, he argued Article 186(1) of the CC of BiH requires that a human trafficking recruiter must have effective contact with a third person who controls the victim, and that third person must give his or her consent to the exploitation of the victim. The Constitutional Court of BiH dismissed Markelić’s appeal, holding the Court of BiH correctly found all constituent elements of human trafficking under Article 186(2) were present. The Constitutional Court of BiH found Markelić had committed the offense of human trafficking by recruiting the minors for the purpose of sexual exploitation; contact with a third party who controlled the victims was not required under the CC BiH.

Decision available in English here.

In the summer of 1992, during an assault on the non-Serb civilian population of Foča in the early months of the Bosnian War, Radovan Stanković, a member of the Republika Srpska Army, established a small detention center for women at an apartment known as “The Brothel.” He and others brought at least nine non-Serb females, most of whom were minors, to the apartment and detained them there. Between August and November 1992, Stanković repeatedly raped one woman and her underage sister and incited other soldiers who visited the apartment to rape the detainees. In addition, Stanković forced the victims to perform physical labor, including cooking for the soldiers, washing the soldiers’ uniforms, and bathing the soldiers. In 2002, Stanković was arrested by the NATO peacekeeping force, KFOR, and transferred to the ICTY. The ICTY referred Stanković’s case to the Court of BiH in 2005. One year later, the Court of BiH convicted Stanković of Crimes against Humanity (enslavement, imprisonment, torture, and rape) under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH and sentenced him to sixteen years imprisonment. In 2007, a panel of the Appeals Division increased the prison term to twenty years. Stanković appealed his sentence, which the ICTY and The Hague Court of Appeal upheld. This case is notable because it was the first time the ICTY referred a case to a court of national jurisdiction.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

From the spring of 1992 to the autumn of 1993, during the Bosnian War, Predrag Kujundžić, a commander in the local military and later police force, led several attacks against non-Serb civilians in Doboj. During that time, he incited, aided, and abetted the murder, rape, imprisonment, and persecution of non-Serb civilians. In addition, from June to December 1992, Kujundžić forced a Muslim minor into sexual slavery by use of force and threats to kill the victim’s mother and younger sister. Kujundžić repeatedly raped the victim, forced her to have sexual intercourse with soldiers, and controlled every aspect of her life. In 2009, the Court of BiH found Kujundžić guilty of Crimes against Humanity under Article 172(1) of the Criminal Code of BiH. The Court found several aggravating circumstances present in Kujundžić’s case, including Kujundžić’s status as a commander, the motives for the attack, the large number of victims, and the fact that the victim of rape and sexual slavery was a minor. The Court accordingly sentenced Kujundžić to 22 years imprisonment. A panel of the Appellate Division later reduced his prison sentence to 17 years.

Second instance verdict available in English here.

The appellant was convicted in a regional magistrates' court of one count of human trafficking, three counts of rape, one count of assault with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, and one count of common assault against a 14-year-old schoolgirl, whom he had married in accordance with customary marriage laws. After she ran away from the appellant, the appellant took the complainant to Cape Town by taxi, where they resided with the appellant's brother and his wife. There, the incidents of rape and assault occurred. The appellant raised as one of his defenses and as a ground of appeal that the alleged rapes took place in the context of a customary arranged marriage, or ukuthwala. According to expert evidence, ukuthwala was an irregular form of initiating a customary marriage. Experts have stated that, in its traditional form, ukuthwala was consensual and innocuous, but there existed an 'aberrant' form in which young girls were abducted and often raped and beaten to force them into marriage. The magistrate held that the matter was not about ukuthwala and its place in our constitutional democracy, but about whether the state had shown that the accused had committed the offences he was charged with and, if so, whether he acted with the knowledge of wrongfulness and the required intent. The court held that child-trafficking and any form of abuse or exploitation of minors for sexual purposes is not tolerated in South Africa’s constitutional dispensation. Furthermore, it ruled that the appellant could not rely on traditional ukuthwala as justification for his conduct because practices associated with an aberrant form of ukuthwala could not secure protection under the law. Thus, the Court could not find that he did not traffic the complainant for sexual purposes or that he had committed the rapes without the required intention ̶ even on the rather precarious grounds of appellant’s assertion that his belief in the aberrant form of ukuthwala constituted a 'traditional' custom of his community.

Die appêlant is skuldig bevind in 'n streek magistraat hof op een geval van mensehandel, drie gevalle van verkragting, een geval van aanranding met die opset om ernstige liggaamlike skade te berokken en een geval van algemene aanranding teen ’n 14 jarige skoolmeisie met wie hy getroud is volgens die gebruiklike huwelikswette. Nadat sy weggehardloop het van die appèllant, het die appèllant die klaer per taxi na Kaapstad geneem waar hulle by die broer van die appellant en sy vrou gewoon het. Daar het die voorval van verkragting en aanranding gebeur. Die appèllant het as verdediging en op gronde van ’n appel beweer dat die sogenaamde verkragting plaas gevind het binne konteks van ’n gebruiklike gerëelde huwelik of ‘ ukuthwala’. Volgens kundige getuienis was ukuthwala ’n onreëlmatige vorm om ’n gebruilike huwelik te begin. Kenners meen dat ukuthwala in sy traditionele vorm, konsensueel en onskuldig was maar dat daar ’n afwykende vorm bestaan waarin jong meisies ontvoer en dikwels verkrag en geslaan is om hulle tot die huwelik te dwing. Die landdros het gesê dat die aangeleedheid nie oor ukuthwala en die plek daarvan in ons grondwettige demokratse gaan nie maar wel of die staat bewys het dat die beskuldigde die misdrywe gepleeg het waarvoor hy aangekla is en indien wel, of hy opgetree het met die wete van onregmatigheid en die vereiste opset(intent). Die hof het beslis dat mensenhandel of uitbuiting van minderjariges vir seksuele doeleindes nie geduld word in Suid-Afrika se gondwetlike bedeling nie. Verder het dit beslis dat die appèllant nie op die tradisionele ukuthwala kon staatmaak as regsverdediging vir sy optrede nie omdat prakyke wat verband hou met ’n afwykende vorm van ukuthwala nie beskerming onder die wet verkry nie. Die Hof kon dus nie bevind dat hy die klaer nie vir mensenhandel met seksuele doeleindes gebruik het nie en dat hy die verkragtings sonder die verwagte intensie gepleeg het nie - selfs op die taamlike onveilige gronde van die bewering van die appellant dat sy geloof in die afwykende vorm van ukuthwala, ’n tradisionele gewoonte in sy gemeenskap is.

“HUMAN TRAFFICKING. IF A VICTIM OF THIS CRIME, IN ONE OF THE FIRST STATEMENTS, MAKES AN ALLEGATION AGAINST THE DEFENDANT, INCLUDING A NARRATIVE OF THE FACTS, AND SUCH STATEMENT IS CORROBORATED BY FURTHER EVIDENCE, SUCH EVIDENCE SHOULD BE REGARDED AS ACCURATE EVEN IF THE VICTIM SUBSEQUENTLY RETRACTS THE ALLEGATIONS.”

This isolated thesis is a relevant example of gender perspective case law, as the criteria issued by the collegiate tribunal is binding on such tribunal. In addition, such criteria may also be persuasive in similar cases arising in other federal courts. In this case, the federal court determined that it is a well-known fact that Mexican society discriminates against sex workers. In light of the stigma that sex workers carry, they are subject to continuous pressure from different societal actors, including their nuclear family, to refrain from providing statements or to withdraw initial statements regarding crimes committed against them. The collegiate tribunal held that when a sex-worker case comes before a court, the court must consider a gender perspective in its ruling. As a result, courts must use all available mechanisms in order to obtain irrefutable proof from the victim. The tribunal based its ruling on Article 2(c) and (d) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW): “(c) to establish legal protection of the rights of women on an equal basis with men and to ensure through competent national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against any act of discrimination; (d) to refrain from engaging in any act or practice of discrimination against women and to ensure that public authorities and institutions shall act in conformity with this obligation.”

“LA TRATA DE PERSONAS. SI UNA VÍCTIMA DE ESTE CRIMEN, EN UNA DE LAS PRIMERAS DECLARACIONES, HACE UNA ALLEGACIÓN CONTRA EL DEFENDIENTE, INCLUYENDO UNA NARRATIVA DE LOS HECHOS, Y DICHA DECLARACIÓN ES SUSTENTADA CON EVIDENCIA DICHA EVIDENCIA SE MANTENDRA COMO VALIDA INCLUSO SI LA VICTIMA RECANTA SU TESTIMONIO."

Esta tesis aislada es un ejemplo relevante de la jurisprudencia de la perspectiva de género, ya que los criterios emitidos por el tribunal colegiado son vinculantes para dicho tribunal. Además, dichos criterios también pueden ser persuasivos en casos similares que surjan en otros tribunales federales. En este caso, el tribunal federal determinó que es un hecho bien conocido que la sociedad mexicana discrimina a las trabajadoras en base a su sexo. En vista del estigma que las trabajadoras sexuales ejercen, están sujetos a la presión continua de diferentes actores sociales, incluida su familia nuclear, para que se abstengan de emitir declaraciones o de retirar declaraciones iniciales sobre los delitos cometidos contra ellas. El tribunal colegiado sostuvo que cuando un caso de trabajadora sexual se presenta ante un tribunal, el tribunal debe considerar una perspectiva de género en su decisión. Como resultado, los tribunales deben usar todos los mecanismos disponibles para obtener pruebas irrefutables de la víctima. El tribunal basó su decisión en el Artículo 2 (c) y (d) de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW): “(c) establecer la protección legal de los derechos de las mujeres en igualdad de condiciones con los hombres y asegurar a través de los tribunales nacionales competentes y otras instituciones públicas la protección efectiva de las mujeres contra cualquier acto de discriminación; (d) abstenerse de participar en cualquier acto o práctica de discriminación contra las mujeres y garantizar que las autoridades e instituciones públicas actúen de conformidad con esta obligación."

Defendant X was condemned under Article 433quinquies and 733septies of the Penal Code for human trafficking with the aim of exploiting three women by prostitution. The fact that the women may have given their consent, and came to Belgium for the specific purpose of prostituting themselves, was considered irrelevant. The Court of Appeal further considered irrelevant the possibility that the women in question had been active in prostitution before. The key test is whether there has been exploitation, and that this is the case when direct or indirect benefit is derived by the exploiter from the income generated by the prostitution, and this becomes the exploiter’s main source of income, regardless of whether the exploiter lives with, or is married to, the prostitute.

On February 23, 2016, 19 women were arrested by police and jointly charged “for the offence of living on the earnings of prostitution” in violation of § 146 of the Penal Code of Malawi (the “Penal Code”) ( ¶ 1.1). A Fourth Grade Magistrate in Dedza convicted them “on their own plea of guilt” and fined them MK 7,000.00 each (¶ 1.2). The police lacked evidence to prove the charge against them. In addition, the women did not have legal representation during the proceedings, including when their guilty plea was recorded. The women challenged the conviction on July 28, 2016 on numerous grounds including (i) that the Fourth Grade Magistrate did not have jurisdiction, (ii) that the women were charged together when they should have been charged separately, (iii) that the High Court should not have accepted a unanimous plea, (iv) that “the charge was wrong in law as living on the earnings of prostitution does not target the sex worker herself” but those who live parasitically and exploitatively off her earnings, and (v) that the plea of guilty should not be accepted because the court did not comply with mandatory procedures regarding the defendants’ knowledge. The High Court found that the Fourth Grade Magistrate did not have jurisdiction to hear the case. In addition, the Court held that the arrest of the women was unconstitutional and not based on evidence. Citing the legislative history of the offense, the Court clarified that § 146 of the Penal Code did not criminalize sex work but was mainly intended to protect sex workers from those who would exploit them. The High Court held that even though sex workers may be arrested in circumstances under this section, the arrest must be properly supported by evidence. Consequently, the High Court vacated the convictions and ordered that fines be repaid to the women.

The accused was charged with human trafficking and aggravated child trafficking for transporting minor girls, who were promised supermarket jobs in Uganda, from Rwanda to Uganda for the purposes of forced unpaid household labor and prostitution. The accused pleaded not guilty and maintained that she transported the girls to Uganda with their parents’ permission for a holiday. The Court found her guilty of the charges related to two of the girls, but found that one of the girls was over the age of majority (19 years old). The Court sentenced the accused to two concurrent terms of imprisonment: eight years for aggravated child trafficking and five years for trafficking in persons.

The Defendant was running a massage parlor that had hidden rooms with beds where a young female employee massaged the whole body of a male customer. The female employee, usually wearing a short skirt and a short-sleeved tee, would undress the male customer, grab his sexual organ with her hands with lotion on, touch the body part just like engaging in a sexual intercourse, and ultimately let him ejaculate. The issue was whether the act of the female employee in the Defendant’s parlor could be considered as "acts that are similar to sexual intercourse" under Article 2 (1) 1 sub paragraph Na of the Act on the Punishment of Acts of Arranging Sexual Traffic. The Act, which aimed to eradicate prostitution and protect the human rights of the victims of prostitution, did not distinguish “sexual intercourse” from “acts that are similar to sexual intercourse”. The Supreme Court interpreted "acts that are similar to sexual intercourse" as stipulated in the above Act to refer to acts of penetrating the body through the mouth or the anus, or at least acts for gaining sexual satisfaction similar to sexual intercourse. Then the Court went through a comprehensive evaluation of the circumstances, including the place where such act was conducted, the clothes the people were wearing, the body parts that were touched, the specific content of the act, and the degree of the resulting sexual satisfaction to decide whether the female employee’s act could be considered as “acts that are similar to sexual intercourse”. The Supreme Court held that the female employee’s act could be deemed as an act of bodily contact for gaining sexual satisfaction similar to sexual intercourse, and therefore dismissed the appeal by the Defendant.

The applicant, a Nigerian-born woman, was granted refugee status based on the absence of protection for violence against women generally in Nigeria, as well as her specific experience with gender-based violence. In 2010, the applicant was, without her consent, taken to Libya where she was subject to forced prostitution and violent attacks that included removal of applicant’s nails and hair. The applicant was then transferred to Italy where she applied to the Territorial Commission for international protection. Her application was denied and she appealed to the Tribunal of Cagliari to overturn the Territorial Commission’s decision. The Tribunal of Cagliari found that the applicant’s subjective credibility should have been considered, along with the objective facts available regarding the dire situation for women in Nigeria, and that the Territorial Commission’s findings were invalid because her application for international protection was not translated to a language that she was able to understand.

La ricorrente, nata in Nigeria, ottenne lo status di rifugiato sulla base dell’assenza di protezione per la violenza contro le donne in Nigeria, nonché della propria esperienza con la violenza di genere. In particolare, nel 2010, la ricorrente è stata, senza il suo consenso, portata in Libia, dove è stata soggetta a prostituzione forzata e ad abusi violenti che comprendevano la rimozione di unghie e capelli. La ricorrente è stata quindi trasferita in Italia dove ha richiesto alla Commissione Territoriale la protezione internazionale. La sua domanda venne respinta e quindi presentava ricorso al Tribunale di Cagliari per ribaltare la decisione della Commissione Territoriale. Il Tribunale di Cagliari ha ritenuto che si dovesse prendere in considerazione la credibilità soggettiva della ricorrente, unitamente ai dati oggettivi disponibili in merito alla terribile situazione delle donne in Nigeria, e che le conclusioni della Commissione Territoriale non erano valide perché la domanda di protezione internazionale non era stata tradotta in una lingua che la ricorrente era in grado di comprendere.

DFT, or Detained Fast Track, involves the placement of asylum seekers in detention while the outcome of their claim is determined. The claimants identified numerous issues in the DFT system with respect to female asylum-seekers and asserted that “the [DFT] system as operated created an unacceptable risk of unfairness for asylum seekers” and especially for vulnerable populations. These populations include pregnant women and trafficked women, who may find the detention period traumatic and who are likely to present complex cases. The Court held “that the DFT as operated carries with it too high a risk of unfair determinations for those that may be vulnerable applicants,” but emphasized that detention periods in and of themselves are not unlawful.

The defendant Lan Shushan was charged of the crime of trafficking women and children for trafficking one woman and 34 children. Throughout 1988 to 2008, the defendant Lan Shushan independently and with his colleagues Tan Ruxi etc trafficked one woman and 34 children to Fujian Province, and traded them for money with the help of accomplice Lin Chuanxi, Su Ermei etc. Lan Shushan benefited approximately RMB 500,000 from the transactions. According to Article 240 section 1 & 2, the ring leader of a large scale trafficking shall be sentenced to death penalty. Thereby, Lan was convicted and sentenced to death by the Appellate Court of Hechi City. Lan appealed to the Supreme Court of Guangxi Province and the judgment is affirmed. The Supreme People’s Court of PRC reaffirmed decision and approved Lan’s death.

人口拐卖

被告蓝树山因拐卖一名妇女和三十四名儿童被控拐卖妇女、儿童罪。1988年至2008年，被告蓝树山单独并伙同同案犯谭汝喜等人拐卖了一名妇女和三十四名儿童至福建省，并在同案犯林传溪、苏二妹的帮助下将这些妇女儿童出卖。蓝树山因此共非法获利约五十万元人民币。根据刑法第三百五十条，在共同犯罪中，蓝树山系地位作用最突出、罪责最严重大型拐卖人口活动的主犯，应依法判处死刑。河池市中级人民法院认定蓝树山犯拐卖妇女、儿童罪，并判处死刑。蓝树山上诉至广西省高级人民法院，法院维持原判。中国最高人民法院维持原判并核准死刑。

The defendant paid his friend to bring the victim, a 14-year-old child, to defendant’s café under the pretext of attending a birthday party. After defendant’s friend abandoned the victim at the café, the defendant told the victim to work as a server but also forced her to have sex with the male clients and kept all payments received for the victim’s services. Because the defendant used fraud to bring the victim to the café and exploited the victim by forcing her to act as a sex worker for profit, the Court of First Instance found the defendant guilty of human trafficking under section 2(1) of Law No. 21 of 2007 and sentenced the defendant to 10 years imprisonment with a fine of Rp. 120,000,000. The High Court upheld the lower court’s decision but amended the defendant’s sentence to seven years imprisonment. On appeal, the defendant argued that the High Court’s sentence of seven years was an error since the court did not consider that the victim had stayed with the defendant’s friend before coming to the café and therefore the health and condition of the victim may have worsened before coming to the defendant. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High Court and did not rule on the sentencing since it was a “judex facti matter (question of fact of the case)”.

Afolabi was convicted in district court on twenty two counts relating to her participation in a visa fraud and human trafficking scheme. From October 2002 through September 2007, Afolabi and her family trafficked over twenty West African girls into the U.S. and forced them into unpaid labor. At trial, the prosecution introduced evidence of the physical, psychological, and sexual abuse the girls endured at the hands of Afolabi and her family in the U.S. and Togo. Specifically, the prosecution used evidence of abuse in Togo to establish the involuntary nature of the girls’ servitude. On appeal, Affolabi claimed the court erred in admitting evidence of acts occurring prior to the indictment period. The Third Circuit Court of Appeals held that the evidence was properly introduced because the evidence of prior bad acts in Togo met the requirements of Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b). The Court held that the evidence had a proper evidentiary purpose because it served to illustrate a plan or scheme to coerce the girls into servitude in the U.S. The Court further held that such evidence was relevant because it could contribute to the jury’s determination of the girls’ inability to leave. Additionally, the Court found that any potential prejudice resulting from the Togo evidence did not substantially outweigh its probative value especially in light of the limiting instruction provided by the trial judge.

Ming Yan Zheng and her husband Chang Da Liu opened a brothel in Saipan, the capital of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (“CMNI”). They recruited employees in China by advertising for positions as waitresses, nightclub performers and service workers. The materials promised wages of between $3,000 and $4,000 and required applicants to pay a $6,000 processing fee. Upon their arrival to CMNI, the employees were forced into prostitution. Six of the victims reported the situation to the FBI which resulted in Zheng and Liu’s convictions for conspiracy, sex trafficking, foreign transportation for prostitution and transportation of persons in execution of fraud. On appeal, Zheng challenged her conviction on several grounds, inter alia, that the court lacked jurisdiction to prosecute her. Zheng argued that the Federal Government lacked authority to prosecute her because Section 501 of the Covenant to Establish a Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the United States of America (“the Covenant”) limited the application of the criminal statutes under which she was convicted in the CMNI. According to Zheng, Section 501provides an exhaustive list of the provisions of the U.S. Constitution which apply to the CMNI. As such, she could not be prosecuted under the criminal statutes used to prosecute her because they were enacted under the commerce clause and that territorial clause, which provisions are not listed in Section 501 of the Covenant. The Court found Zheng’s argument to be lacking because Section 501 sets forth the Constitutional provisions which apply in the CNMI as if it were a state. By contrast, the commerce clause and the territorial clause apply to Congress and regulate its ability to enact legislation applicable to the CMNI. As such, the Court held that Congress had authority to legislate over the CMNI, and that the court had jurisdiction over Zheng. The Court pointed out that although Congress has authority to legislate over the CMNI, the Covenant does limit Congress’s powers with respect to legislation enacted after the Covenant’s effective date. For such legislation, the Court must balance the federal interest served by the legislation against the degree of intrusion into the CMNI’s local affairs. However, the Court found that the federal interest in combating international sex trafficking through the U.S. territories outweighs the intrusion into the CMNI’s local affairs.

Defendant James Mozie ran prostitution ring from his house, commonly known as the Boom Boom Room by his customers. Mozie recruited vulnerable teenage girls by posing as a modeling agent, luring them to the Boom Boom Room, and forcing them to have sex with him and his customers. In 2011, law enforcement agents raided the Boom Boom Room and Mozie was subsequently charged with one count of conspiring to commit child sex trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1594(c), eight counts of child trafficking in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) and one count of producing child pornography in vilation of 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). The jury convicted Mozie of all ten counts and he was sentenced to the guideline-recommended sentence of life imprisonment. On appeal, Mozie claimed his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a) violated the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. Mozie argued that the statute is facially unconstitutional because it allows the government to obtain a conviction without proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew his victim was a minor. The Court held that the statute is not unconstitutional because it requires the Government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the victim. If such element is proven, then the Government need only prove that the defendant recklessly disregarded that victims age. The Court explained that the Due Process clause does not prevent Congress from criminalizing reckless conduct, especially in the context of statutory rape and other measures to protect young children from sexual exploitation. Additionally, Mozie contended that his conviction should be reversed because his indictment was constructively amended by the district court. Mozie’s indictment alleged conjunctively that he knew and recklessly disregarded his victims’ age. The district court, however, instructed the jury that they could convict Mozie “if they found he either knew his victims were minor or recklessly disregarded the fact that they were minors.” The Court held that there was no constructive amendment of the indictment because when an indictment charges in the conjunctive, the jury instructions may properly be framed in the disjunctive.

Cheng Kwong-Chung was charged with four offenses. Wong Lai-Ming was charged with two offenses. Cheng’s first and third charges alleged conspiracy to possess a false instrument, contrary to section 75(1) and section 159A of the Crimes Ordinance, Cap. 200. Count 1 alleged that Cheng conspired with other defendants to possess a false passport, which he knew was false. Cheng and Wong also allegedly conspired to provide Lu Quifeng to enable her to possess a false US passport with knowledge that it was false. Several other fraud charges were brought. The prosecution alleged that Lu and another defendant were to be smuggled from Hong Kong to the US. Neither Cheng nor Wong presented any evidence at trial. Cheng appealed, arguing that the verdicts were unsatisfactory and against the great weight of the evidence. The Court held that there was “an abundance of evidence on which to convict” of both conspiracies in counts one and four, citing evidence adduced and presented at trial. Cheng also argued that there was insufficient evidence for the trial court judge to find that the instrument that was the subject of charge one was false. The Court also held that the trial court judge’s conclusion that whatever passport Cheng held must have been false was not erroneous. Cheng’s appeal was dismissed. Wong also appealed, arguing that the trial judge had insufficient evidence upon which to find that it was in fact Wong who committed the crime. The Court held that there was no ground upon which to disturb the trial judge’s conviction. The evidence against Wong included standard procedures from airline employee’s standard procedure of matching passports against the person who presents it and the fact that Wong never reported her passport lost or stolen. Cheng and Lu appealed their sentences as manifestly excessive because their offenses were part of one course of conduct. The Court held that the course of conduct was sophisticated and, further, stated, “We take the view that offences such as these are very serious. They involve the exploitation of persons on the Mainland, for substantial sums, exploitation which is no doubt financially crippling to the emigrant and his or her family and which puts the emigrant at continuing risk. Beyond that and importantly, the offences deliberately seek not only to undermine Hong Kong’s laws but also the immigration laws of other jurisdictions and to enable persons to travel on aircraft when they are not authorized to do so. It hardly needs to be emphasized that conduct of this kind is to be treated by our courts with a firm hand, not least when air security and international immigration controls carry an importance greater than ever before.”

The female defendant was charged with trafficking in person for the purpose of sexual exploitation. The defendant used an employment agency in Peru to offer Peruvian women waitress jobs at her residence in Chile. She would assist them in crossing the border and would pay travel costs. Upon arrival, the victims were kept at the defendant’s residence and were forced to provide sexual services to clients arranged by the defendant. The defendant also kept the victims’ passports so that they would be unable to leave until their debts were paid. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to six months of imprisonment.

Al acusado se le inculpó de trata de personas con fines de explotación sexual. El acusado utilizó una agencia de empleo en Perú para ofrecer trabajos de meseras peruanas en su residencia en Chile, prometiendo que los ayudaría a cruzar la frontera y pagaría los gastos de viaje. A su llegada, las víctimas fueron mantenidas en la residencia del acusado y fueron obligadas a proporcionar servicios sexuales a los clientes organizados por el acusado. El acusado también se quedó con los pasaportes de las víctimas para que no pudieran salir hasta que se pagaran sus deudas. El acusado fue declarado culpable y condenado a seis meses de prisión.

Children’s’ rights, child labor, forced labor, human trafficking, sexual abuse. Bachpan Bachao Andolan, a non-governmental organization in India submitted a petition to the Supreme Court of India to take action against the use of child performers in India’s traveling circuses. A study found that children were being trafficked from Nepal or taken from their homes, exploited as child laborers in these circuses, and subjected to mental, physical, and sexual abuse. In recognition that this practice was in violation of child labor laws and regulations on a child’s right to an education, among other national and international statutes, the Supreme Court gave an order to prohibit the employment of children in circuses, raid circuses to free children, and establish rehabilitation schemes for the child victims. This case is an important victory for children’s rights in India, where parents often sell their children to work at a young age, and also displays the willingness of the Supreme Court of India to hear petitions from NGOs, offering an important avenue for human rights reform.

The defendant was charged with trafficking in persons. He was accused of recruiting Peruvian women to come to Chile, where they then were engaged in prostitution. The defendant used an employment agency in Peru to recruit the women, who signed labor contracts to serve as waitresses in the defendant’s premises. The women victims were forced to wear provocative clothing and drink alcohol with the premises’ clients. There also was prostitution at the premises. The defendant was found guilty and sentenced to six years in prison.

Al acusado se le inculpó de trata de personas. Fue acusado de reclutar mujeres peruanas para venir a Chile, donde luego las forzaba a dedicarse a la prostitución. El acusado utilizó una agencia de empleo en Perú para contratar a las mujeres, quienes firmaron contratos laborales para servir como camareras en las instalaciones del acusado. Las mujeres víctimas fueron obligadas a llevar ropa provocativa y beber alcohol con los clientes del local. También hubo prostitución en el local. El acusado fue declarado culpable y condenado a seis años de prisión.

Ms. Streanga is a citizen of Romania who was smuggled to Canada by a sex trafficking ring. After escaping from her traffickers, Ms. Streanga submitted an application for protection. Her application was denied, the deciding officer concluding that since the Romanian government had “taken serious measures” to punish those responsible for trafficking, state protection would be available to Ms. Streanga upon her return. Ms. Streanga made a motion for an order staying her removal until such time as her Application for Leave and for Judicial Review of her application could be decided. On hearing the motion, the judge found that the public pronouncements and public awareness cited by the officer, as well as services for women who have already been victimized, did not amount to state protection. The judge also found that Ms. Streanga would likely suffer irreparable harm if deported to Romania. Further, the judge found reviewable error in that the officer had applied the wrong legal test to determine state protection, and that in light of the evidence of the serious inadequacies of the Romanian police in combating and preventing human trafficking, the officer’s standard of review was flawed. The court granted the stay of removal until the deposition of the leave application, and provided that if leave was granted, the stay would remain until such time as the application for judicial review could be disposed of by the Court.

O, a Nigerian national and apparently only 17 years old, appealed against a conviction for the offence of possessing a false identity document. One of the submissions on her behalf, supported by a senior outreach worker for The Poppy Project, was that she had been the victim of trafficking for sexual exploitation and used the false identity document in an attempt to escape. The Court of Appeal granted her appeal, stating that it regretted that neither the prosecution nor the defense had considered her age or the possibility that she might have been a victim of sex trafficking at first instance. It was unlawful to impose a prison sentence as such on a person aged 17. Further, the Court of Appeal noted that common law and article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights alike require far higher standards of procedural protection than were given to O at first instance. The Court of Appeal expressed the hope that the case would drive home the message that proper inquiries need to be made where there is doubt about the age of a Defendant who is a possible victim of trafficking.

In an application under Article 102 of the Constitution, the Bangladesh National Women's Lawyers Association (BNWLA) petitioned the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court Division) to address the exploitation and abuse endured by child domestic laborers in Bangladesh. The BNWLA argued that child domestic workers are subjected to economic exploitation, physical and emotional abuse, and the deprival of an education in violation of their fundamental constitutional rights. In support of these arguments, it presented multiple reports of extreme abuse suffered by child domestic workers. In deciding this case, the Court reviewed the current laws in Bangladesh, including the Labour Act, 2006, which fails to extend labor protections to "domestic workers," including children, and lacks an effective implementation and enforcement system. The Court directed the government of Bangladesh to take immediate steps to increase its protection of the fundamental rights of child domestic workers including prohibiting children under the age of 12 from working in any capacity including domestic settings; supporting the education of adolescents; implementing the National Elimination of Child Labour Policy 2010 and applying the Labour Act, 2006 to domestic workers. Additionally, the Court directed the government to monitor and prosecute incidents of violence against child domestic workers, maintain a registry of domestic workers and their whereabouts to combat trafficking, promulgate mandatory health check-ups and strengthen the legal framework relating to child domestic workers.

E.V. Gavrilov and his associates ran a brothel. He offered a well-paid job in a night club in Moscow to three girls, who, to the best knowledge of Gavrilov, were minors. Later he and other associate bought tickets for the girls and carried them to Moscow. On the way to Moscow the girls asked several times whether the job was related to prostitution, but Gavrilov always said that it was not. Upon arrival, the victims were moved to a private apartment. There they were threatened by Gavrilov and forced to engage in prostitution. Gavrilov organized the brothel, and his associates carried girls to clients and guarded them. Gavrilov pled not guilty, claiming that he did not use violence against the victims and did not run a brothel. The Moscow district court of Chuvashia found Gavrilov guilty of the following crimes: involvement in and enforcement to prostitution connected with use of force or threat of using force performed by a group of individuals by previous concert with knowledge that victims were minors. The court of the City of Moscow confirmed the decision of the court of first instance.

Plaintiff Jane Doe (“Doe”) filed a lawsuit under a pseudonym and alleged 23 causes of action including human trafficking, sexual battery, forced labor and involuntary servitude against Defendants Mr. and Mrs. Penzato. Mrs. Penzato had offered Doe $1,500 per month, free room and board, and transportation to the United States in exchange for child care and housekeeping services. Doe accepted the offer and moved to San Francisco, California. Doe alleged that during her employment Defendants physically assaulted her, sexually molested her, threatened her with cancellation of her visa, and abused or exploited her in various other ways. She eventually left the Penzatos’ household and moved to a transitional housing residence for female victims of violence. Doe filed a motion for a protective order and requested permission to proceed with the lawsuit under a pseudonym. Doe argued that this was necessary to avoid additional psychological trauma due to the sensitive and personal nature of her claims. Further, she argued that the use of a pseudonym would help maintain the safety and anonymity of her fellow transitional housing residents. Defendants argued that because they were publically accused of sexual abuse, human trafficking, and forced labor, Doe should also be publicly exposed. Defendants also argued that they would be prejudiced by the extra effort they would have to take to keep her identity a secret. The court granted Doe’s motion and allowed her to proceed under a pseudonym, holding that Doe’s need to remain anonymous outweighed Defendants’ arguments and the public’s interest in knowing her identity. The court noted the strong interest in protecting sexual assault victims’ identities—to encourage them to report the assaults without fear of being stigmatized as a sexual assault victim.

Defendants were convicted in a Paraguayan trial court for mistreatment of persons, in violation of Article 129 of the Penal Code, for deceiving several women into thinking that the defendants had found them jobs as grocery store cashiers in Spain, and then trying to force the women to work at a brothel upon arrival in Spain. The Appellate Court reversed the conviction, saying the trial court lacked jurisdiction because in a case where a crime begins in one jurisdiction and is completed in another, the latter jurisdiction, in this case Spain, should hear the case. The Supreme Court, Penal division, disagreed with the appellate court, holding that the trial court did have jurisdiction, and further held that the conviction was consistent with Article 6 of the American Convention on Human Rights (“Pact of San Jose”), Article 8 of the International Pact of Civil and Political Rights, Articles 2 and 3 of the Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and Eradication of Violence Against Women, and Articles 3 and 5 of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children.

Los acusados​​fueron condenados en un tribunal de primera instancia paraguayo por maltrato de personas, en violación del artículo 129 del Código Penal, por engañar a varias mujeres haciéndoles creer que los acusados ​​les habían encontrado trabajo como cajeras de abarrotes en España, y luego intentar forzarlas a trabajar en un burdel al llegar a España. El Tribunal de Apelación revocó la condena, diciendo que el tribunal de primera instancia carecía de competencia porque en un caso en el que un delito comienza en una jurisdicción y se completa en otra, esta última jurisdicción, en este caso España, debería escuchar el caso. La Corte Suprema, División Penal, no estuvo de acuerdo con la corte de apelaciones, sosteniendo que el tribunal de primera instancia sí tenía jurisdicción, y además sostuvo que la condena era consistente con el Artículo 6 de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos (“Pacto de San José”), Artículo 8 del Pacto Internacional de Derechos Civiles y Políticos, Artículos 2 y 3 de la Convención Interamericana para Prevenir, Sancionar y Erradicar la Violencia contra la Mujer y Artículos 3 y 5 del Protocolo para Prevenir, Reprimir y Sancionar la Trata de Personas Especialmente mujeres y niños.

After a police raid on a brothel, four pimps were arrested and twenty-four women and girls were taken into custody. The magistrate ordered a medical examination to, among other things, determine the women's ages. The magistrate then ordered that the women 18 and over be released, and a few days later ordered the minor girls to be released. The magistrate explained that the girls had expressed a desire to be released. The Court held that this act was in violation of the Juvenile Justice Act, that only a child welfare board could determine how the girls were to be released. The Court then set forth guidelines for courts dealing with girls taken from brothels in the future. This case is significant because victims of trafficking may need counseling and other medical services in order to prevent their re-victimization.

This document provides a background to the history of trafficking in human beings in Bosnia and reflects on the implementation of the previous counter-trafficking plan, which was in place for 2013-2015. International resources, including the international political and legal framework, are explained in the context of the counter-trafficking plan in Bosnia. Specific actions are detailed to achieve each of five strategic objectives: (1) improve the support system for combating trafficking; (2) efficiently prosecute trafficking and related crimes; (3) prevent THB through risk reduction; (4) efficiently protect and assist trafficking victims; (5) strengthen the partnership and cooperation among stakeholders involved in combating trafficking. English translation of 2016-2019 plan available here. 2020-2023 plan in Bosnian available here. 2013-2015 plan in Bosnian available here and in English here.

Mr. Katanga was the leader of the Patriotic Resistance Force (“PRF”) in Ituri, an opposition group in DRC, and was accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity in relation to an attack against the village of Bogoro. The Pre-Trial Chamber found that the PRF forces committed acts of rape and sexual slavery: Mr. Katanga’s combatants abducted, sexually enslaved, and physically abused women. Mr. Katanga was found guilty as an accessory to war crimes on four counts: i.e., murder, attacking a civilian population, destruction of property, and pillaging. He was also found guilty as an accessory to murder constituting a crime against humanity. However, he was acquitted on the charges of rape and sexual slavery committed by the PRF forces because the crimes could not be attributed to him; it could not be proved that the crimes were common practice among the combatants. Despite Mr. Katanga’s acquittal, this case is particularly significant as it was the first case in which crimes of sexual violence, including rape and sexual slavery, were charged.

In May 2003, a Roma family with Bulgarian nationality traveled to Italy with a promise of work in a villa. M.’s parents alleged that they were threatened and forced to return to Bulgaria, leaving M.—their 17-year-old daughter—in the villa, where she was raped and beaten. M.’s mother returned to Italy on 24 May and reported to the police that her daughter had been kidnapped. M. was rescued from the villa 17 days later, on 11 June 2003. No criminal proceedings were taken against M.’s kidnapper, but the police instituted proceedings against M.’s parents for perjury and libel, believing that the accusations of kidnapping were untrue and that M.’s parents had contracted to marry M. to the alleged kidnapper for a sum of money. The European Court of Human Rights found a violation of Article 3—prohibition of ill-treatment—in the investigation of rape and beating by the Italian authorities, which it found was ineffective. The Court found no violation of Article 3, however, in the steps taken by the police to secure the release of M.

Nel maggio del 2003, una famiglia rom di nazionalità bulgara si recava in Italia con la promessa di lavorare come domestici in una villa. I genitori di M. asserivano che erano stati minacciati e forzati a ritornare in Bulgaria, lasciando M. – la loro figlia di 17 anni – nella villa, dove veniva stuprata e picchiata. La madre di M. ritornava in Italia il 24 maggio e riferiva alla polizia che sua figlia era stata rapita. M. veniva salvata dalla villa 17 giorni dopo, l’11 giugno 2003. Nessun procedimento penale veniva iniziato contro il rapitore di M. ma la polizia instaurava un procedimento contro i genitori di M. per falsa testimonianza e diffamazione, ritenendo che l’accusa di rapimento non fosse vera e che i genitori di M. avessero concordato di far sposare M. con il presunto rapitore per una somma di denaro. La Corte europea dei diritti dell’uomo riteneva violato da parte delle autorità italiane l’articolo 3 della Convenzione – divieto di maltrattamento – durante le indagini sullo stupro e le percosse. La Corte non riscontrava alcuna violazione dell’articolo 3, tuttavia, nelle misure adottate dalla polizia per garantire il rilascio di M.

R arrived in Cyprus on an "artiste" visa. She started work as an artiste in a cabaret in Cyprus only to leave work three days later. After finding her, the manager of the cabaret where she had worked took her to the police asking them to declare her illegal in the country and to detain her. The police concluded that R did not appear to be illegal and refused to detain her. They asked the cabaret manager to collect her from the police station and to return with her later that morning to make further inquiries into her immigration status. The cabaret manager collected R and took her to the house of another employee of the cabaret, where the cabaret manager also remained. Later R fell from the window and was found dead in the street below the apartment. Following R’s death, interviews were conducted so was an autopsy. An inquest hearing was finally held nine months later in the applicant, R’s father's absence. The court decided that R died out of an accident and there was no evidence to suggest criminal liability for her death. Upon a request by the applicant, after the body was repatriated from Cyprus to Russia. Forensic medical experts in Russia carried out a separate autopsy and the findings of the Russian authorities, which concluded that R had died in strange and unestablished circumstances requiring additional investigation, were forwarded to the Cypriot authorities in the form of a request for mutual legal assistance under treaties in which Cyprus and Russia were parties. The request asked, inter alia, that further investigation be carried out, that the institution of criminal proceedings in respect of R's death be considered and that the applicant be allowed to participate effectively in the proceedings. Cyprus subsequently confirmed to the Russian Prosecution Service that the inquest into R's death was completed and that the verdict delivered by the court was final. The applicant has continued to press for an effective investigation into his daughter's death. The Cypriot Ombudsman, the Council of Europe's Human Rights Commissioner and the United States State Department have published reports which refer to the prevalence of trafficking in human beings for commercial sexual exploitation in Cyprus and the role of the cabaret industry and "artiste" visas in facilitating trafficking in Cyprus. The ECtHR found a violation of Article 2 as a result of the failure of the Cypriot authorities to investigate effectively R’s death. As regards Russia, the Court concluded that there it had not violated Article 2 as the Russian authorities were not obliged themselves to investigate R's death, which had occurred outside their jurisdiction. With respect to Article 3, the Court held that any ill-treatment which R may have suffered before her death had been inherently linked to her alleged trafficking and exploitation and that it would consider this complaint under Article 4. The Court noted that, like slavery, trafficking in human beings, by its very nature and aim of exploitation, was based on the exercise of powers attaching to the right of ownership; it treated human beings as commodities to be bought and sold and put to forced labor; it implied close surveillance of the activities of victims, whose movements were often circumscribed; and it involved the use of violence and threats against victims. Accordingly the Court held that trafficking itself was prohibited by Article 4. It concluded that there had been a violation by Cyprus of its positive obligations arising under that Article on two counts: first, its failure to put in place an appropriate legal and administrative framework to combat trafficking as a result of the existing regime of artiste visas, and, second, the failure of the police to take operational measures to protect R from trafficking, despite circumstances which had given rise to a credible suspicion that she might have been a victim of trafficking. In light of its findings as to the inadequacy of the Cypriot police investigation under Article 2, the Court did not consider it necessary to examine the effectiveness of the police investigation separately under Article 4. There had also been a violation of Article 4 by Russia on account of its failure to investigate how and where R had been recruited and, in particular, to take steps to identify those involved in R's recruitment or the methods of recruitment used. The Court held that the detention by the police following the confirmation that R was not illegal had no basis in domestic law. It further held that her subsequent detention in the apartment had been both arbitrary and unlawful. There was therefore a violation of Article 5 § 1 by Cyprus. The Court rejected the applicant's other complaints. As important as this case is for taking aim at the exploitive nature of the sex industry and the willingness of States to turn a blind eye to it, Rantsev brings with it questions regarding the very ability of the Court to adjudicate over issues emanating from Article 4 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). With the determination of the Court that obligations emanating from Article 4 of the ECHR come into play because trafficking is based on slavery, the Court reveals itself as not having truly engaged with the legal distinctions that exist between these two concepts. As a result, the Court has further muddied the waters as to where legal distinction should be made regarding various types of human exploitation, be it the forced labor, servitude or slavery.

In the summer of 1995, Mr. P.Š. and Mr. K.P. (the defendants) transported juvenile Ms. Š.N. and juvenile Ms. A.G. (the Aggrieved) to Prague under the guise of providing employment. The defendants intended to sell the Aggrieved to R.R. into prostitution. After examining the Aggrieved primarily on the basis of their moral standing and their relationship with the defendants, the district court acquitted both defendants. Subsequently, the Prosecutor appealed the decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court quashed the decision of the district court and found the defendants guilty of trafficking in women. It further held that an examination of the moral standing and the relationship of the Aggrieved to the defendants was unreasonable. The Supreme Court clarified that the criminal act of trafficking in women is committed if a woman is lured (i.e., by promises, offers of money, etc.), hired (conclusion of any agreement, including illegal agreements about the trafficking of women to another country), or transported to another country (crossing of a border being sufficient, the specifics of the actual location not required) for the purpose of prostitution. It is irrelevant whether the women in question actually worked as prostitutes or not, the intention to work as a prostitute is sufficient. The Supreme Court ordered the district court to re-examine the case.