Women and Justice: Type: Domestic Case Law

The petitioner sought a divorce from her husband under common law rather than Islamic rite. After several years of marriage, (i) the petitioner discovered that the respondent had lied about being divorced prior to their marriage, (ii) the respondent stopped supporting her financially, and (iii) the respondent neglected their relationship. After she started a business to provide for herself, the respondent employed his former wife’s relatives to “spy and scorn her to leave the house.” The matter was brought to their religious leader, who ordered the couple to three months’ separation to see whether reconciliation was possible. During that period, the respondent lived with his former wife, admitted to other extra-marital relationships, continued to harass the petitioner for conjugal relations, and declared that he did not want her as his wife, which he believed should have legally relieved him of their marriage. The petitioner subsequently applied for divorce in the High Court. The respondent contested adjudicating the matter before the High Court, arguing (i) that the divorce should have been adjudicated by religious leaders rather than a secular court and (ii) that he believed that the marriage was already dissolved given his declaration to his religious leader that he no longer wanted to be married (although no witnesses testified to hearing the respondent pronounce the “talaq” against his wife). The High Court emphasized that courts do not have a monopoly on divorce; for example, couples can divorce by mutual agreement at custom before village civic authorities or other tribunals. However, even in such situations, if one party is wronged or does not consent to the divorce, that party can seek resolution in a secular court. The High Court concluded that the respondent’s alleged “divorce” was not valid, as the respondent had violated the tenets of his faith with his extramarital affairs, harassment of his estranged wife, and lies to lure her into the marriage. Emphasizing the equal status of husband and wife under the Constitution, the Court held that the respondent’s summary declaration of a dissolved marriage in this case, especially as it was unjustified, did not conform to the principles of justice, equality, and morality, and granted the petitioner the divorce under law.

The defendant was convicted rape, with the trial court finding that he followed the complainant to her house, suggested sexual intercourse, attacked her when she declined, and raped her. The defendant, a first-time offender, received a sentence of four years’ imprisonment. A judge reviewed the sentence and sent it to the High Court for consideration on the grounds that the sentence necessitated judicial remand due to manifest inadequacy. In concluding the lack of necessity of remand, the High Court reviewed the approach to sentencing for criminal offenses, which must regard the specific circumstances of the offense, the offender and the victim, and the public interest. The High Court discussed a few factors that must be taken into consideration in sentencing in rape cases, namely the victim’s age, the effect of the rape on the victim, and whether the perpetrator i) used violence above the minimum force to commit the rape, ii) used a weapon to intimidate or wound the victim, iii) repeatedly raped the victim, iv) premeditated and planned the rape, v) had previous convictions for sexual or other violent offences, and vi) subjected the victim to additional sexual indignities or perversions. The High Court affirmed precedent suggesting that three years is the minimum sentence for an adult convicted of rape without aggravating or mitigating factors. Specifically, the Court cited English precedent, which suggested five years as the threshold sentence, before citing the Malawi High Court suggesting that the threshold should be three years because of prison conditions in Malawi. In applying precedential sentencing standards to the specific circumstances of the case, the High Court determined that the lower court’s sentence did not qualify as manifestly inadequate, and therefore did not warrant intervention.

Three minor girls, victims of human trafficking who the defendant lured in with promises of working in a restaurant, but instead sent to work at a bar, appealed their case. When the work conditions turned out to be exploitative, the appellants reported the defendant to the police. The case was appealed to the High Court on the basis that: (i) the case file did not go through the standard process whereby a case is registered in the Criminal Registry then distributed to a Magistrate by a Chief Resident Magistrate, and (ii) the magistrate did not follow proper procedure for the child witnesses’ testimony. In concluding that a proper lower court be assigned to re-hear the matter, the High Court underscored the importance of following legal procedure designed to protect the rights of vulnerable child witnesses. The High Court pointed out a number of procedural protocols, such as ensuring that the child witnesses did not come into direct contact with the accused, making provision for the witness to be accompanied by a supportive figure in court, and considering the possibility of a pre-recorded interview of a child witness as evidence. The court noted that a court competent in handling child witnesses must re-hear the matter, as causing witnesses to endure repeat trials as a result of the failure to follow proper judicial procedure is akin to repeat victimization of such witnesses.

A Fourth Grade Magistrate convicted the appellant and 18 other women for knowingly living on prostitution earnings, a misdemeanor that carries a maximum sentence of 24 months in prison. In Malawi, Fourth Grade Magistrates’ jurisdiction is limited to cases in which the maximum sentence is 12 months. This jurisdictional limit was the appellants’ first ground of appeal. Despite finding that the appellants succeeded in proving their convictions null and void due to the magistrate’s jurisdictional overreach, the appellate court found it “imperative” to address the appellants’ other arguments because of “the prevalent misuse of section 146 by law enforcement.” The appellants’ second ground of appeal was that Penal Code Section 146, the offence of a woman living on the earnings of prostitution, does not target the sex worker herself, but rather restricts women from exercising influence over the movements of sex workers for monetary gain. Section 145 of the Penal Code addresses men’s criminal behavior toward sex workers. The High Court again agreed with the appellants, concluding that Section 146 of the Penal Code was clearly aimed at targeting those who exploit sex workers, rather than a punitive measure applicable to sex workers themselves. The High Court pointed out that the lower court’s conclusion that the appellants’ convictions rested on the fact that they had booked rooms in a rest house, “conduct which was not criminal at all.” The High Court also expressed concern about how the government obtained the women’s confessions to prostitution, “especially after reading the caution statements.” As a result, the High Court held the trial and convictions of the appellants unconstitutional and predicated on discrimination against women in the sex trade. In conclusion, the judge called for Malawi to have “a frank discussion” about the fact that prostitution-related offences in Malawi “remain an area of blatant discrimination, unfairness, inequality, abuse as well as bias from law enforcement as well as the courts as evidenced in this case.”

The defendant physically attacked and raped the victim. The court of the first instance found the defendant guilty of rape (part 1 of Article 152 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine - after this The Criminal Code) and sentenced him to three years of imprisonment. However, the appellate court released the defendant from serving the sentence and instead imposed a three-year probationary period (Article 75 of the Criminal Code). In accordance with Article 75, the court may decide to release a person from serving a sentence with probation if the maximum sentence for a criminal offense does not exceed five years of imprisonment (the maximum imprisonment for rape is five years). The prosecutor noted that the punishment was disproportionate to the gravity of the crime. The victim demanded actual imprisonment because, as a result of the attack, she developed depression and needed a rehabilitation course with a psychologist. The Supreme Court noted that a person who has committed a crime must be given a punishment that is necessary, proportionate to the crime, and sufficient for his correction and prevention of new crimes (50, 65 of the Criminal Code). The Supreme Court annulled the appellate decision due to the court’s failure to take into account the gravity of the crime and the consequences for the victim. Thus, the Supreme Court ordered a new trial, ordering that the court apply the law on a more serious criminal offense or increase the punishment. This means that Article 75 (exemption from punishment with the appointment of probation and probationary period) cannot be applied, and instead the punishment should be imposed in accordance with Article 152 (rape): from three to five years in prison. This case is important because it emphasizes the severity of rape, the need for proportionate punishment, and consideration of the consequences for the victim.

Особа 2 напав на Особу 1 та зґвалтував із застосуванням фізичного насильства. Судом першої інстанції Особу 2 було визнано винним у вчиненні зґвалтування (ч. 1 ст. 152 Кримінального Кодексу України - далі КК) та призначено покарання у виді позбавлення волі на строк 3 роки, але рішенням апеляційного суду Особу 2 було звільнено від відбування призначеного покарання з випробуванням та іспитовим строком тривалістю 3 роки (ст. 75 КК). Прокурор зазначив, що покарання є невідповідним тяжкості злочину; потерпіла вимагала покарання у вигляді реального позбавлення волі, бо внаслідок вчинення злочину щодо неї вона перебуває у стані депресії, проходить курс реабілітації у психолога. Верховний Суд зазначив, що особі, яка вчинила злочин, має бути призначене покарання, необхідне і достатнє для її виправлення і попередження нових злочинів ( 50, 65 КК); виходячи з вказаної мети й принципів справедливості, співмірності та індивідуалізації, покарання повинно бути співмірним характеру вчинених дій та їх небезпечності. Рішення апеляційної інстанції було скасовано, через неврахування тяжкості злочину та наслідків для потерпілої; було призначено новий розгляд справи у зв'язку з необхідністю застосування закону про більш тяжке кримінальне правопорушення або посилення покарання. Ця справа є важливою, бо наголошує на тяжкості згвалтування, необхідності співмірного покарання та урахування наслідків для жертви.

While intoxicated, the defendant committed lewd acts against a minor (under 14 years old) by forcing her to expose herself and photographing her naked. He also took the photographs, which were recognized as a pornographic product. According to the courts of the first and second instance, the illegal actions qualified as corruption of a minor (Article 156 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine) and the production of child pornography for which he was sentenced to seven years of imprisonment. In his complaint to the Supreme Court, the prosecutor demanded a longer sentence, arguing that the sentence was disproportionate to the crime and emphasizing the defendant’s criminal history. The Supreme Court noted that the court of the first instance considered the severity of the crimes, the personal information about the offender, the defendant’s attitude towards the crimes, the defendant’s partial recognition of his guilt, and the aggravating circumstance of intoxication. Thus, by imposing a penalty of imprisonment near the maximum allowable sentence, the Supreme Court held that court of the first instance complied with the requirements of proportionality and fairness. In this case, the prosecutor's complaint was dismissed.

Чоловік в стані алкогольного сп’яніння вчинив відносно малолітньої (до 14 років) потерпілої розпусні дії (ст. 156 КК), які виразились у її примушуванні до оголення та фотографуванні в оголеному вигляді; він також створив фотознімки з таким зображенням потерпілої (було визнано продукцією порнографічного характеру). За результатами розгляду справи судом першої та другої інстанції протиправні дії було кваліфіковано як розбещення малолітньої особи та виготовлення дитячої порнографії та засуджено до 7 років позбавлення волі. Прокурор у своїй скарзі до Верховного Суду вимагає скасування рішення та призначення нового розгляду через невідповідність призначеного покарання скоєному злочину та неврахування особи винного, що неодноразово притягувався до адміністративної відповідальності. Верховний Суд зазначає, що суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі, врахував ступінь тяжкості вчинених злочинів, ставлення до вчиненого, часткове визнання своєї винуватості, наявність обставини, що обтяжує покарання - вчинення злочину в стані алкогольного сп'яніння, а також дані про його особу. Таким чином, суд першої інстанції, призначаючи покарання у виді позбавлення волі в розмірі, наближеному до максимального (передбаченого за інкриміновані правопорушення), дотримався вимоги співмірності та справедливості. Скарга прокурора не підлягає задоволенню.

The appellant attacked the victim in the park in an attempt to rape her, but he was noticed by other people and fled the scene of the crime before committing rape. The court of first instance sentenced the appellant to imprisonment for three years. However, the court discharged the appellant from imprisonment and instead put him on probation, with the imposition of certain duties. The appellate court overturned this decision and reinstituted the prison sentence of three years, cancelling the discharge from punishment on probation. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision, finding that the court of first instance did not sufficiently consider the degree of public danger of the crime, or that the victim was disabled since childhood, which made her exceptionally vulnerable. Also, the first-instance court did not consider the fact that the appellant did not succeed in raping the victim only because of the intervention of other people who forced the appellant to flee the scene, not because he willingly abandoned the crime. This case is significant because it illustrated how Ukrainian courts should apply the sentencing factors for attempted crimes – (i) the gravity of the offense, (ii) the amount of progress made toward completing the crime, and (iii) the reasons the crime was incomplete – in sexual violence cases.

Скаржник напав на жертву в парку, намагаючись її зґвалтувати, але оскільки його помітили інші люди, він втік з місця злочину, перш ніж вчинити зґвалтування. Суд першої інстанції засудив заявника до трьох років позбавлення волі. Проте, суд звільнив скаржника від відбування покарання, натомість призначив йому випробувальний термін із покладенням певних обов’язків. Апеляційний суд скасував це рішення та поновив покарання у вигляді трьох років позбавлення волі, скасувавши звільнення від відбування покарання з випробуванням. Верховний Суд залишив без змін рішення апеляційного суду, встановивши, що суд першої інстанції недостатньо врахував ступінь суспільної небезпеки злочину та те, що потерпіла була інвалідом з дитинства, що робило її особливо вразливою. Крім того, суд першої інстанції не взяв до уваги той факт, що скаржнику не вдалося зґвалтувати жертву лише через втручання інших осіб, які змусили скаржника втекти з місця події, а не через те, що він добровільно відмовився від злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки вона продемонструвала, які обставини мають враховувати українські суди при призначенні покарання за замах на злочин у справах, які стосуються сексуального насильства: (i) тяжкість правопорушення, (ii) ступінь досягнутого на шляху завершення злочину, і (iii) причини, через які злочин не був доведений до кінця злочину.

The appellant was convicted of trafficking in human beings because he intentionally, for financial purposes, recruited financially vulnerable Ukrainian women for sex trafficking in Russia. The court of first instance sentenced him to five years of imprisonment with confiscation of property for an “accumulation of crimes” (in Ukraine, this term means commission of two or more crimes by one person stipulated by different Articles or different parts of one Article of the Special Part of this Code, where that person has not been convicted of any of these crimes). The Court of Appeal left this sentence unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court, claiming that the appellant was not guilty, because there was no evidence that he recruited women. Instead, the appellant argued that there was a mutual agreement between himself and the women. The Supreme Court left the decisions of the previous courts unchanged, drawing attention to the fact that the courts' conclusions were based on the testimony of the victims and the witness, the protocol of secret investigative actions, and audio and video recordings of the appellant’s meetings with women.

Скаржник був засуджений за торгівлю людьми через те, що він умисно, маючи корисну мету, вербував незаможних українських жінок для торгівлі ними в сексуальних цілях у Росії. Суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді п’яти років позбавлення волі з конфіскацією майна за "сукупністю злочинів" (в Україні це поняття означає вчинення однією особою двох або більше злочинів, передбачених різними статтями або різними частинами однієї статті Особливої ​​частини Кримінального кодексу, якщо ця особа не була засуджена за жоден із цих злочинів). Апеляційний суд залишив цей вирок без змін. Скаржник подав касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, стверджуючи, що він невинний, оскільки немає доказів того, що він вербував жінок. Натомість, скаржник стверджував, що між ним і жінками існувала взаємна домовленість. Верховний Суд залишив рішення попередніх судів без змін, звернувши увагу на те, що висновки судів ґрунтуються на показаннях потерпілих і свідків, протоколах негласних слідчих дій, аудіо- та відеозаписах зустрічей скаржника із жінками.

The appellant was convicted of debauchery for committing lewd acts against the victim, a girl under 14 years old. The first-instance court sentenced the defendant to five years of imprisonment and banned him for three years from continuing to volunteer at a children’s home. The appellate court left this decision unchanged. However, the Supreme Court changed the additional punishment, stating that courts may only impose such additional punishment if the commission of the crime was related to the perpetrator’s position or to engagement in certain activities. The Supreme Court found that, although the appellant provided volunteer assistance to the children's center, his volunteer activity was in no way related to the commission of a crime. This case is significant because the Supreme Court used a narrow definition of “related to” in finding that the defendant’s volunteer work with children unrelated to his sexual abuse of a child.

Скаржник був засуджений за вчинення розпусних дій щодо особи, дівчини віком до 14 років. Суд першої інстанції засудив обвинуваченого до п’яти років позбавлення волі та заборонив йому продовжувати волонтерську діяльність у дитячому будинку строком на 3 роки. Суд апеляційної інстанції залишив це рішення без змін. Проте, Верховний Суд змінив додаткове покарання, зазначивши, що суди можуть призначати таке додаткове покарання лише у тому випадку, якщо вчинення злочину було пов’язане зі службовим становищем винного або із заняттям певною діяльністю. Верховний Суд встановив, що хоча скаржник надавав волонтерську допомогу дитячому центру, його волонтерська діяльність жодним чином не пов’язана зі вчиненням злочину. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки Верховний суд використав вузьке визначення "пов’язаного з", коли встановив, що волонтерська робота обвинуваченого з дітьми не має відношення до сексуального насильства над дитиною.

Officials of the Odessa City Council sued the head of the organizing committee of "Odessa Pride-2015" (a multi-day queer festival and peaceful meeting in support of human rights for everyone, regardless of sexual orientation and gender identity scheduled for August 2015), in order to limit the right of this organization to peaceful assembly by banning their mass public events, namely gatherings, rallies, pickets, demonstrations meetings, etc., in the center of Odessa. The claim was based on the fact that although the organizers of "Odessa Pride-2015" sent a notification letter containing the date of the event in advance (as required in Article 39 of the Constitution of Ukraine), there was no detailed information about the nature of the planned peaceful assembly, place, time, routes, etc., which made it impossible for local authorities and law enforcement agencies to take necessary measures in the interests of public order to prevent riots or crimes. The first-instance court partially satisfied the claim, finding that the equality march of the LGBTQ community could create a real danger and threat to public order in the city. The appellate court left this decision unchanged. However, the Supreme Court overruled the decisions of the courts of the previous instance, noting that in order to restrict the right to assemble peacefully, the court must be convinced of the reality of a possible threat and such reality must be confirmed by relevant evidence. Given that there was no such evidence in this case, the courts of previous instances wrongfully restricted the defendant's constitutional right to peaceful assembly. This case is important because it affirms the right of marginalized people to peacefully assemble in celebration of their identity and humanity without undue state interference.

Чиновники Одеської міськради подали до суду на голову організаційного комітету "Одеса Прайд-2015" (багатоденний квір-фестиваль і мирний мітинг на підтримку прав людини для всіх, незалежно від сексуальної орієнтації та гендерної ідентичності, запланований на серпень 2015 року), з метою обмеження права цієї організації на мирні зібрання,, шляхом заборони проведення масових публічних заходів, а саме зборів, мітингів, пікетів, демонстраційних мітингів тощо в центрі Одеси. Позов обґрунтовувався тим, що хоча організатори "Одеса-Прайд-2015" заздалегідь надіслали лист-повідомлення із зазначенням дати проведення заходу (як того вимагає стаття 39 Конституції України), однак в ньому не було детальної інформації про характер запланованого мирного зібрання, місце, час, маршрути тощо, що унеможливило вжиття органами місцевого самоврядування та правоохоронними органами необхідних заходів з метою підтримання громадського порядку та запобігання заворушенням чи злочинам. Суд першої інстанції частково задовольнив позов, встановивши, що марш рівності ЛГБТК-спільноти може створити реальну небезпеку та загрозу громадському порядку в місті. Суд апеляційної інстанції залишив це рішення без змін. Проте, Верховний Суд скасував рішення судів попередньої інстанції, зазначивши, що для обмеження права на мирні зібрання суд має переконатися в реальності можливої загрози і така загроза має бути підтверджена відповідними доказами. Враховуючи відсутність таких доказів у цій справі, суди попередніх інстанцій неправомірно обмежили конституційне право відповідача на мирні зібрання. Цей випадок важливий, оскільки він підтверджує право груп (спільнот), які зазнають дискримінації, мирно збиратися для святкування своєї ідентичності та людяності без неправомірного втручання держави.

The plaintiff sued his ex-wife, the appellant, and requested recognition that a piece of real estate was his private property. The plaintiff noted that he and his wife were in a registered marriage for a certain period. The plaintiff made money as an individual entrepreneur (in Ukraine, this term means an individual that owns his or her business and possesses all the profit). While running his business, he acquired real estate and registered title. The plaintiff invested his own money in this property. The appellant believed that due to the fact that the plaintiff acquired the property during their marriage, the real estate was the joint property of the spouses and should be split between them. Rejecting the appellant’s arguments, the court of first instance concluded that, as the plaintiff acquired the disputed property using his own money, the property belonged only to him, as she did not prove that the property was acquired as a result of their joint work or that her funds were invested in its acquisition. The Court of Appeal left this decision unchanged. The Supreme Court slightly changed the motivational part of the decisions of the first-instance court, as well as Court of Appeal, accepting that the property of the individual entrepreneur can be joint property of the spouses, provided that it was either bought by the spouses together, or invested in by both spouses. Considering that the appellant did not prove that the property was acquired during their marriage, nor that they both invested in the property, the Court held that it belonged only to the plaintiff.

Позивач подав до суду на свою колишню дружину (скаржницю) та просив визнати, що нерухоме майно є його приватною власністю. Позивач зазначив, що певний період вони з дружиною перебували в зареєстрованому шлюбі. Позивач заробляв гроші як фізична особа-підприємець (в Україні під цим терміном розуміється фізична особа, яка є власником свого бізнесу та володіє всім прибутком). Під час ведення бізнесу він придбав нерухомість і зареєстрував право власності на неї. Позивач інвестував свої власні кошти в це нерухоме майно. Скаржниця вважала, що у зв'язку з тим, що Позивач набув майно під час шлюбу, нерухоме майно є спільною сумісною власністю подружжя і підлягає розподілу між ними. Суд першої інстанції відхилив доводи скаржниці та дійшов висновку, що, оскільки позивач придбав спірне майно за власні кошти, це майно належить лише йому, оскільки вона не довела, що це майно було набуте в результаті їх спільної праці або, що її кошти були вкладені в його придбання. Апеляційний суд залишив це рішення без змін. Верховний Суд дещо змінив мотивувальну частину рішення суду першої інстанції, а також апеляційного суду, вказавши, що майно фізичної особи-підприємця може бути спільною сумісною власністю подружжя за умови, що воно було придбано обома подружжя або в нього було інвестовано кошти обох подружжя. Зважаючи на те, що скаржниця не довела ні того, що це майно було придбано під час їхнього шлюбу, ні того, що вони обидва інвестували у це майно, Суд постановив, що воно належало лише позивачу.

The appellant was convicted by the court of first instance for the murder and rape of one woman and the murder and attempted of rape of a second woman. Taking into account the fact that the man had previously been convicted of similar crimes, the first instance court sentenced him to life imprisonment. The appellate court left the judgment unchanged. The appellant’s attorney filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, in which he asked the Court to revoke the sentence and close the criminal proceedings due to insufficient evidence. Specifically, the appellant argued that a third party staged the crime scene and placed his property there; sexual intercourse with the first woman was consensual; and the forensic medical examination confirmed that the appellant did not engage in sexual intercourse with another woman. The Supreme Court emphasized that the conclusions of the lower courts regarding the appellant’s guilt were based on their careful examination of the evidence (e.g., the appellant’s property near the corpses indicated that he was at the place of the crimes; forensic medical examinations found traces of a man's DNA on the bodies). Accordingly, the Supreme Court left the sentence of life imprisonment unchanged. This decision is important because it demonstrates that serving a prison sentence may not deter persons who commit sex crimes from re-offending after their release from custody.

Cкаржник був засуджений судом першої інстанції за вбивство та зґвалтування однієї жінки, а також вбивство та замах на зґвалтування іншої жінки. Враховуючи те, що чоловік раніше був судимий за аналогічні злочини, суд першої інстанції призначив йому покарання у вигляді довічного позбавлення волі. Апеляційний суд залишив вирок без змін. Адвокат скаржника подав до Верховного Суду касаційну скаргу, в якій просив суд скасувати вирок та закрити кримінальне провадження через недостатність доказів. Зокрема, скаржник стверджував, що третя сторона влаштувала інсценування злочину та розмістила там його майно; статевий акт з першою жінкою був за її згодою; і судово-медична експертиза підтвердила, що скаржник не вступав у статеві зносини з іншою жінкою. Верховний Суд підкреслив, що висновки судів попередніх інстанцій щодо винуватості скаржника ґрунтувалися на ретельному дослідженні доказів (наприклад, майно скаржника поблизу трупів вказувало на те, що він був на місці злочинів; судово-медичні експертизи виявили сліди ДНК чоловіка на тілах). Відповідно, Верховний Суд залишив без змін покарання у вигляді довічного ув'язнення. Це рішення є важливим, оскільки воно демонструє, що відбування покарання не може стримувати осіб, які вчинили сексуальні злочини, від повторного вчинення злочину після звільнення з-під варти.

The appellant applied to the court for a restraining order against her son (in Ukrainian legislation, this term means a judicially established measure that temporarily restricts rights or imposes obligations on a perpetrator of domestic violence and is aimed at ensuring the victim's safety). The appellant wanted the restraining order because her son, who lived in the same apartment with her, consumed alcoholic beverages and narcotics, and verbally insulted, humiliated, intimidated, threatened to kill her. The appellant asked the court to issue a six-month restraining order imposing certain obligations on her son, including the obligation to leave her place of residence. The court of first instance granted the appellant’s application in part, but the court did not impose the restrictive measure related to her son's access to housing. In the court’s opinion, the obligation to leave the appellant’s place of residence could violate the son's right to own and use housing and therefore such a measure was not proportionate under the established circumstances. The Court of Appeal left this decision unchanged. The appellant filed a cassation appeal to the Supreme Court, claiming that the courts of previous instances did not fully assess the risk of her son continuing to commit, or re-committing, domestic violence. The appellant argued that this case did not involve deprivation of property rights, but only temporary restrictions. Referring to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court concluded that in this case there was indeed a justified risk of continuation or repeated perpetration of domestic violence, the occurrence of severe or particularly severe consequences for the victim, and such risk was real. This case is significant because it found that courts should prioritize the safety of the victim rather than the property rights of the perpetrator. Under such circumstances, the Supreme Court prohibited the woman's son from approaching within 100 meters of their joint residence.

Скаржниця звернулася до суду із заявою про видачу обмежувального припису щодо її сина (в українському законодавстві під цим терміном розуміється встановлений у судовому порядку захід тимчасового обмеження прав чи покладення обов’язків на особу, яка вчинила домашнє насильство, спрямований на забезпечення безпеки постраждалої особи). Скаржниця хотіла, аби суд видав обмежувальний припис, оскільки її син (який проживав з нею в одній квартирі) вживав алкогольні напої та наркотики, погрожував їй вбивством, використовував щодо неї словесні образи, приниження та залякування. Скаржниця просила суд видати обмежувальний припис строком на шість місяців із покладенням на її сина певних обов’язків, зокрема зобов’язання залишити місце проживання. Суд першої інстанції частково задовольнив заяву скаржниці, але суд не застосовував обмежувальний захід до її сина, який стосувався доступу до житла. На думку суду, зобов’язання залишити місце проживання скаржниці могло порушити право сина на володіння та користування житлом, а тому такий захід не був пропорційним за встановлених обставин. Апеляційний суд залишив це рішення без змін. Скаржниця подала касаційну скаргу до Верховного Суду, посилаючись на те, що суди попередніх інстанцій не в повній мірі оцінили ризик продовження або повторного вчинення її сином домашнього насильства. Скаржниця стверджувала, що в цій справі не йдеться про позбавлення права власності, а лише про тимчасові обмеження. Посилаючись на практику Європейського суду з прав людини, Верховний Суд дійшов висновку, що в даному випадку дійсно існував обґрунтований ризик продовження або повторного вчинення домашнього насильства, настання тяжких чи особливо тяжких наслідків для потерпілої і такий ризик був реальним. Ця справа є важливою, оскільки в ній було встановлено, що суди повинні надавати пріоритет безпеці жертви, а не майновим правам кривдника. За таких обставин, Верховний Суд заборонив синові жінки наближатися на відстань ближче 100 метрів до їхнього спільного помешкання.

In this case, the Supreme Court articulated its view of the nature of marriage and how the value of the contributions of the spouses should relate to property entitlements under Irish law. Referencing the Family Law (Divorcer) Act 1996, the Supreme Court noted that the legislature had not made any mandatory requirements regarding the division of assets in divorce and judicial separation cases; discretion had been left to the court to consider what would be the best and most just resolution of the case at hand. Appellate courts should, to a certain degree, give latitude to the discretion of the trial judge in these matters. The parties had a “turbulent” marriage. During the marriage, the respondent-wife: sold her pre-marital home (the proceeds of which were used as marital property), significantly pulled back from her career as a general practitioner focus on the marriage and couple’s children, and worked as a receptionist for her husband’s medical practice to save him money. The applicant-husband had affairs with multiple women, then filed for divorce when he had a child with another woman and decided to marry her. He transferred the family’s house, including some of the art and furnishings, to the respondent and paid about ₤400 per week in child support, which the High Court ordered increased to ₤800 per week. The Court stated that courts should incorporate the value of a spouse’s work performed at home as well as the factors listed in the Family Law Act (including but not limited to income, earning capacity, property and other financial resources, any physical or mental disability of either spouse, past and future contributions each spouse has made – or is likely to make – to the family welfare, and the conduct of the spouses). In this case, the applicant-husband had assets of at least ₤14 million and a current salary of about ₤210,000. The respondent-wife had about ₤1 million and uncertain salary; she requested between 33-50% of the applicant’s assets and a pension adjustment order. The High Court granted the respondent ₤5 million to be paid over 18 months and 55% of the applicant’s pension. On appeal, the applicant asked the Court to give greater weight to, among other factors, the facts (i) that he transferred 30% of his assets to the respondent when the marriage broke down and (ii) that he would have new responsibilities in his next marriage. The Court was of the view that ‘equality’ did not apply in this context, but that the courts are obliged to make ‘proper provision’ for both spouses having regard to the circumstances. In this case, the Court affirmed that the respondent was entitled 38% (approximately ₤5 million) of the total net assets, but revised the pension adjustment to 49-51% in favour of the respondent.

The plaintiff’s husband suffered serious injuries in an explosion, one of which impaired his ability to have sex. In the plaintiff’s claim against her husband’s employer, the Minister for Defence, she claimed compensation for loss of consortium at common law. In the past, this action was available only to a husband. The question asked by the plaintiff was whether this was inconsistent with the Constitution, and in particular its guarantee of equality and implied guarantee of spousal equality. The Supreme Court unanimously agreed that restricting a claim of loss of consortium to husbands only was inconsistent with the Constitution, but disagreed on how to respond to the inconsistency. A majority took the view that the defect should be remedied in a positive manner, by extending the action to wives, while the minority thought that the solution was to abolish the action of loss of consortium entirely. Thus, the majority of the Supreme Court held that the effect of the principle of equality of spouses was to extend the benefit of the common law rule to the wife.

The appellant, a gay man, entered into an agreement with the respondents, a lesbian couple in a civil partnership, to donate sperm to the respondents so they could have a baby. It was agreed that the respondents would have full care and custody of the child, effectively as parents. They were to be fully responsible for the child’s upbringing, and the appellant, the sperm donor, would be, at most, considered a “favourite uncle.” It was explicitly agreed that the appellant would not have any responsibility for the child’s upbringing and would not seek to influence it. However, following the child’s birth, he attempted to assert rights as the father. While not seeking custody, he sought to be appointed as a guardian of the child and to have rights of access. The respondents opposed his application, and it was their intention to move to Australia, which the appellant sought an injunction to prevent. This case constituted the first time in which the superior courts of Ireland dealt with the matter of parenthood in assisted reproduction, and both the High Court and Supreme Court took different views of the case. McD’s application to be appointed guardian under the Guardianship of Infants Act 1964 was unsuccessful in the High Court, which found that the donor had acted dishonestly and deliberately misled them as to his intentions. Emphasising the child’s best interests, the High Court, while acknowledging the importance of the blood link between donor and child, found that this was a rare case in which it was not in the best interests of the child to have a relationship with both of his biological parents. The High Court rejected the applications for guardianship and access, finding that granting them would result in too great a cost to the child: the “loss of a tranquil and calm upbringing.” The Supreme Court took a different approach, however, sympathising with the donor’s perspective. Importantly, the Supreme Court ruled that, under Irish law, the lesbian couple was not a family. There was a strong rejection of the idea of ‘de facto families’ having any legal status or rights in Irish law. This concept was relied on by the High Court, where weight was afforded to the position of the ‘de facto family’ consisting of the couple and the child. In this vein, the Supreme Court rejected the applicability of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The Supreme Court agreed that it was not in the best interests of the child that McD. be appointed guardian, but held that he should have access rights, and remitted the matter to the High Court for determination of the terms of such access. The case is also important regarding the relationship between Irish law and the ECHR, with the Supreme Court highlighting that the Convention is not directly applicable in Irish law and taking a restrictive approach in relation to its interpretation and application. The Supreme Court also warned against domestic courts ‘outpacing’ the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights.

The 51-year-old claimant, a female employee, argued that the age limit on her employer’s pension fund discriminated against her based on, among other things, her gender, . The age limit only provided for pension claims for employees who were not older than 50 at the beginning of their employment. However, the claimant had stopped working after the birth of her child and did not return to the work force until she was 51. Her child was already 25 years old at that time and had fully completed his vocational training. The court confirmed the earlier decision of the Federal Labor Court (3 AZR 356/12 (available here: https://www.bag-urteil.com/12-11-2013-3-azr-356-12/)) that the age limit does not constitute indirect discrimination against women. In its decision, the Federal Labor Court had expressly recognized the general principle that an employer must prevent indirect discrimination on the basis of gender when introducing an age limit in its company pension scheme. In particular, it had to factor in that many women interrupt their careers to raise and care for their children, and that an age limit should not in principle prevent these women from receiving benefits from a pension fund. However, the Federal Labor Court found that women typically return from this interruption before reaching age 50 and therefore ruled that the claimant's rights were not indirectly violated by the age limit. The claimant argued that there was no general principle that women are finished raising children before age 50. The Court affirmed the Federal Labor Court’s judgment and held that the general principle of equality was not violated by this age cap as there was no evidence that the age limit posed a greater risk for women than for men of not being able to benefit from the pension fund after a certain age. The Court also brought up that the claimant's child was already 25 years old and had completed her vocational training, so the claimant could not claim that her fundamental rights had been violated because she could have returned to work before the age of 51.

Die 51-jährige Klägerin, eine Arbeitnehmerin, machte geltend, dass sie durch eine Altersgrenze der betrieblichen Altersversorgung ihres Arbeitgebers unter anderem aufgrund ihres Geschlechts diskriminiert wurde. Diese Altersgrenze berechtigte nur Arbeitnehmer, die zum Zeitpunkt des Eintritts in ein Arbeitsverhältnis mit dem Arbeitgeber nicht älter als 50 Jahre waren, zu etwaigen Rentenansprüchen. Die Klägerin hatte jedoch nach der Geburt ihres Kindes aufgehört zu arbeiten und kehrte erst mit 51 Jahren in ihr Berufsleben zurück. Ihr Kind war zu diesem Zeitpunkt bereits 25 Jahre alt und hatte seine Berufsausbildung vollständig abgeschlossen. Das Verfassungsgericht bestätigte die frühere Entscheidung des Bundesarbeitsgerichts (3 AZR 356/12), dass die Altersgrenze keine mittelbare Diskriminierung von Frauen darstellt. Das Bundesarbeitsgericht hatte in seiner Entscheidung ausdrücklich den allgemeinen Grundsatz anerkannt, dass ein Arbeitgeber bei der Einführung einer Altersgrenze in seiner betrieblichen Altersversorgung eine mittelbare Diskriminierung wegen des Geschlechts verhindern muss. Insbesondere sei zu berücksichtigen, dass viele Frauen ihre Berufstätigkeit unterbrechen, um ihre Kinder zu erziehen und zu betreuen, und dass eine Altersgrenze diese Frauen nicht grundsätzlich daran hindern dürfe, Leistungen aus einer Pensionskasse zu beziehen. Das Bundesarbeitsgericht stellte jedoch fest, dass Frauen in der Regel vor Erreichen des 50. Lebensjahres aus dieser Unterbrechung zurückkehren, und entschied daher, dass die Rechte der Klägerin durch die Altersgrenze nicht mittelbar verletzt werden. Die Klägerin argumentierte vor dem Verfassungsgericht, dass es keinen allgemeinen Grundsatz gebe, wonach Frauen ihre Kindererziehungszeit vor dem Alter von 50 Jahren abschließen. Das Das Verfassungsgericht bestätigte die frühere Entscheidung des Bundesarbeitsgerichts und vertrat die Auffassung, dass der allgemeine Gleichheitsgrundsatz nicht durch diese Altersgrenze verletzt wird, da es keine Anhaltspunkte dafür gibt, dass die Altersgrenze ein größeres Risiko für Frauen darstellt als für Männer, ab einem bestimmten Alter keine Leistungen aus der Rentenkasse mehr beziehen zu können. Das Gericht fügte hinzu, dass das Kind der Klägerin bereits 25 Jahre alt war und seine Ausbildung abgeschlossen hatte, so dass die Klägerin nicht geltend machen konnte in ihren Grundrechten verletzt worden zu sein, weil sie gehindert worden sei, vor dem Alter von 51 wieder erwerbstätig zu werden.

A 17-year-old girl engaged in sexual acts with an online acquaintance she had met only twice because he threatened to end the relationship if she refused. The Court ruled that threatening to end a relationship can constitute a threat of substantial harm and thus sexual coercion if the relationship has a high emotional value to the victim. Specifically, the Court noted that whether the termination of a relationship constitutes substantial harm depends on the individual perception of the victim, and not on the perception of a reasonable average person.

Ein 17-jähriges Mädchen nahm sexuelle Handlungen mit einem Online-Bekannten vor, den sie nur zweimal getroffen hatte, weil er drohte, die Beziehung zu beenden, wenn sie diese Handlungen nicht vornehmen würde. Das Gericht entschied, dass die Drohung, eine Beziehung zu beenden, eine Drohung mit einem empfindlichen Übel und somit sexuelle Nötigung darstellen kann, wenn die Beziehung für das Opfer einen hohen emotionalen Wert hat. Das Gericht stellte insbesondere fest, dass die Frage, ob die Beendigung einer Beziehung ein empfindliches Übel darstellt, von der individuellen Wahrnehmung des Opfers abhängt und nicht von der Wahrnehmung einer vernünftigen Durchschnittsperson.

The complainant was the Human Resources manager of her company and claimed back-pay arising out of the company’s alleged gender discrimination and gender-pay gap. She contested the pay disparity in comparison to her male colleagues who performed similar tasks, had similar responsibilities, had a similar classification, and occupied a similar place in the company hierarchy. Before this decision, a pay gap could not ground an allegation of discrimination on the basis of sex where the relevant employees exercised different functions. In this decision, the Court of Cassation, overturning the Court of Appeals of Paris’ decision, held that a gender-based pay gap between members of the board of directors of a company constituted discrimination on the basis of sex. Therefore, the Court of Cassation found that, although the female claimant and the male members of the board of directors exercised different functions, their seniority, responsibility, and role classification and importance were equivalent, making the pay gap discriminatory. The female claimant had also been at the company longer than the male members of the board of directors, and had a similar level of education. Finally, the Court was of the view that the claimant’s work was of equal value to her male counterparts’ work, and as such, there was no justification for the inequality of pay.

Le plaignant était la Responsable des Ressources Humaines de son entreprise et réclame du salaire rétroactif, revendiquant la discrimination de genre, et l’inégalité de rémunération fondé sur son genre, pendant son travail à l’entreprise. Elle conteste l’inégalité salariale en comparaison à ses collègues, des hommes membres du comité de direction, quand ils avaient tous des responsabilités comparables, une identité de niveau hiérarchique similaire, et une classification semblable. Avant cette décision, une inégalité salariale ne pouvait pas fonder des allégations de discrimination sur la base du genre, quand les employés exercent des fonctions différentes. La Cour de Cassation renverse la décision de la cour d’appel de Paris, et trouve qu’une inégalité salariale entre membres du comité de direction fondé sur le genre qualifie comme de la discrimination. La Cour de Cassation trouve que même si la plaignante, une femme, avais une fonction différente des autres membres du comité de direction, elle avait une identité comparable au niveau hiérarchique, en termes de classification, de responsabilités, et d’importance comparable, par rapport au fonctionnement de l'entreprise. La plaignante était aussi à l’entreprise plus longtemps, et avait un niveau d’éducation comparable. Finalement, la Cour de Cassation trouve que le travail de la plaignante était de valeur équivalente aux autres membres du comité de direction, et qu’il n’y avait donc aucune justification pour l’inégalité de salaire.

This decision ratified the content of the "100 Rules of Basel" on access to justice for people in vulnerable conditions. The incorporation of such rules guarantees equality and non-discrimination rights, facilitating the participation of people in conditions of vulnerability before the Judicial System. The decision also creates a multidisciplinary commission, to be operated under the supervision of the ‘Human Rights Directorate’ Ministry, whose main responsibility is the promotion, in a plural and coordinated manner, of these rules, so that they are generally known and adopted.

Esta decisión ratificó el contenido de las “100 Reglas de Basilea” sobre el acceso a la justicia de las personas en condiciones de vulnerabilidad. La incorporación de tales normas garantiza los derechos de igualdad y no discriminación, facilitando la participación de las personas en condiciones de vulnerabilidad en el Sistema Judicial. La decisión también crea una comisión multidisciplinaria, que funcionará bajo la supervisión del Ministerio “Dirección de Derechos Humanos”, cuya responsabilidad principal es la promoción, de manera plural y coordinada, de estas normas, para que sean conocidas y adoptadas en general.

This decision provides that complaints of domestic violence must be channeled through the ‘Permanent Attention Office’ (Oficina de Atención Permanente). This Office is responsible of receiving all types of domestic or intra-family violence claims, without making any distinction based on the sex or age of the victims. Since violence against women constitutes a violation of human rights, the creation of the Office is intended to streamline judicial proceedings, serving victims of physical or mental abuse in a timely and efficient manner.

Esta decisión establece que las denuncias de violencia intrafamiliar deben canalizarse a través de la Oficina de Atención Permanente. Esta Oficina es la encargada de recibir todo tipo de denuncias por violencia doméstica o intrafamiliar, sin distinción alguna en razón de sexo o edad de las víctimas. Dado que la violencia contra la mujer constituye una violación de los derechos humanos, la creación de la Oficina tiene por objeto agilizar los procesos judiciales, atendiendo a las víctimas de maltrato físico o psíquico de manera oportuna y eficiente.

This decision promoted the systematization of complaints relating to domestic and intra-family violence. It updated the ‘Violence Registration Form’ approved by Decision nº 454 dated April 24, 2007. The form promotes a system of centralized information and, consequently, accurate statistical indicators that will help authorities to better understand and prevent violence against women. This decision also promotes a new management model for all cases and complaints relating to domestic, intra-family violence and violence against women, filed in the ‘peace courts’ (juzgados de paz) throughout the country.

Esta decisión impulsó la sistematización de las denuncias relacionadas con violencia doméstica e intrafamiliar. Actualizó el “Formulario de Registro de Violencia” aprobado en la Decisión nº 454 del 24 de abril de 2007. El formulario promueve un sistema de información centralizada y, en consecuencia, indicadores estadísticos precisos que ayudarán a las autoridades a comprender mejor y prevenir la violencia contra las mujeres. Esta decisión también promueve un nuevo modelo de gestión para todos los casos y denuncias relacionadas con la violencia doméstica, intrafamiliar y contra la mujer, que se presenten en los juzgados de paz de todo el país.

The case concerned sexual abuse involving an underage victim. The court ruled in accordance with article 135.1º, 4º of the Criminal Code, on sexual abuse of minors, finding the defendant guilty and sentencing him to eight years in prison. It was argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, who was a minor. For such purposes, the defendant used to pick the plaintiff up at school and take her in his car to empty places to have sexual intercourse. The court held that the plaintiff as a victim shall be protected against all forms of sexual abuse and violence, as established by the national Constitution. Because she was a minor, her consent to enter into such relations was void and, therefore, must not be considered a reason to leave her without protection.

El caso se refería al abuso sexual de una víctima menor de edad. El tribunal resolvió el caso de conformidad con el artículo 135.1º, 4º del Código Penal, sobre abusos sexuales a menores, declarando culpable al acusado y condenándolo a ocho años de prisión. Se argumentó que el acusado mantuvo varios encuentros sexuales con la demandante, quien era menor de edad. Para tales efectos, el imputado recogía a la demandante en la escuela y la llevaba en su automóvil a lugares solitarios para tener relaciones sexuales. El tribunal sostuvo que la denunciante como víctima debe ser protegida contra toda forma de abuso y violencia sexual, tal como lo establece la Constitución Nacional. Por ser menor de edad, su consentimiento para entablar tales relaciones fue nulo y, por tanto, no se considera motivo para dejarla sin protección.

This case concerned women’s equality in public-sector employment. The court ruled in favor of gender quotas for positions of public power. The plenary of the court reviewed a statutory project regulating the effective participation of women in public institutions by the establishment of gender quotas. A minimum of 30% of the top decision-making positions, among other senior positions in public Colombian institutions, shall be held by women. Sanctions were established for those appointing authorities that would not comply with the rule. Sanctions consisted of a 30-day period suspension and, if non-compliance persisted, destitution from public charges. It was argued that the aim of the project was to ensure genuine and effective equality of opportunities, which was considered a legitimate constitutional end. Nevertheless, the court held that some of the proposed provisions did not comply with the Constitution. For instance, some of the regulated sanctions were considered to be disproportionate. Thus, the court endorsed the Congress to issue the legislation excluding the provisions that were unconstitutional.

Este caso se refería a la igualdad laboral de la mujer en el sector público. La Corte Constitucional consideró constitucional el establecimiento de cuotas de género para los cargos del poder público. La plenaria de la Corte revisó un proyecto de ley que regulaba la participación efectiva de las mujeres en las instituciones públicas mediante el establecimiento de cuotas de género. Al menos el 30% de los cargos directivos y otros altos cargos de las instituciones públicas colombianas, deberán ser ocupados por mujeres. Se establecieron sanciones para aquellas autoridades que no cumplieran con la norma. Las sanciones consistían en la suspensión por un período de 30 días y, de persistir el incumplimiento, la destitución de los cargos públicos. Se argumentó que el objeto del proyecto era garantizar una igualdad de oportunidades real y efectiva, lo que se consideraba un fin constitucional legítimo. Sin embargo, la Corte argumentó que algunas de las disposiciones propuestas no estaban alineadas con la Constitución, por ejemplo, algunas de las sanciones reguladas se consideraron desproporcionadas. De esta manera, el tribunal avaló al Congreso para dictar la legislación excluyendo las disposiciones que fueran inconstitucionales.

The case concerned women’s sexual and reproductive rights, specifically the right to voluntarily terminate the pregnancy. The court ruled that sexual and reproductive rights, including abortion in certain circumstances, are subject to constitutional protection. A pregnant woman’s husband requested that the health care provider perform a genetic and pathological test on the fetus and the termination of his wife’s pregnancy, based on an alleged diagnosis of malformation, among other complications. The doctor refused upon conscientious objection. The court cited the ruling C-355/06, which referred to the decriminalization of abortion under any of three circumstances: (i) the pregnancy poses a serious risk for the woman life, (ii) the fetus has severe malformations or (iii) the pregnancy was the result of a rape. In this decision, the court also ruled that the physician’s conscientious objection to perform the procedure was inadmissible. Ultimately, specific guidelines were established, so women could freely exercise their right to voluntarily terminate their pregnancy under the authorized scenarios. As such, the court instructed the Superintendent of Health (‘Superintendencia Nacional de Salud’) to adopt a number of measures to ensure that health centers and medical institutions have adequate staff to attend voluntary abortions.

El caso se refería a los derechos sexuales y reproductivos de la mujer, específicamente el derecho a interrumpir voluntariamente el embarazo. La Corte Constitucional indicó que los derechos sexuales y reproductivos, incluido el aborto en determinadas circunstancias, son objeto de protección constitucional. El esposo de una mujer embarazada solicitó a la prestadora de salud la realización de un examen genético y patológico al feto y la interrupción del embarazo de su esposa, con base en un presunto diagnóstico de malformación, entre otras complicaciones. El médico se negó por objeción de conciencia. La Corte Constitucional citó la sentencia C-355/06, que se refería a la despenalización del aborto en cualquiera de estas tres circunstancias: (i) el embarazo presenta un riesgo grave para la vida de la mujer, (ii) el feto presenta malformaciones graves o (iii) el embarazo fue el resultado de una violación. En esta sentencia, la Corte también declaró inadmisible la objeción de conciencia del médico para realizar el procedimiento. En definitiva, se establecieron lineamientos específicos para que las mujeres pudieran ejercer libremente su derecho a interrumpir voluntariamente su embarazo en los supuestos autorizados. Como tal, la Corte instruyó a la Superintendencia Nacional de Salud a adoptar una serie de medidas para garantizar que los centros de salud y las instituciones médicas cuenten con el personal adecuado para atender abortos voluntarios.

This decision unified court’s criteria regarding issues of protection of motherhood and employment rights for pregnant women. The Constitutional Court analyzed 33 cases where pregnant women were dismissed by their employers after learning of their pregnancy status. The court ruled in favor of reinforced protection of motherhood in the workplace. Such doctrine must be duly applied in all those cases in which a woman is pregnant or during her lactation period. In relation to the dismissal of female workers, the court established criteria that takes into consideration the knowledge of the pregnancy status by the employer. It is argued that in order to dismiss a woman under such circumstances, the employer shall demonstrate (i) that a fair motive can be argued and (ii) that permission from the competent administrative authority has been granted. The required protection measures in cases where the employer dismissed the worker without the aforementioned procedure are as follows: (i) recognition of health benefits, up to the moment the woman acquires the right to claim the economic maternity leave benefit; (ii) reinstatement of the pregnant woman or the renewal of her contract, whenever possible; (iii) in some cases, compensation as provided for in article 239 of the Labor Code.

Esta sentencia unificó los criterios de la Corte Constitucional en temas de protección de la maternidad y derechos laborales de las mujeres embarazadas. La Corte Constitucional analizó 33 casos en los que mujeres embarazadas fueron despedidas por sus empleadores después de conocer su estado de embarazo. El tribunal falló a favor de una protección laboral reforzada de la maternidad en el lugar de trabajo. Tal doctrina debe ser debidamente aplicada en todos aquellos casos en los que una mujer se encuentre embarazada o lactando. En relación con el despido de trabajadoras, la Corte estableció criterios que toman en consideración el conocimiento del estado de embarazo por parte del empleador. Se argumenta que, para despedir a una mujer embarazada, el empleador deberá demostrar (i) que se puede alegar una justa causa y (ii) que se ha otorgado el permiso de la autoridad administrativa competente. Las medidas de protección requeridas en los casos en que el empleador despida a la trabajadora sin el procedimiento antes mencionado son las siguientes: (i) reconocimiento de beneficios de salud, hasta el momento en que la mujer adquiera el derecho a reclamar el beneficio económico de licencia por maternidad; (ii) la reincorporación de la mujer embarazada o la renovación de su contrato, cuando sea posible; (iii) en algunos casos, la indemnización prevista en el artículo 239 del Código del Trabajo.

This action concerned couples’ reproductive health rights, specifically related to in vitro fertilization treatment ("IVF"). The plaintiff requested protection of his fundamental health and equality rights and his right to have a family, which he considered violated by Salud Total EPS when it refused to carry out an IVF procedure for the plaintiff’s wife. The Constitutional Court held that infertility is considered by the World Health Organization as a reproductive system disease that affects the couple who suffer from it. Thus, the State must adopt affirmative actions tending to include assisted reproduction techniques in the national health system when the couple does not have enough resources to afford it. Failure to do so may result in a violation of the fundamental rights to reproductive health and personal integrity. Thus, the court ruled that Salud Total EPS was obligated to provide the couple with the IVF procedure to protect their reproductive health rights. Furthermore, the court exhorted the Colombian Government and the Health Ministry to evaluate the best mechanism to add IVF treatments to the national mandatory health plan for those people that cannot afford the procedure.

Esta acción se refería a los derechos de salud reproductiva de las parejas, específicamente relacionados con el tratamiento de fecundación in vitro. El demandante solicitó la protección de sus derechos fundamentales de salud e igualdad y su derecho a formar una familia, los cuales consideró vulnerados por parte de Salud Total EPS al negarse a realizar un procedimiento de fecundación in vitro a la pareja del demandante. La Corte Constitucional sostuvo que la infertilidad es considerada por la Organización Mundial de la Salud como una enfermedad del sistema reproductivo que afecta a la pareja que la padece. En este sentido, el Estado debe adoptar acciones afirmativas tendientes a incluir las técnicas de reproducción asistida en el sistema nacional de salud cuando la pareja no cuenta con los recursos suficientes para costearlo. El no hacerlo puede resultar en una violación de los derechos fundamentales a la salud reproductiva y la integridad personal. En esta línea, la Corte dictaminó que Salud Total EPS estaba obligada a brindarle a la pareja el procedimiento in vitro para proteger sus derechos de salud reproductiva. Además, la Corte exhortó al Gobierno de Colombia y al Ministerio de Salud a evaluar el mejor mecanismo para incorporar los tratamientos de fecundación in vitro al plan nacional de salud obligatorio para aquellas personas que no pueden costear el procedimiento.

This judicial review concerned the issue of women’s military service. The court ruled that limits on the activities that women can perform during voluntary military service were unconstitutional, because they violated women’s constitutional right to be treated equally. The law stated that women in the military could only engage in assistant, administrative, or cultural tasks. The Court indicated that such limitations were based on stereotypes that imply that women are not suitable for other military activities. Consequently, the Court argued that those measures were unreasonable and disproportionate, and therefore unconstitutional. Arguably, such limits were also contrary to the values and principles of an egalitarian society that confronts patriarchal models of domination and violence against women. The Court elaborated by holding that the activities carried out by each person in the military service must be determined based on the needs of the service and according to objective and reasonable criteria. Characteristics of each person have to be considered, not merely generalized based on gender stereotypes.

Esta demanda de constitucionalidad buscaba analizar las condiciones del servicio militar de las mujeres. La Corte dictaminó que los límites a las actividades que pueden realizar las mujeres durante el servicio militar voluntario eran inconstitucionales, porque violaban el derecho constitucional de las mujeres a ser tratadas en igualdad de condiciones. La ley establecía que las mujeres en las fuerzas armadas solo podían desempeñar tareas de asistentes, tareas administrativas o actividades culturales. La Corte indicó que tales limitaciones se basaban en estereotipos que implican que las mujeres no son aptas para otras actividades militares. En consecuencia, la Corte argumentó que dichas medidas eran infundadas y desproporcionadas y, por lo tanto, inconstitucionales. Tales límites también eran contrarios a los valores y principios de una sociedad igualitaria que busca enfrentar modelos patriarcales de dominación y violencia contra las mujeres. La Corte sostuvo que las actividades realizadas por cada persona en el servicio militar deben determinarse con base en las necesidades del servicio y de acuerdo con criterios objetivos y razonables. Hay que tener en cuenta las características de cada persona, no generalizarlas con base en estereotipos de género.

The case concerned issues of language in judicial rulings that led to revictimization. The protected applicant, the leader of an association of peasant women, was kidnapped and raped by an illegal armed group that considered her a threat. The plaintiff brought suit against two potential perpetrators who were acquitted by the court of Cundinamarca. The Constitutional Court ruled to exclude a section of the aforementioned decision because of the section’s use of vulgar and disqualifying expressions in relation to the victim of sexual violence. The court argued that judges must, in their decisions: (a) avoid value judgments that refer to the personality or physical appearance of an alleged victim of sexual violence; (b) quote literally the testimonies and sections that refer to the analyzed criminal behavior, and; (c) make the descriptions of the provided evidence with an objective and respectful tone.

El caso se refería al uso del lenguaje en sentencias judiciales que conducen a la re-victimización. La persona protegida, líder de una asociación de mujeres campesinas, fue secuestrada y violada por un grupo armado ilegal que la consideraba una amenaza. La víctima denunció a dos posibles perpetradores del crimen, pero fueron absueltos por la Corte de Cundinamarca. La Corte Constitucional resolvió excluir una sección de la sentencia proferida por la Corte de Cundinamarca por el uso de expresiones vulgares e insultantes contra la víctima de violencia sexual. La Corte Constitucional argumentó que los jueces deben, en sus decisiones: (a) evitar hacer juicios de valor que se refieran a la personalidad o apariencia física de una presunta víctima de violencia sexual; (b) citar literalmente los testimonios y apartados que se refieran a la conducta delictiva analizada, y; (c) hacer las descripciones de las pruebas aportadas con un tono objetivo y respetuoso.

This case concerned issues of personal freedom and the discrimination against sex workers. The ruling resulted in the protection of two sex workers’ fundamental rights: to be treated equally and not be discriminated because of their profession. The events that triggered such protection concerned a police raid against sex workers in Bogotá under the excuse of regaining a public space. At that time, the Government was working on the implementation of a special protection program, including special training for police, to promote the importance of the dignified treatment of sex workers and the prohibition of verbal and physical abuse. The decision ultimately further reinforced constitutional protections for sex workers’ rights to freedom, work, free movement, and non-discrimination.

Este caso se refería a cuestiones de libertad personal y discriminación contra las trabajadoras sexuales. El fallo otorgó la protección de los derechos fundamentales de dos trabajadoras sexuales a ser tratadas por igual y a no ser discriminadas por su profesión. Los hechos que desencadenaron tal protección se referían a un allanamiento policial en contra de trabajadoras sexuales en Bogotá bajo el pretexto de la recuperación del espacio público. En ese momento, el Gobierno estaba trabajando en la implementación de un programa de protección especial, incluida la capacitación especial para policías para promover la importancia del trato digno de las trabajadoras sexuales y la prohibición del abuso verbal y físico contra ellas. La decisión finalmente reforzó aún más que los derechos de las trabajadoras sexuales a la libertad, el trabajo, la libre circulación y la no discriminación están protegidos constitucionalmente.

The court reviewed a decision made by the ‘Family Commissioner’ (Comisario de Familia) and endorsed by the Family Judge (Juzgado de Familia), denying the plaintiff’s request for precautionary measures against the defendant, based on physical and psychological aggressions. The Commissioner estimated that there was not enough evidence as to affirm that the risk to the plaintiff’s life or integrity. Given the parties’ mutual aggression, the Commissioner advised the couple to cease all acts of violence against each other. The plaintiff alleged that the Commissioner did not take into consideration a medical report by the Institute of Legal Medicine (Instituto de Medicina Legal) acknowledging the existing risks to the plaintiff’s physical integrity. The judge who initially heard the case endorsed the Commissioner’s decision. The Constitutional Court ultimately overturned the court’s decision based on the special protections granted to women in the context of domestic violence. Such special protection arises out of the historical disadvantages that women have had to face within society, especially within the family environment. On this note, the Court ruled that any failure by the competent authorities to provide protection measures against domestic violence violates the fundamental rights of women, understood as a vulnerable group within society.

In this case, the defendant, the mayor of a Colombian town, was convicted of rape and non-consensual abortion. The penalty was 261 months of imprisonment and 20 years of disqualification from exercising political roles in the public sector. The prosecutor argued that the defendant had several sexual encounters with the plaintiff, a minor, against her will and, as a result, she got pregnant. The defendant forced the plaintiff to terminate the pregnancy. The defendant argued before the Supreme Court of Justice that the appellant court omitted at least seven fundamental testimonies. The defendant also claimed that the plaintiff’s testimony, as well as some of the testimonies from other witnesses, was inconsistent. The plaintiff declared out-of-court that the defendant raped her and forced her to abort, however, during the appellate trial she testified that the lawsuit was a stratagem designed by her uncle, who was a candidate and political opponent of the defendant, to discredit the defendant. However, the appellate court learned that defendant, in order to obtain an acquittal, extorted, threatened, and attempted to bribe the plaintiff, plaintiff’s relatives, and other witnesses involved in the case. The Supreme Court of Justice found that even though the plaintiff changed her testimony, the other evidence suggested that the defendant was guilty of the charges. Therefore, the Court ultimately upheld the defendant’s conviction.

En este caso, el acusado, alcalde de un pueblo colombiano, fue condenado por acceso carnal violento y aborto no consentido. La pena fue de 261 meses de prisión y 20 años de inhabilitación para ejercer cargos públicos. El fiscal argumentó que el acusado tuvo varios encuentros sexuales con una víctima menor de edad, en contra de su voluntad y, como consecuencia, quedó embarazada. La víctima fue obligada por el acusado a interrumpir el embarazo. El acusado alegó ante la Corte Suprema de Justicia que la corte de segunda instancia omitió al menos siete testimonios fundamentales para el caso. También afirmó que el testimonio de la víctima, así como algunos de los testimonios de otros testigos, eran inconsistentes. La víctima declaró extrajudicialmente que el acusado la violó y la obligó a abortar, sin embargo, durante el juicio de apelación declaró que la demanda fue una estrategia diseñada por su tío, quien era candidato y opositor político del acusado, para desacreditar al acusado. Sin embargo, la corte de segunda instancia se enteró que el acusado extorsionó, amenazó e intentó sobornar a la víctima, a los familiares de la víctima y a otros testigos involucrados en el caso, con el fin de obtener una absolución. La Corte Suprema de Justicia encontró que, a pesar de que la víctima cambió su testimonio, la evidencia sugería que el acusado era culpable de los cargos que se le imputaban. Por lo tanto, la Corte finalmente confirmó la condena del acusado.

The plaintiff was a mother whose second and third pregnancies were complicated by medical issues and resulted in her suffering from a stroke and temporary paralysis. She was advised that her life would be endangered if she became pregnant again. As such, she sought to obtain contraceptives, but their sale and importation was prohibited by Irish law. The Supreme Court held that a law prohibiting the importation, sale or advertising of contraceptives was inconsistent with the plaintiff’s right to privacy in marital affairs, an unenumerated right in the Irish Constitution. Although the Court left undisturbed the then-existing ban on sale of contraceptives in Ireland, the use and importation of contraceptives was not prohibited based on the law’s inconsistency with the Constitution.

The plaintiff, the Child and Family Agency, sought permission to disclose the HIV status of A., a minor teenager living with HIV since birth in the plaintiff’s care, to another minor (B.) who the plaintiff believed had a sexual relationship with A. A. denied having a sexual relationship with B. and refused to consent to the disclosure of his HIV status. The plaintiff argued that it was entitled to disclose A.’s status so that B. could obtain testing, medical treatment, and counseling. Citing doctor-patient confidentiality, the High Court refused to order disclosure of A.’s HIV status without his consent. The test applied by the court was whether, on the balance of probabilities, the failure to breach patient confidentiality would create a significant risk of death or very serious harm to an innocent third party. The court concluded that it did not because the plaintiff failed to establish on the balance of probabilities that A. and B. were having unprotected sex. In addition, the court reasoned, if B. was willing to have unprotected sex with A., thereby assuming all the risks associated with unprotected sex, then the “low” risk of HIV infection (due to (i) A. taking anti-retroviral medication, albeit without complete consistency, (ii) A. having an undetectable viral load when tested, and (iii) HIV being a "chronic condition" rather than "a terminal illness") in such circumstances is not such as to justify breaching a patient’s right to confidentiality, which should only be breached in exceptional circumstances. The court repeatedly expressed concerns about "paternalistic" state interference in private matters. Finally, the court emphasized the public interest in HIV-positive people seeking treatment rather than foregoing medical care to avoid potential disclosure of their status or sexual activities.

In 2007, the High Court held that the failure to allow the applicant, a transgender woman who had undergone gender-affirming surgery, to obtain a new birth certificate recording her gender as female violated her rights under Article 8 and 12 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which had been made part of Irish law, despite having found in previous proceedings involving the same applicant that her constitutional right to privacy was not disproportionately or excessively infringed. The Court agreed with the applicant that existing Irish law barred the effective recognition of her Article 8 and 12 rights in Ireland as they rendered her without the power to correct or vary the original entry on her birth certificate. The High Court considered the European Court of Human Right’s 2002 decisions in Goodwin v. United Kingdom and I. v. United Kingdom, in which the Court held that the State’s failure to have a system of law in place affording proper respect for a trans person’s Convention rights violated Articles 8 and 12 of the Convention.

The plaintiff, a newspaper editor, was convicted under a Virginia law making it illegal for "any person, by publication, lecture, advertisement, or by the sale or circulation of any publication, or in any other manner, [from encouraging] or [prompting] the procuring of abortion or miscarriage." The plaintiff challenged the constitutionality of this law and argued that it violated rights protected by the First Amendment. The Court rejected the Supreme Court of Virginia’s ruling that commercial speech was not protected by the First Amendment, and further held that the Virginia Law violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.

A Massachusetts statute made it illegal to give “drugs, medicine, instrument or article whatever for the prevention of contraception” to any unmarried person. The plaintiff, found guilty of violating the statute, challenged its constitutionality, claiming it violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Court held that a statute preventing unmarried people from obtaining contraception was unconstitutional. The Court found that unequal access to contraception for married and unmarried people created a suspect class in violation of the Equal Protection Clause and the right to privacy as discussed in Griswold v. Connecticut (1965).

The Supreme Court held that the appellate court erred in finding that the appellant’s professional activity of assisting with childbirth at home is prohibited. Instead, it specified that the circumstances of her working without a license and necessary qualifications, such as being a doctor, an obstetrician-gynecologist, or a midwife, made this type of activity illegal.

Aukščiausiasis Teismas nusprendė, kad apeliacinis teismas suklydo konstatuodamas, jog apeliantės profesinė veikla—pagalba gimdyti namuose, yra draudžiama. Vietoj to, Teismas nurodė, kad šio darbo be licencijos ir būtinų kvalifikacijų aplinkybės padarė tokio pobūdžio veiklą neteisėtą. Sveikatos apsaugos ministras 2019 m. patvirtino įsakymą Nr. V-10 dėl gimdymo namuose priežiūros paslaugos teikimo tvarkos aprašo patvirtinimo.

The applicant, a translator for the Romanian Embassy, was terminated without explanation the day after officially informing the employer of her pregnancy. She argued that her dismissal was based on gender discrimination, while the employer stated that it was because of unsatisfactory results during the contractual probationary period. The Court ruled in favor of the applicant awarding LT 50,000 in pecuniary and LT 10,000 in non-pecuniary damages to be paid by the Romanian Embassy in the Republic of Lithuania.

Pareiškėja, vertėja Rumunijos ambasadoje, buvo atleista iš darbo be paaiškinimo dieną po to, kai oficialiai informavo darbdavį apie savo nėštumą. Ji grindė šį atleidimą diskriminacija dėl lyties, bet darbdavys nurodė, kad priežastis buvo nepatenkinami rezultatai bandomuoju sutarties laikotarpiu. Teismas priėmė sprendimą ieškovės naudai priteisdamas 50 000 LT turtinės žalos ir 10 000 LT neturtinės žalos, kurią turi sumokėti Rumunijos ambasada Lietuvos Respublikoje.

This case considers conformity of constitutional provisions mandating that the State shall ensure, foster, and protect fatherhood, motherhood, and childhood, with the Children’s Maintenance Fund’s requirement that the applicant and the child must permanently reside in Lithuania to receive benefits. The petitioner argued that if the applicant and the child would lose their state-guaranteed support upon leaving Lithuania, it would violate the right to freedom of movement and the State’s duty to prioritize child interests. The Court clarified that the applicant and the child must permanently reside within the Country at the moment of the application for benefits but can move to another State later without the termination of benefits; therefore, the Law of the Fund does not contradict the Constitution. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje nagrinėjamas konstitucinių nuostatų, įpareigojančių valstybę užtikrinti, puoselėti ir saugoti tėvystę, motinystę ir vaikystę, atitikimas Vaikų išlaikymo fondo reikalavimui, kad pareiškėjas ir vaikas nuolat gyventų Lietuvoje, norint gauti išlaikymo išmokas. Pareiškėjas teigė, kad jeigu jie ir vaikas išvykęs iš Lietuvos prarastų valstybės garantuojamą paramą, tai pažeistų jų judėjimo laisvę ir valstybės pareigą teikti pirmenybę vaiko interesams. Teismas išaiškino, kad pareiškėjas ir vaikas prašymo skirti išmoką pateikimo metu turi nuolat gyventi Lietuvoje, tačiau vėliau gali persikelti į kitą valstybę neprarasdami išmokos, todėl Vaikų išlaikymo fondo įstatymas neprieštarauja Konstitucijai.

This case considers conformity of a Constitutional provision declaring that the State recognizes marriages registered in church with the Matrimonial and Family Code, which states that only civil marriages have legal effect. A widow was refused inheritance from her deceased spouse because their marriage was not contracted in a civil office before the passage of the Constitution. The Court affirmed that Constitutional provisions could not be applied retroactively, and thus only after 1992 when the legislation came into force can a church marriage be recognized by the State. English translation available here.

Šioje byloje nagrinėjamos konstitucinės nuostatos, skelbiančios, kad valstybė pripažįsta bažnyčioje įregistruotas santuokas, atitikimas santuokos ir šeimos kodeksui, kuriame teigiama, kad teisinę galią turi tik civilinės santuokos. Našlei buvo atsisakyta išduoti paveldėjimo teisės liudijimą, nes santuoka su vėlioniu nebuvo sudaryta civilinės metrikacijos institucijose iki Konstitucijos priėmimo. Teismas patvirtino, kad konstitucinės nuostatos negali būti taikomos atgaline data, todėl tik po 1992 m., kai įstatymas įsigaliojo, valstybė gali pripažinti bažnytinę santuoką.

The local court denied the petitioner’s motion to certify the approval of her female partner to conduct in vitro fertilization with a third person’s semen. The regional court denied the appeal. It held that the wording of the Austrian Reproductive Medicine Act (FMedG) aims to exclude same-sex parenthood. The Supreme Court decided to bring this question to the attention of the Austrian Constitutional Court. The Austrian Constitutional Court decided that certain sections of the FMedG were unconstitutional. Referencing the European Court of Human Right’s judgements, the Court stressed that same-sex partnerships can fall under the protection of Article 8 of the EHRC as a family. Even though the legislature has discretion in the implementation of new rules, the FMedG is missing sufficient grounds for a differential treatment of same sex couples and heterosexual couples. The impact of this decision was far-reaching because it made it immediately permissible for lesbian couples to receive sperm donations and reproductive medication. Before this decision, these medical treatments were solely available to heterosexual couples.

Das Amtsgericht lehnte den Antrag der Antragsstellerin ab, die Zustimmung ihres weiblichen Partners zur Durchführung einer In-vitro-Fertilisation mit dem Samen einer dritten Person zu bescheinigen. Das Landgericht wies die Berufung zurück. Es vertrat die Auffassung, dass der Wortlaut des österreichischen Fortpflanzungsmedizingesetzes (FMedG) darauf abziele, gleichgeschlechtliche Elternschaft auszuschließen. Der Oberste Gerichtshof beschloss, den österreichischen Verfassungsgerichtshof mit dieser Frage zu befassen. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof entschied, dass bestimmte Abschnitte des FMedG verfassungswidrig sind. Unter Verweis auf die Urteile des Europäischen Gerichtshofs für Menschenrechte betonte das Gericht, dass gleichgeschlechtliche Partnerschaften als Familie unter den Schutz von Artikel 8 der EMRK fallen können. Auch wenn der Gesetzgeber bei der Umsetzung neuer Regelungen einen Ermessensspielraum hat, fehlt es dem FMedG an einer ausreichenden Begründung für eine unterschiedliche Behandlung von gleichgeschlechtlichen und heterosexuellen Paaren. Die Auswirkungen dieser Entscheidung waren weitreichend, da sie es lesbischen Paaren sofort erlaubte, Samenspenden und reproduktionsmedizinische Behandlungen in Anspruch zu nehmen. Vor dieser Entscheidung waren diese medizinischen Behandlungen ausschließlich heterosexuellen Paaren vorbehalten.

The appellant, a Somali girl, applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection due to her precarious situation in Yemen. The appellant’s family fled to Yemen when she was four years old because her family was discriminated against in Somalia due to their affiliation with a Madhibaan minority clan. The plaintiff’s brother and father were killed and no other family remained in Somalia. Further, female genital mutilation is a common practice in Somalia. The appellant’s application for asylum and international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that the nature of the persecution was found to be insufficiently intense or severe. It was further decided that the appellant’s genital mutilation had already happened , so the international protection against threatened genital mutilation could not apply. However, the Austrian Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of this case were not given sufficient consideration, in particular, the disregard of the fact that women of minority clans in the relevant geographic areas were particularly vulnerable to risks of torture, rape, murder, and forced marriages. The lower court also failed to consider sufficiently the possibility of repeated genital mutilation. Finally, the Court referred to UNHCR’s finding that prior genital mutilation was an equally reasonable justification for the application for asylum and international protection because the victim suffered life-long physical and mental damages.

Die Beschwerdeführerin, ein somalisches Mädchen, beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz aufgrund ihrer prekären Situation im Jemen. Die Familie der Klägerin floh in den Jemen, als sie vier Jahre alt war, weil ihre Familie in Somalia aufgrund ihrer Zugehörigkeit zu einem Clan der Madhibaan-Minderheit diskriminiert wurde. Der Bruder und der Vater der Klägerin wurden getötet, und keine andere Familie blieb in Somalia. Außerdem ist die weibliche Genitalverstümmelung in Somalia eine gängige Praxis. Der Antrag der Klägerin auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, dass die Art der Verfolgung nicht ausreichend intensiv oder schwer sei. Außerdem wurde festgestellt, dass die Genitalverstümmelung der Beschwerdeführerin bereits stattgefunden hatte, so dass der internationale Schutz gegen drohende Genitalverstümmelung nicht zur Anwendung kommen konnte. Der österreichische Verfassungsgerichtshof hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf, da er (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) feststellte, dass die Umstände dieses Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere die Tatsache, dass Frauen von Minderheitenclans in den betreffenden geografischen Gebieten besonders gefährdet sind, gefoltert, vergewaltigt, ermordet und zwangsverheiratet werden. Die Vorinstanz hat auch die Möglichkeit wiederholter Genitalverstümmelung nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt. Schließlich verwies das Gericht auf die Feststellung des UNHCR, dass eine frühere Genitalverstümmelung eine ebenso angemessene Begründung für den Antrag auf Asyl und internationalen Schutz sei, da das Opfer lebenslange körperliche und seelische Schäden erleidet.

The 90-year-old female appellant (an Iraqi national) applied to the Austrian government for asylum and international protection, stating that due to the war in Iraq, she feared for her life and for her family. She stated that she had been threatened by various battle groups. It appeared that the appellant was confined to a wheelchair and suffered from various illnesses including labyrinthine deafness, arterial hypertonia, kidney cysts, and dementia with behavioral disorder. Her application for international protection was rejected by the relevant asylum authorities and the Austrian Federal Administrative Court on the grounds that she did not meet the criteria for asylum or international protection. Among other reasons, her medical conditions were found to be insufficiently serious and of a nature that could be treated in Iraq. In addition, the fact that she still had family in Iraq to support her was found to be sufficient proof that she could lead a life without undue hardship. However, the Constitutional Court ultimately revoked this judgment, finding (among other conclusions) that the circumstances of the case were not sufficiently considered, especially the appellant’s age, serious medical condition, unreasonable difficulty accessing medical treatment in Iraq. Therefore, the Court found (1) the appellant’s rights of Article 3 European Human Rights Convention to be violated, and (2) the lower court’s decision arbitrary.

Die 90-jährige Beschwerdeführerin (eine irakische Staatsangehörige) beantragte bei der österreichischen Regierung Asyl und internationalen Schutz mit der Begründung, dass sie aufgrund des Krieges im Irak um ihr Leben und ihre Familie fürchte. Sie gab an, dass sie von verschiedenen Kampfgruppen bedroht worden sei. Es stellte sich heraus, dass die Beschwerdeführerin an einen Rollstuhl gefesselt war und an verschiedenen Krankheiten litt, darunter labyrinthische Taubheit, arterielle Hypertonie, Nierenzysten und Demenz mit Verhaltensstörungen. Ihr Antrag auf internationalen Schutz wurde von den zuständigen Asylbehörden und dem österreichischen Bundesverwaltungsgericht mit der Begründung abgelehnt, sie erfülle nicht die Kriterien für Asyl oder internationalen Schutz. Unter anderem wurde ihr Gesundheitszustand als nicht so schwerwiegend eingestuft, sodass dieser auch im Irak behandelt werden könne. Außerdem wurde die Tatsache, dass sie noch Familie im Irak hat, die sie unterstützen könnte, als ausreichender Beweis dafür angesehen, dass sie ein Leben ohne unzumutbare Härten führen kann. Das Verfassungsgericht hob dieses Urteil jedoch schließlich auf und stellte (neben anderen Schlussfolgerungen) fest, dass die Umstände des Falles nicht ausreichend berücksichtigt wurden, insbesondere das Alter der Beschwerdeführerin, ihr schwerer Gesundheitszustand und die unzumutbaren Schwierigkeiten beim Zugang zu medizinischer Behandlung im Irak. Daher stellte das Gericht fest, dass (1) die Rechte des Beschwerdeführers aus Artikel 3 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonvention verletzt wurden und (2) die Entscheidung der unteren Instanz willkürlich war.

The applicant alleged that the respondent terminated her employment in violation of Section 57 (1) and (2) of the Employment Act, which respectively require that termination must be for a valid cause and only after the employee has had an opportunity to defend herself. In the course of her testimony, she described systemic racial discrimination, harassment, and sexual assault by her superiors in the workplace. The applicant alleged that women were frequently raped or indecently assaulted, but the employer never punished the perpetrators and there was no mechanism for complaint. The court, recognizing its lack of jurisdiction over the allegations of grave human rights abuses, used its discretionary authority to forward the decision to appropriate institutions, including the Office of the Ombudsman and the Human Rights Commission for public enquiries. This case demonstrates a non-judicial pathway for investigation into gender-based issues and the ability of the judiciary to put such efforts into motion.

This judgment was issued as part of the assessment proceedings subsequent to a judicial review by the state. This review investigated systemic and individual failures resulting in police officers committing widespread violent and traumatic sexual assaults and rapes of women and girls during the civil unrest in October 2019. The court was tasked with assessing the amount of compensation to be awarded to the 18 applicants on whose behalf the review was conducted. The basis for this award was the previous judgment of the court that: (i) failures by the Inspector General of Police resulted in violence, torture, and inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment against the applicants in violation of section 19(3) of the Constitution; (ii) failures by the Inspector General of Police further resulted in violations of the right of applicants to dignity and equality under sections 19(1) and 20 of the Constitution; and (iii) failures by the Clerk of the National Assembly and the Malawi Police Service to investigate and prosecute the allegations of violence and rape resulted in violations of the right of access to justice under section 41 of the Constitution. The court also found numerous violations of domestic laws, including the Police Act, as well as Malawi’s obligations under human rights treaties, including CEDAW. Under section 46(4) of the Constitution, the courts have the power to award compensation to any person whose rights or freedoms have been unlawfully denied or violated. The court applied the principle of restitution intergrum, or making the victim whole as they would have been prior to the violation, and turned to international precedents when evaluating appropriate amounts. The court noted that any amount should be elevated when caused by a “constitutional duty bearer,” such as the police, and that lack of investigation was an aggravating factor. The court awarded different amounts to each applicant depending on the circumstances of their particular harm, ranging from K4,500,000-10,000,000, in addition to costs.

The appellant pleaded guilty to raping and impregnating a 12-year-old girl for which he was originally sentenced to 12 years imprisonment with hard labor. On appeal, the appellant argued that his sentence was excessive in light of mitigating factors. While recognizing the victim’s age and pregnancy as aggravating factors, the appeals court reduced his sentence to nine years imprisonment. The court articulated several rules regarding mitigation in favor of this outcome based on the citation of cases from the appellant. First, the court stated that guilty pleas should reduce a sentence by one-third, even in the case of serious crimes. Second, citing in Rep v. Bamusi Mkwapatira, the court stated that all first-time offenders, regardless of the severity of the offense, should benefit from mitigation. Finally, the court identified the appellant, who was 33 years old at the time of the offense, as “youthful,” asserting that “men especially grow slowly mentally and at 35 they are at their prime experimenting with life.” Cautioning against mitigating too significantly, however, the court explicitly recognized the victim’s pregnancy, which “disturbed [her] life […] physically and psychologically,” and her very young age as aggravating factors. Thus, the court reduced the sentence by one-quarter, resulting in a nine-year sentence, rather than one-third or more.

The plaintiff, a gay man, participated in a gay recreational softball league. Subsequently, he received criticism at his job as a welfare services coordinator for Clayton Country, Georgia, for his sexual orientation and participating in the league. Previously he had received positive professional evaluations. In 2013, Clayton County conducted an internal audit of the funds the plaintiff managed and then dismissed him for “conduct unbecoming of its employees.” The plaintiff filed a case with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and, in 2016, he filed a pro se lawsuit against the county alleging discrimination based on sexual orientation, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. His case was dismissed by the district court and such dismissal was affirmed by the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. The Supreme Court had to decide whether Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, prohibiting employment discrimination “because of . . . sex” encompassed discrimination based on sexual orientation. The Court held that it was a violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to fire an employee for being gay or transgender. The court reasoned that the ordinary meaning of “because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin” was that firing an employee based on sex was a violation of the Act. This, in turn, applied to one’s homosexuality or transgender status as discrimination on the basis of this required employers to discriminate against employees based on their sex.

The Court found that Article 49(1) of the Labor Standards Act, which prohibits female workers from working at night, violated the Constitution’s gender equality rule. One of the purposes of the article is to protect female workers' health. However, it is a requirement for all workers, and there is no reasonable ground to exclude male workers from this requirement. Another purpose of the article is to protect female workers' safety at night. Based on the Constitution, the state is obligated to take various possible protections, including imposing some obligations on employers to provide safe transportation or dormitories to those female workers. However, instead of protecting female workers' safety at night, the article completely prohibits female workers from working at night, limiting female workers' freedom and right to work at night. Thus, it is unconstitutional.

勞動基準法第49條第1項限制女性勞工於夜間工作之規定，違反憲法第7條保障性別平等之意旨。本條其中一項立法目的，係保障女性勞工之健康，惟此種需求係所有勞工之需求，並無合理理由將男性勞工排除在外。本條另一項立法目的係保障女性勞工夜間工作之安全。基於憲法增修條文規定，國家應有義務採取各種可能之安全保護措施，包括使雇主提供安全交通工具或宿舍予女性勞工之義務。然而，系爭規定竟全面禁止女性勞工於夜間工作，致女性原應享有並受保障之安全夜行權變相成為限制其自由選擇夜間工作之理由，因此系爭規定應屬違憲。

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to eight years imprisonment including hard labor for defilement of an11-month-old girl. On appeal, the appellant’s primary argument was that the testimony of the child’s mother was not sufficiently corroborated and therefore the conviction was not supported by the evidence. He also argued that the sentence was excessive. Regarding the corroboration rule in sexual violence cases, the court announced that it was a longstanding practice based on blatant discrimination against women, who are the predominant victims of such offenses and assumed to be unreliable witnesses. The court found the corroboration rule unlawful under existing constitutional (article 20), evidence, and criminal laws. Instead, the court held that courts should take caution basing convictions on uncorroborated evidence to ensure satisfaction of the burden of proof. Regarding the appellant’s arguments, the court found that there was not sufficient evidence of penetration to sustain the defilement conviction, thus acquitting the appellant of defilement. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported a conviction for the lesser offense of indecent assault, for which the court imposed a sentence of three years of imprisonment out of a maximum of 14 years. The court chose a substantially lower sentence than the maximum due to what it described as mitigating factors, including that: (i) the appellant was a first-time offender; (ii) the child was largely unharmed physically according to the medical report; (iii) there was no evidence that the child would subsequently suffer an STI or psychological impacts; and (iv) the crime was not premeditated in the court’s view, but a crime of opportunity.

The Plenum of the Supreme Court held that divorce based on the claim of one spouse may be granted by the courts if “the preservation of the family has become impossible.” The passing of the three-month reconciliation period and the claim by one spouse is not enough for such a determination, rather, the courts must comprehensively analyze the relationship between the spouses, the motives for the claim for divorce, and the reasons for discord between the spouses with the participation of both spouses. The Plenum further held that if a court determines that there is evidence of the possibility of preserving the family, such as underage children, the duration of the marriage, the Court may, based on the request of one or both spouses, or on its own initiative, postpone the granting of the divorce and grant an additional six-months reconciliation period. The Plenum also determined that because divorce is not allowed during pregnancy and before the child reaches three years of age, unless the other spouse consents or certain other circumstances are established according to the Marriage and Family Code Art. 35, the husband is not permitted to bring a claim for divorce during this time. The Plenum further held that the common joint property of the spouses subject to division at the termination of a marriage is any movable and immovable property that can be the object of a person’s property rights acquired during the marriage. If it is established that one of the spouses alienated the common joint property against the will of the other spouse or contrary to the interest of the family, or hid property, such property or the value of it shall be taken into account at the division of property. If the spouses stopped running a common household before the division of property, only the property acquired during the existence of a common household shall be the joint common property subject to division. Property that was acquired during marriage through the personal funds of one of the spouses, property which belonged to one of the spouses before marriage, property acquired during marriage by gift or inheritance, or items “for individual use,” such as clothing, with the exception of jewelry and other luxury items, shall not be considered common joint property.

The Constitutional Court reviewed the constitutionality of the law “on Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Belarus on Marriage and Family” dated 2011. The Court noted that the Constitution protects marriage, family, motherhood, fatherhood, and childhood. It further noted that the protection and strengthening of the family institution is an integral part of the State’s social policy and held that amendments to the Code are aimed at protecting the family. The Court further noted that the Constitutional guarantee on the equality of both spouses means equal rights and obligations, including the obligation, financially, to support the other spouse. This constitutional guarantee is implemented by the amendments to the Code as it expands the list of circumstances when one spouse can apply to a court for maintenance, including when that spouse is caring for a disabled common child. The Court also held that amendments to the Code establishing that certain contracts between the spouses, such as a prenuptial agreement and agreement on payment of alimony if they contain conditions regarding immovable property, have to be registered with the appropriate State organs, are aimed at ensuring legal certainty and consistency of legal regulation of marriage and family relationships. The Court held that the law “on Amendments and Additions to the Code of the Republic of Belarus on Marriage and Family” dated 2011 was constitutional as it was aimed at strengthening marriage and family institutions, and increasing the spouses’ awareness of their rights and responsibilities.

The appellant was convicted of statutory rape of his partner’s 8-year-old daughter and sentenced to 10 years in prison as well as of payment of a compensation to the victim. Before the trial, the appellant confessed having sexual relations with the minor, arguing that it only happened because he was under the influence of alcohol and had mistaken her for his partner. In his appeal, he, however, 1) denied all accusations against him, 2) argued that no evidence was produced against him, and 3) alleged that his partner had convinced the victim to accuse him of the crime. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts’ decisions, ruling that there was enough physical evidence through gynecological examination that the appellant sexually assaulted the minor more than one time. In deciding to increase the appellant’s sentence and compensation order, the court noted that he waited for his partner to go to sleep before entering another room with the intent and will to perpetrate the morally reprehensible crime against his stepdaughter.

O apelante foi condenado por estupro da filha de 8 anos da sua parceira e sentenciado a 10 anos de prisão, assim como ao pagamento de indenização para a vítima. Antes do julgamento, o apelante confessou ter tido relações sexuais com a menor, argumentando que isso só aconteceu porque ele estava sob a influência do álcool e tinha confundido ela pela sua parceira. Na sua apelação, no entanto, ele 1) negou todas as acusações contra ele, 2) arguiu que não havia evidência produzida contra ele, e 3) alegou que sua parceira havia convencido a vítima a acusá-lo do crime. O Tribunal Supremo reafirmou a decisão da corte inferior, decretando que o exame ginecológico mostrava evidência física suficiente de que o apelante abusou sexualmente da menor mais de uma vez. Ao decidir que a sentença e a ordem de indenização fossem aumentadas, a corte notou que ele esperava a sua parceira dormir para entrar em outro quarto com intenção e vontade de cometer o crime moralmente repreensível contra a sua enteada.

The trial court convicted the accused of one count of murder and sentenced him to 17 years in prison, in addition to financial compensation the victim’s family. The circumstances of the case showed that the accused and the victim were consuming drugs by a local river when, for unrevealed reasons, he pushed her over the stairs which led to the river, at a height of approximately five meters. The victim ended up by the water with bruises on her face and a broken neck, which was stated as the cause of death. Afterwards, the accused took off the victim’s wig and clothes, subsequently burning them. The prosecution argued that his intent was to make it appear as though the victim had suffered sexual assault. There was no autopsy and the evidence was based on 1) the death certificate, 2) photographs, and 3) eye-witnesses who saw both individuals together on that day. The accused confessed during interrogation, but denied the charges during trial. On appeal, the accused argued for a lower sentence. However, the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision. The penalty for murder was increased due to the following circumstances: (i) surprise, (ii) deserted place, and (iii) superiority by reason of gender, under Article 34 of the 1982 Penal Code.

O tribunal de julgamento condenou o acusado por homicídio e sentenciou ele a 17 anos de prisão, em adição a indenização à família da vítima. As circunstâncias do caso mostraram que o acusado e a vítima estavam consumindo drogas perto do rio local quando, por razões não reveladas, ele a empurrou das escadas que levava ao rio, de uma altura de aproximadamente cinco metros. A vítima acabou dentro da água com machucados no rosto e pescoço quebrado, que foi a causa declarada da morte. Após, o acusado retirou a peruca e as roupas da vítima, subsequentemente queimando-as. A acusação argumentou que sua intenção era de fazer parecer com que a vítima tivesse sofrido agressão sexual. Não houve autópsia e a evidência foi baseada em 1) certidão de óbito, 2) fotografias, e 3) testemunhas que viram ambos os indivíduos juntos naquele dia. O réu confessou durante a interrogação, mas negou as acusações durante o julgamento. Na apelação, o acusado pleiteou uma sentença menor. Entretanto, o Tribunal Supremo manteve a decisão da corte inferior. A penalidade por homicídio foi aumentada pelas seguintes circunstâncias: (i) surpresa, (ii) lugar deserto, e (iii) superioridade por razão de gênero, sob o Artigo 34 do Código Penal de 1982.

The appellant was convicted of two accounts of domestic violence in the form of sexual assault of two minors (11 and 9-years-old) and sentenced to 8 years in prison, in addition to payment of a compensation to the victims. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the appellant 1) claimed that the accusation was based merely on the victims’ testimony, which he alleged untrue and made with the sole purpose of monetary gain by their mother (his partner at the time of the crimes), 2) denied having any kind of sexual intercourse with the victims, and 3) claimed the conviction violated his constitutional rights because the evidence was insufficient to prove his guilt. The Supreme Court argued that there was enough physical evidence that the defendant violated both victims, including evidence that proved anal rape. However, as the evidence and testimony of the victims showed, the assault had not occurred through vaginal penetration, but solely anal. Therefore, the type of crime perpetrated had not been correctly invoked by the lower court, as the configuration of sexual assault requires vaginal penetration under Angolan law. Under that paradigm, the Supreme Court ruled that the crime committed was indecent exposure and, consequently, domestic violence and that such criminal offense is punishable with a sentence lower than 12 years in prison. The Supreme Court then found the defendant amnestied and, consequently, extinguished the criminal proceedings against him, without prejudice of the monetary compensation for damages. In 2016, Angola published an amnesty law (Lei nº 11/16) in which it pardoned common crimes punishable by a prison sentence of up to 12 years. Although the amnesty law excludes sexual crimes, the crime committed in this case does not fit the exception, precisely because of the absence of vaginal penetration. At the end of 2020, a new Angolan Penal Code was enacted, which has been in effect since February 2021. The new Penal Code considers both vaginal and anal penetration to be sexual penetration.

O apelante foi condenado por duas ocorrências de violência doméstica na forma de abuso sexual de dois menores (11 e 9 anos de idade) e sentenciado a 8 anos na prisão, com adição de pagamento de indenização às vítimas. Na apelação para o Tribunal Supremo, o apelante 1) afirmou que as acusações foram feitas somente com base nos depoimentos das vítimas, os quais ele alegou serem falsos e feitos com o único propósito de ganho financeiro pela mãe (a sua parceira no momento dos crimes), 2) negou ter qualquer tipo de relação sexual com as vítimas, e 3) afirmou que a condenação violou os seus direitos constitucionais porque a evidência não foi suficiente para provar a sua culpa. O Tribunal Supremo argumentou que havia evidência física suficiente para provar que o réu violou ambas as vítimas, incluindo evidência que provou estupro anal. Entretanto, como a evidência e o depoimento mostraram, o abuso não foi feito por penetração vaginal, mas somente anal. Assim, o tipo do crime perpetrado não tinha sido corretamente aplicado pela corte inferior, já que a configuração de abuso sexual na legislação de Angola requer penetração vaginal. Sob este paradigma, o Tribunal Supremo deliberou que o crime foi de atentado ao pudor e, consequentemente, violência doméstica e esse tipo penal é punido com sentença menor que 12 anos de prisão. O Tribunal Supremo então declarou o réu anistiado e, portanto, extinguiu os procedimentos criminais contra ele, sem prejuízo da indenização por danos. Em 2016, Angola publicou uma lei de anistia (Lei nº 11/16) em que perdoou crimes comuns que são puníveis com penas de até 12 anos. Ainda que a lei de anistia excluda crimes sexuais, o crime neste caso não se encaixa nessa exceção, precisamente por causa da abstinência da penetração vaginal. No fim de 2020, um novo Código Penal Angolano foi promulgado, o qual está em vigor desde Fevereiro de 2021. O novo Código Penal considera ambas penetrações vaginal e anal como penetração sexual.

The defendant appealed from a lower court decision (Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Aveiro) convicting him for committing the crime of child pornography, domestic violence, and an offense against physical integrity. In his appeal, the defendant argued that he did not commit the crime of child pornography, arguing that the elements of the crime of child pornography were not presented in this case. The Court of Appeals of Porto partially granted the appeal and declared the defendant not guilty of committing child pornography. The record showed that the victim, who was 16, and defendant’s girlfriend at the time of the occurrence, had voluntarily sent defendant photos of herself in the nude via Facebook Messenger. In its reasoning, the Court concluded that the victim was capable of assessing the consequences of her own actions, further noting that defendant’s conduct of asking for more nude photos did not constitute an element of child pornography. The Court of Appeals resorted to international law (the UN Convention on Children’s Rights and Cybercrime Law) to interpret the concept of “child pornography”, and distinguished the psychological maturity of a child from that of an adolescent. The Court also noted the Portuguese legal system treats 16-year-olds as individuals capable of self-determination (Section 19 of the Penal Code states that individuals 16 and older can be accused of committing crimes).

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instância pelo Tribunal Judicial da Comarca de Aveiro, a qual o condenou peloc rime de pornografia infantil, violência doméstica e ofensa à integridade física. Em seu apelo recursal, o Defendente argumentou que não cometeu o crime de pornografia infantil, uma vez que os elementos do tipo penal não estavam presentes no caso. O Tribunal de Relação do Porto deu parcial provimento ao Recurso, inocentando o Defendente do crime de pornografia infantil. Conforme constam nos autos, a vítima, que tinha 16 anos e era namorada do Defendente à época dos fatos, voluntariamente, enviou ao Defendente fotos suas nuas, através do Facebook Messenger. O Tribunal entendeu que a vítima tinha capacidade de entender as consequências de suas ações (envios de nudes) e qu o fato de o Defendente pedir por mais nudes da vítima não constituía elemento do crime de pornografia infantil. Além disso, o Tribunal recorreu ainda ao Direito Internacional (Convenção das Nações Unidas sobre os Direitos da Criança e Lei de Crimes Cibernéticos) para interpretar o conceito de "pornografia infantil", e distinguiu a maturidade psicológica de uma criança da maturidade de um adolescente. O Tribuanl também observou que o sistema jurídico português trata crianças de 16 anos como indivíduos capazes e autônomos (o artigo 19 do Código Penal afirma que indivíduos com 16 anos ou mais podem ser acusados de cometer crimes).

The defendant appealed from a lower court decision convicting him to 12 years of imprisonment for committing the crimes of domestic violence, child mistreatment and sexual abuse, and aggravated coercion. The defendant sought to reduce his sentence, arguing that the lower court erred in applying the law to the facts, since there was no evidence that his actions could be characterized as domestic violence. The Court of Appeals of Coimbra denied the appeal, concluding that the record demonstrated that defendant had treated his spouse inhumanely over the years, through repeated physical, psychological, and moral humiliations and aggressions. The Court of Appeals did not find the 12-year imprisonment sentencing excessive, noting that the defendant’s overall conduct was particularly egregious and manifestly inconsistent with the social values that criminal law seeks to protect (sexual self-determination and human dignity).

O Defendente apresentou Recurso em face da decisão proferida em 1ª instância, o qual o condenou a 12 anos de prisão pelos crimes de violência doméstica, maus-tratos e sexual abuso contra seus filhos e coerção agravada. O Defendente buscou no recurso a redução da sua pena, sob a justificativa de que a decisão em 1ª instância errou ao aplicar a lei aos fatos, em razão da inexistência de provas que caracterizariam o crime de violência doméstica. O Tribunal de Relação de Coimbra negou provimento ao recurso, concluindo que as provas nos autos demonstravam que o Defendente tratava sua esposa de forma desumana ao longo dos anos, a partir de repetidas humilhações e agressões verbais, físicas, psicológicas e morais. Além disso, o Tribunal entendeu correta a aplicação de pena de 12 anos de prisão, ressaltando que a conduta do Defendente foi particularmente grave e manifestamente inconsistente com os valores sociais que o direito penal procura proteger (autonomia sexual e dignidade humana).

The Public Prosecutor (Ministério Público) brought charges against the defendant for sexual coercion and domestic violence against his spouse. The defendant was convicted by the lower court (Tribunal Judicial da Comarca dos Açores) of a aggravated domestic violence, but acquitted of sexual coercion, because the court understood that the elements of domestic violence encompassed the elements of sexual coercion. The prosecutor filed an appeal, which was granted by the Court of Appeals of Lisbon. After reexamining the facts, the Court of Appeals convicted the defendant of a more severe offense of rape (“violação”), finding that forced penetration took place, in addition to the offense of domestic violence. In its reasoning, the Court of Appeals stated that the legal interests protected by the criminalization of rape (“violação”) and domestic violence are distinct and independent – the criminalization of domestic violence aims at protecting the integrity, health and the dignity of the victim, whereas the criminalization of rape aims at protecting the victim’s sexual freedom and self-determination. The Court of Appeals also stated that the facts related to the crime of rape are different than the facts related to domestic violence, understanding that both crimes are autonomous and therefore need to be punished differently.

O Ministério Público apresentou denúncia contra o acusado em razão de coação sexual e violência doméstica contra sua esposa. O acusado foi condenado pelo Tribunal Judicial da Comarca dos Açores, por violência doméstica com agravante, no entanto, foi absolvido das acusações de coação sexual, visto que o Tribunal entendeu que os elementos do crime de violência doméstica englobam os elementos do crime de coação sexual. O Ministério Público apresentou Recurso, o qual foi acolhido pelo Tribunal de Relação de Lisboa. Após o reexame dos fatos, o Tribunal de Lisboa condenou o acusado pelo crime de violação sexual (estupro, o que é mais grave do que o crime de coação sexual, vez que ocorreu a penetração sexual forçada), além de manter a condenação por violência doméstica. Na decisão, o Tribunal de Lisboa estabeleceu que os bens jurídicos protegidos pela criminalização do estupro e da violência doméstica são distintos e independentes – a criminalização da violência doméstica visa proteger a integridade, saúde e dignidade da vítima, enquanto a criminalização do estupro tem por objetivo a proteção de liberdade sexual da vítima, bem como seu livre arbítrio. Além disso, a Corte estabeleceu que os fatos relacionados ao crime de violação sexual/estupro são diferentes dos fatos decorrentes do crime de violência doméstica, de modo que ambos os crimes são autônomos e não podem ser englobados sob a justificativo de concurso aparente.

The Regulations for the Handling of the Government Owned Housing and Farmlands Vacated by Married Veterans after Their Hospitalization, Retirement or Death distributes plots of state farmland to veterans. Section 4-III of the Regulations provides, “If the surviving spouse of the deceased veteran remarries but without issue or has only daughter(s), the land and housing shall be reclaimed unconditionally upon the marriage of the daughter(s); and the rights of the veteran may be inherited by his son, if any.” The Court explained that the government can allow a veteran’s surviving dependents to continue using and farming the state land distributed to veterans, and can extend the term “dependents” to a veteran’s children. In doing so, however, the government should consider the children’s ability to earn a living and cultivate the land, and must keep in mind the principle of gender equality enshrined in Article 7 of the Constitution and Article 10-VI of the Amendments to the Constitution. The Court held that Section 4-III of the Regulations violates this principle because it limits the right of inheritance of a deceased veteran to the veteran’s son without regard to the son’s ability or marital status. Thus, the Court held that Section 4-III of the Regulations discriminates against a specific group of women on the premise of marital status and sex. As such, the Court held that the government must revise Section 4-III of the Regulations to remove the discriminatory provision.

行政院國軍退除役官兵輔導委員會發布之「本會各農場有眷場員就醫、就養或死亡開缺後房舍土地處理要點」第4條第3項規定：「死亡場員之遺眷如改嫁他人而無子女者或僅有女兒，其女兒出嫁後均應無條件收回土地及眷舍，如有兒子准由兒子繼承其權利」。法院解釋認為，政府可以允許退除役官兵的遺眷繼續使用和耕種分配給該退除役官兵的國有土地，並可以將「遺眷」一詞擴大解釋至該退除役官兵的子女。然而，於此同時，政府應考慮該子女的謀生和耕種能力，並且必須謹記憲法第7條和憲法增修條文第10條第6項規定的性別平等原則。法院認為，該要點第4條第3項規定違反了此一原則，因為其將已故退除役官兵的繼承權限制在退伍軍人的兒子身上，且不考慮兒子的謀生和耕種能力或婚姻狀況。因此，法院認為，該要點第4條第3項規定以婚姻狀況和性別為前提，歧視特定婦女群體。於此情況下，法院認為，政府必須修正該要點第4條第3項規定以刪除歧視條文。

Article 235 of the Criminal Code provides for criminal penalties for people who distribute, broadcast or sell “obscene” material, and to people who manufacture or possess obscene material “with the intent to distribute, broadcast or sell.” The Court held that the term “obscene” is not an indefinite “concept of law,” but rather includes material containing, among other things, violent or sexually abusive content. As such, the Court held that the law is a reasonable restraint on free speech and free publication. Thus, the law is constitutional and bans, among other things, material that includes violent or sexually abusive content.

刑法第235條規定對散布、播送或販賣，以及意圖散布、播送、販賣而製造、持有「猥褻」物品的人，處以刑事處罰。法院認為，「猥褻」一詞並非不確定的「法律概念」，而是包括含有暴力或性虐待等內容。於此情形，法院認為，此一法條是對言論自由和出版自由的合理限制。因此，該法律為合憲，而且禁止包含暴力或性虐待之內容。

The defendant-husband, who had joint parental authority with his wife, forcibly took his son away from his mother. The court held that the defendant's act constituted kidnapping, as there were no special circumstances which made the defendant's actions necessary, and the act was "violent and coercive." In addition, the court found that the act of kidnapping the child could not be justified even though the defendant had parental authority.

本件は、被告人である夫が、他方親権者である妻から息子を強制的に連れ去った事件である。最高裁は、被告人である夫がそのような行為に出ることを必要とする特段な事情が認められないことから、その行為はが粗暴で強引であるとして、被告人が親権を持っていたとしても、子の略取は正当化できないとし、未成年者略取罪の成立を認めた。

Person X1 transitioned from female to male. X1 registered as a male and married a woman, X2, in 2008. In 2009, X2 bore a child. In 2012, X1 applied to have the family registry reflect that X1 was the child’s father and that the child was born while X1 and X2 were married. The ward mayor in charge of changes to family registries held that there was a problem with the application because Article 774 of the Civil Law was inapplicable to the child’s situation as the child was not related by blood to X1. X1 did not comply with the ward mayor’s request to fix the application, so the ward mayor filled in the family registry for the child with a blank for father and a note that the child was X2’s oldest son. X1 and X2 filed suit to have X1 added as the child’s father on the grounds that the child should be presumed to be a “legitimately” born child based on Article 772 of the Civil Law. The Supreme Court held that the child should be presumed to be the son of X1, overruling the lower court and the ward mayor’s decision. The court reasoned that under Article 3.1 of the Gender Identity Disorder Law, a transgender man should be treated for all purposes under the law as a man. The court held that this includes being able to marry and have a “legitimate” child. Following this decision, the Ministry of Justice issued a notification on 27 January, 2014 directing that this procedure be followed for any similarly situated families. Subsequently, the state changed the family registry for 45 such couples to reflect that both parents are their children’s parents.

X1は女性だったが、男性になるため、性転換手術を受けた。その後、彼は男性として登録し、2008年に女性のX2と結婚した。その翌年、X2は子どもを出産した。2012年、X1は、X1が子どもの父親であること、子どもがX1とX2の婚姻中に生まれたことを戸籍に反映させることを地方公共団体に請求した。戸籍変更を担当する区長は、子どもがX1と血縁関係にないことから、民法774条の適用を受けられないため、申請に問題があると、子の戸籍に父の欄を空欄にして、子がX2の長男であると記入した。X1とX2は、子が民法772条に基づいて「嫡出子」と推定されるべきであるとして、X1を子の父として加えることを要求し提訴した。最高裁は、X1の子と推定すべきであるとし、下級審および区長の判断を棄却し、「性同一性障害の性別の取り扱いの特例に関する法律」第3条第1項に基づき、トランスジェンダーの男性は、法に基づき、あらことで男性として扱われるべきであるとした。これには、結婚して「正当に」子どもを産むことができることも含まれるとした。この判決を受けて、法務省は2014年1月27日に、同様の状況にある家族に対してこの手続きを行うよう指示する通達を出した。その後、国は、そのようなカップル45組の戸籍を訂正した。

The plaintiff was a physiotherapist in a managerial position at her employer. She requested and was granted maternity leave but was not allowed to return to her position at the end of the maternity leave. She filed a lawsuit against her employer, asserting that there was a violation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Law. The Supreme Court found in favor of the plaintiff because the Equal Employment Opportunity Law forbids disadvantaging employees based on the employee’s pregnancy, childbirth, request for maternity leave, or request for transfer to lighter work.

原告は、管理職にあった理学療法士で、育児休業の終了後、元の職に戻れなかったことから、被告の雇用主に対して、男女雇用機会均等法違反に基づいて損害賠償を求めた。最高裁は、男女雇用機会均等法は、妊娠・出産・産前産後休暇の申請・軽易な業務への転換の申請などを理由に従業員に不利益な扱いを禁じていることを理由に、原告を支持した。

The defendant was indicted under the Stalker Regulation Law on a charge of stalking his former girlfriend. The defendant demanded many times by email and phone that she repay costs he incurred while they were dating. The defendant sent a letter to her threatening to distribute nude photos of her if she did not unblock him on her cell phone. The Supreme Court determined that, even though he sent the letter only once, his conduct amounted to “stalking” under the Stalker Regulation Law since his conduct was as a whole persistent and repetitive.

被告人は、元交際相手に対し、交際中にかかった費用の返済をメールや電話で何度も要求し、携帯電話のブロックを解除しなければヌード写真をばら撒くと脅す手紙を送った。最高裁は、手紙を送ったのが1回だけであっても、「つきまとい等」の行為が反復することから、ストーカー規制法の「ストーカー行為」に該当すると判断した。

The respondent pleaded guilty to two charges of indecent assault and two charges of defilement for repeatedly raping his wife’s 12-year-old granddaughter. When the girl reported the rapes to her grandmother, the respondent’s wife, he apologized. Later, the respondent wanted the victim to sleep with him and the victim’s grandmother told her to do so. The respondent again raped the victim. The High Court, in sentencing the respondent to two years imprisonment, considered his early plea, the seriousness of the case, and his apology to the girl. Counsel for the Republic appealed on the grounds that the two-year sentence was manifestly inadequate. The Republic argued that due to the rising prevalence of sexual offences in Kiribati, sentencing guidelines were needed. She further contended that the High Court erred in considering the respondent’s apology to the girl a mitigating factor. Relying on Kimaere v The Republic, a Kiribati Court of Appeal decision from 2005, and sentencing standards of New Zealand and Australia, the Court found that a five-year prison sentence was an appropriate starting point in defilement cases. The Court noted that in cases involving multiple offenses, it is more important that the overall sentence appropriately reflect the entirety of the defendant’s conduct rather than adding together the sentences for each offense. Determining that the respondent’s conduct justified a prison sentence of seven to eight years, the Court then reduced his sentence for his early plea to a total of five years. The Court found that the sentencing judge incorrectly weighted the respondent’s apology as a mitigating factor. The Court also held that the starting point for the indecent assault charges would have been two-and-a-half years before accounting for mitigating factors.

The respondent was convicted of two charges of defilement of a 13-year-old girl and sentenced to four years and six months of imprisonment even though the maximum punishment for each charge was life imprisonment. The Attorney General of Kiribati appealed this sentence as “manifestly inadequate.” The Court of Appeal of Kiribati allowed the appeal and delineated the proper framework for sentencing in the context of this offense. First, the court noted that the minimum sentence for defilement should be five years and that any aggravating or mitigating factors must be accounted for in the final sentencing decision. Second, a court must make an upward adjustment for any aggravating factors external to the criminal act such as a person’s relevant criminal record. Third, a court should allow a reduction of the sentence where there are mitigating factors, such as guilty pleas, expressions of genuine remorse, prior good character, cooperation with police, or the youth of the offender. Fourth, a court should reduce the sentence based on the amount of time the offender spent in custody prior to sentencing. Finally, where a sentence would be less than two years, the court should consider a suspended sentence. Considering the aggravating factor of the multiple instances of sexual abuse against the victim and the mitigating factor of the respondent’s record of past good character, the court found the initial sentence manifestly inadequate and adjusted it to six years and six months imprisonment.

In this interpretation, the Taiwan Constitutional Court upheld a criminal penalty provision of the Child and Juvenile Sexual Transaction Prevention Act (subsequently amended and retitled as the Child and Youth Sexual Exploitation Prevention Act, or “CYSEPA”) that provided for imprisonment and monetary fines for parties publishing, broadcasting, or otherwise spreading information that may by any means induce a person to engage in an unlawful sexual transaction. The Court cited its earlier precedents holding that the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech was not absolute and that lawmakers may impose restrictions through clear and unambiguous laws. With regard to the Constitution’s Article 23 proportionality principle, the Court addressed the broad scope of the criminal penalty provision, which did not require that the information in question specifically involve or result in underage sexual transactions or inducement of children or juveniles to engage in sexual transactions. The Court noted that children and juveniles are still in danger of becoming objects of sexual transactions because of the wide distribution of such information and, therefore, distribution of such information constitutes a crime. The Court held that the criminal penalty provision in question was a rational and necessary means of achieving the significant state interest of protecting children and juveniles from becoming objects of sexual transactions and therefore was consistent with the principle of proportionality. The Court nonetheless directed competent authorities to design a “classified management system” so that readers and viewers of such information “can be strictly differentiated in light of the technological developments so as to comply with the principle of proportionality.” The current version of this criminal penalty provision, as reflected in the CYSEPA, has a narrower scope and applies to “messages that are deemed to be sufficient to seduce, arrange, suggest, or cause a child or youth to be subjected” to sexual exploitation. English translation available here.

The Taiwan Constitutional Court held in this interpretation that the provisions of the Taiwan Civil Code on marriage and family, which did not contemplate same-sex marriage, violated the guarantees of freedom of marriage and right to equality under Articles 22 and 7, respectively, of the Taiwan Constitution. The case involved consolidated appeals by (i) the Taipei City Government, arguing that the relevant Civil Code provisions and a related directive of the Ministry of the Interior required it to deny registration for same-sex marriages in violation of the Constitution and (ii) an individual seeking a constitutional interpretation after exhausting other judicial remedies for the denial of his applications for a same-sex marriage. The Court concluded that an individual’s “decisional autonomy” as to whether and whom to marry is a fundamental right protected by Article 22 of the Constitution and that extending this right to same-sex couples would not affect the application of the Civil Code provisions on betrothal, conclusion of marriage, general effects of marriage, marital property regimes, and divorce with regard to opposite sex couples and also would not undermine or alter the social order. The Court also concluded that the classifications of impermissible discrimination under Article 7 of the Constitution are only illustrative rather than exhaustive and that different treatment based on other classifications, such as disability or sexual orientation, are also governed by the constitutional right to equality. The Court applied a heightened standard under Article 7, and concluded that the societal interest in procreation was not an essential element of marriage and that the “basic ethical orders” relating to traditional marriage (e.g., minimum age, monogamy, prohibition of marriage between close relatives, obligation of fidelity, and mutual obligation) would not be affected by legal recognition of same-sex marriages. The Court further stated that leaving the determination of the issue of same-sex marriage to the legislative process would indefinitely prolong the unfair treatment and ordered the legislative authorities to amend or enact laws to reflect this interpretation within two years. The Act for Implementation of J.Y. Interpretation 748 was enacted in 2019 to enforce this Interpretation.

台灣憲法法庭認為台灣民法親屬篇中未考量納入同性婚姻，有違反台灣憲法第22條及第7條之婚姻自由及平等權之保障。本案為共同聲請案件，聲請人之一臺北市政府為戶籍登記業務主管機關（戶籍法第22條參照），因所轄戶政事務所於辦理相同性別二人民申請之結婚登記業務，適用民法第4編親屬第2章婚姻（下稱婚姻章）規定及內政部函示，函轉法務部函，發生有牴觸憲法第7條、第22條及第23條規定之疑義，經由上級機關內政部層轉行政院，再由行政院轉請本院解釋。另一聲請人於窮盡司法途徑後，向憲法法庭聲請解釋。憲法法庭認為是否結婚及與誰接婚，皆屬個人憲法第22條所保障之自由意志，且該權利亦為同性伴侶所適用。現行婚姻章有關異性婚姻制度之當事人身分及相關權利、義務關係，不因本解釋而改變。憲法法庭也指出，憲法第7條規定：「中華民國人民，無分男女、宗教、種族、階級、黨派，在法律上一律平等。」本條明文揭示之5種禁止歧視事由，僅係例示，而非窮盡列舉。是如以其他事由，如身心障礙、性傾向等為分類標準，所為之差別待遇，亦屬本條平等權規範之範圍。是以性傾向作為分類標準所為之差別待遇，應適用較為嚴格之審查標準，以判斷其合憲性，除其目的須為追求重要公共利益外，其手段與目的之達成間並須具有實質關聯，始符合憲法第7條保障平等權之意旨。故以不能繁衍後代為由，未使相同性別二人得以結婚，顯非合理之差別待遇。倘以婚姻係為維護基本倫理秩序，如結婚年齡、單一配偶、近親禁婚、忠貞義務及扶養義務等為考量，其計慮固屬正當。惟若容許相同性別二人得依婚姻章實質與形式要件規定，成立法律上婚姻關係，且要求其亦應遵守婚姻關係存續中及終止後之雙方權利義務規定，並不影響現行異性婚姻制度所建構之基本倫理秩序。有關機關應於本解釋公布之日起2年內，依本解釋意旨完成相關法律之修正或制定。至於以何種形式達成婚姻自由之平等保護，屬立法形成之範圍。逾期未完成相關法律之修正或制定者，相同性別二人為成立上開永久結合關係，得依上開婚姻章規定，持二人以上證人簽名之書面，向戶政機關辦理結婚登記。

The plaintiffs were two female criminal defendants who chose to be tried by a jury and objected to the Juries Act of 1927, which excluded all women from jury pools except those who opted to be part of the potential jurors list. The Supreme Court ruled the Juries Act unconstitutional because it constituted invidious discrimination on the basis of sex.

The applicant was found guilty of four counts of sexual assault on a 15-year-old girl. He appealed on the grounds that the judge did not instruct the jury as to the danger of convicting the accused in the absence of corroboration of the victim's testimony. The Court rejected the appeal and held that the Criminal Law (Rape) Amendment leaves it to the judge's discretion whether to issue a warning about corroboration or not.

In this case, the Constitutional Court held that §7(1) of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 (RMCA) was inconsistent with 172(2) of the Constitution, and therefore invalid, because it unfairly discriminated against women in polygamous customary marriages entered into before the enactment of the RMCA on the bases of gender and race, ethnic, or social origin. This case followed Gumede v. President of the Republic of South Africa, in which it was held that §7(1) was invalid as to monogamous customary marriages, but left the question of polygamous customary marriages for Parliament. The effect of this ruling was that pre-RCMA marriages continued to be governed by customary law, while post-RCMA marriages were automatically out of community of property. The Court declared that, in the interim until Parliament changes the RCMA, a husband and his wives in pre-RCMA polygamous customary marriages must share equally in the right of ownership of, and other rights attaching to, family property, including the right of management and control of family property.

In this case, the Constitutional Court declared §2(1) of the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act (Upgrading Act) unconstitutional. §2(1) of the Upgrading Act automatically turned land tenure rights into rights of property ownership, without providing other occupants or affected parties an opportunity to make submissions. The Court held §2(1) unconstitutional because it had a discriminatory effect on women’s property rights. During apartheid, only men could be the head of the family and hold Certificates of Deed and Grant. This had the effect of excluding women from holding land tenure rights. The Court determined that because §2(1) of the Upgrading Act was based on this apartheid position, it indirectly differentiated between men and women in a way that amounted to gender discrimination.

The issue on appeal in this case was whether the doctrine of common purpose can be applied to the common law crime of rape. Under the common law, rape is an instrumentality offense, which means that the perpetrator must have committed the act himself or facilitated the offense by his conduct. The doctrine of common purpose, however, is applied when a crime is committed by a group of people “with a mutual objective intended to produce a specific result against a targeted victim.” In this case, a group of young men terrorized a township, breaking into homes, attacking occupants, and several of the attackers repeatedly raped eight women. The men were charged and convicted of eight counts of rape, respectively, seven of which were imposed based on the doctrine of common purpose. The Constitutional Court reasoned that it is unsustainable to simply characterize rape as an act of a man inserting his genitalia into an unconsenting woman’s genitalia, especially in a group rape context where the mere presence of the group results in power and dominance over the victim. Thus, it held, the law must dispose of the misguided idea that rape is only a sex crime. The Court, therefore, declared that the instrumentality approach perpetuates gender inequality and promotes discrimination because it seeks to absolve those who may not have committed the crime itself but who contributed toward the commission of the crime from liability. The Court further reasoned that the doctrine of common purpose should apply to rape because the object and purpose of the doctrine is to “overcome an otherwise unjust result… by removing the element of causation from criminal liability and replacing it with the imputing deed which cased the [crime] to all the co-perpetrators.” It observed that it is “irrational and arbitrary” to not apply the doctrine to common law rape, as opposed to murder and assault, based on the distinction that a genital organ must be used to perpetrate rape. It argued that courts should be aiming to afford the constitutional principles of equality, dignity, and the protection of bodily and psychological integrity to victims of sexual assault. Therefore, in this case, the Court observed that the applicants knowingly and with the requisite intention participated in the activities of the group and fully associated themselves with its criminal designs. Thus, the Court held them guilty of rape based on the doctrine of common purpose.

The appellant was convicted and sentenced to seven years in prison for the attempted murder of his spouse, and the conviction was upheld by the Court of Appeal. On appeal, the appellant claimed that the lower court erred by (1) failing to consider the facts as exposed by the appellant, (2) failing to take into account that the wounds suffered by the victim were not deadly, (3) refusing to consider the “voluntary and timely abandonment of the act”, (4) failing to set out its reasoning in reaching its conclusions as to the events and the injuries suffered by the victim, and (5) imposing an excessive sentence. The Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court’s decision, finding that the Trial Court considered witness testimony and set out the facts underlying the decision, which were sufficient to uphold the decision and sentence. It also found that the fact that the wounds suffered by the victim were not fatal was not inconsistent with the crime charged. Finally, it upheld the Trial Court’s determination that the appellant did not voluntarily “abandon[…] the act”, but instead was interrupted by the victim fleeing and seeking assistance from her neighbors, which were independent of the appellant’s actions. Therefore, the appellant never ended his attempt to commit the murder. The Court of Appeals upheld the sentence. (External Link leads to the website for the Chilean Judicial System. The case is available by searching for the case number.)

El recurrente fue declarado culpable y condenado a siete años de prisión por el intento de asesinato de su cónyuge, y la condena fue confirmada por el Tribunal de Apelación. En la apelación, el apelante alegó que el tribunal inferior incurrió en error al (1) no considerar los hechos expuestos por el apelante, (2) no tener en cuenta que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no eran mortales, (3) negarse a considerar el “abandono voluntario y oportuno del acto,” (4) no exponer su razonamiento para llegar a sus conclusiones sobre los hechos y las lesiones sufridas por la víctima, y ​​(5) imponer una pena excesiva. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia y determinó que el Tribunal de Primera Instancia consideró el testimonio de los testigos y expuso los hechos subyacentes a la decisión, que fueron suficientes para confirmar la decisión y la sentencia. Asimismo, concluyó que el hecho de que las heridas sufridas por la víctima no fueran mortales no contradecía el delito imputado. Finalmente, confirmó la determinación del Juzgado de Primera Instancia de que el recurrente no “abandonó […] el acto” voluntariamente, sino que fue interrumpido por la víctima que huyó y solicitó la asistencia de sus vecinos, quienes ayudaron, y no fue el recurrente quien detuvo el acto por si mismo. Por tanto, el recurrente nunca puso fin a su intento de cometer el asesinato. El Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la sentencia. (Enlace externo conduce al sitio web del Sistema Judicial chileno. El caso está disponible buscando el número de caso).

The plaintiff, a councilwoman in the Comune of Lampa, identified as a woman and presented herself to society as a woman, filed a discrimination complaint against the defendant, claiming arbitrary discrimination for failure by the Mayor, as representative of the State, to respect her gender identity. She sued, claiming a violation of Anti-Discrimination Law No. 20.069 (“the Law”). The court, on appeal, reversed the trial court judgment and imposed a fine, finding that the Mayor of the Comune of Lampa had arbitrarily discriminated against plaintiff by failing to respect her gender identity as a woman. The court held that arbitrary discrimination means any distinction, exclusion, or restriction made by agents of the State or individuals that lacks reasonable justification, and that causes deprivation, disturbance, or threat in the legitimate exercise of the fundamental rights established in the Constitution or international treaties on human rights ratified by Chile and in effect, including gender identity as defined by the LGBTI Unit of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, which includes transgender identity. Therefore, the right to an identity is constitutionally protected, including the right to identify as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, and intersexual. Any deprivation, disturbance or threat to such identifying rights constitutes an arbitrary discrimination within the meaning of Article 2 of Law No. 20,609.

La demandante, vecina de la comunidad de Lampa, identificada como mujer y presentada a la sociedad como mujer, interpuso una denuncia de discriminación contra la imputada, alegando discriminación arbitraria por incumplimiento del Alcalde, como representante del Estado, de respetar su identidad de género. Ella demandó, alegando una violación de la Ley contra la Discriminación No. 20.069 (“la Ley”). El tribunal, en apelación, revocó la sentencia del tribunal de primera instancia e impuso una multa, al considerar que el alcalde de la comuna de Lampa había discriminado arbitrariamente a la demandante al no respetar su identidad de género como mujer. El tribunal sostuvo que “discriminación arbitraria” significa toda distinción, exclusión o restricción realizada por agentes del Estado o personas que carece de justificación razonable, y que ocasiona privación, alteración o amenaza en el legítimo ejercicio de los derechos fundamentales consagrados en la Constitución o en las normas internacionales, tratados de derechos humanos ratificados por Chile y en vigencia, incluida la identidad de género según la definición de la Unidad LGBTI de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, que incluye la identidad transgénero. Por lo tanto, el derecho a la identidad está protegido constitucionalmente, incluido el derecho a identificarse como lesbiana, gay, bisexual, transgénero e intersexual. Cualquier privación, alteración o amenaza a tales derechos identificativos constituye una discriminación arbitraria en el sentido del artículo 2 de la Ley N ° 20.609.

This Supreme Court case is notable for solidifying the “Jurisprudence of Equality” doctrine as predominant in determining the sharing of marital property upon divorce. Following the termination of the marriage, the wife was granted by the High Court of Accra in May 2010 (i) custody of the children; (ii) ownership of a house and a “half share of the ‘storey building’; and (iii) a half share of ‘the shops at Weija, Accra. The husband appealed the decision to the Court of Appeal. The Court of Appeal set aside and replaced the orders of the High Court. The wife appealed that decision to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court restored the decision of the trial judge in its entirety and noted that its decision was based on the marriage equality principle delineated in Article 16 (1) of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948. The Court affirmed the principle that property acquired during marriage is a joint property and that the sharing of spousal property should no longer be dependent on the substantial contribution principle.

The petitioner filed for divorce and sought an equal share of assets acquired during the marriage. At the time of marriage, neither party owned any property. During their marriage, the plaintiff assisted in building their business and managed their shop while her husband continued to work for the Controller and Accountant General's Department. The plaintiff also advised the respondent on property investments. The respondent denied that the petitioner contributed to the business and claimed that she embezzled money from him, and therefore should not be considered an equal holder of marital assets. The trial court and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the petitioner, finding that she was a joint owner of the property and was therefore entitled to an equal share of the marital assets. The Supreme Court affirmed. Previous case law denied a wife a share in property acquired during the marriage unless the wife could show that she had made a "substantial contribution" to the acquirement of these assets. Yet, because more recent cases supported the "equality is equity" principle in the division of marital assets, the Supreme Court concluded that "the death knell has been sung to the substantial contribution principle, making way for the equitable distribution as provided for under Article 22 (3) of the Constitution 1992." Thus, the court held that even if it determined that the petitioner did not make a substantial contribution to the acquisition of marital property, she would still be entitled to a share of the property. To further support its decision, the Supreme Court referenced Article 1 and Article 5 of CEDAW, in addition to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which emphasize equality between the sexes.

The complainant applied for membership of the Yukon Order of Pioneers and was rejected on the ground that she was female. According to its constitution, the Order is dedicated to, among other things, the advancement of the Yukon territory, the mutual protection of its members and the collection and the preservation of literature and incidents of Yukon’s history. The historical materials and details of members are made available to the public, which is the only public-service related activity of the organization. The Board of Adjudication, constituted by the Yukon Human Rights Commission, concluded that the Order was offering or providing services to the public and concluded that the discrimination was prohibited under section 8 of the Yukon Human Rights Act. The Yukon Supreme Court set aside that decision and concluded that the complainant’s exclusion did not amount to discrimination and the Yukon Court of Appeal agreed. The Supreme Court, with two dissenters, also found in favour of the Order of Pioneers, stating that section 8 prohibits discrimination in membership of certain types of organizations that provide public services and that the Order did not provide public services.

The respondent’s group insurance plan provided weekly benefits for loss of pay due to accident or sickness. The plan covered pregnant women subject to an exclusion from coverage during the period commencing on the tenth week prior to the expected week of childbirth and extending to six weeks after it (even if the accident or sickness was unrelated to the pregnancy). The appellants, who all became pregnant in 1982, alleged that the differential treatment of pregnancy in the respondent’s plan constituted discrimination on the basis of sex contrary to s.6(1) of the Human Rights Act of Manitoba. The Supreme Court ruled that pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex discrimination and that the respondent had discriminated against the appellants on the basis of sex. It said that bearing children benefits society as a whole and women should not be economically or socially disadvantaged due to childbearing.

The complainant agreed to sexual intercourse with her partner provided that he use a condom to prevent conception. Without the complainant’s knowledge, the accused poked holes in the condom and the complainant became pregnant. The trial judge found that the complainant had not consented to sexual intercourse without a condom and the accused was convicted of sexual assault. On appeal, the majority upheld the conviction on basis that the condom was an “essential feature” of the sexual activity. The main issue before the Supreme Court was whether the act of sabotaging a condom results in there being no consent under s.273.1(1) of the Criminal Code or should it be considered as a factor to vitiate consent under s.265(3)(c). The law prescribes a two-step test for determining whether there is consent to sexual activity. The first step requires the court to determine whether there was a voluntary agreement of the complainant to engage in the sexual activity in question and if the court finds that there was consent, the court then considers the possible presence of circumstances that would negate consent. The majority of the Supreme Court found that the consent was vitiated by fraud under s.265(3)(c).

The accused was charged with sexual assault of a woman he had once dated. The complainant claimed that on the night in question, she had called to the accused’s house for drinks and that he snapped, dragged her to his bedroom, hit her, and forced her to have sex with him. At trial, the accused requested that evidence of a “friends with benefits” relationship be admitted to the jury as it was important context for the jury to know. The trial judge allowed what he called the “benign” evidence to be admitted. The jury found the accused not guilty but the Court of Appeal said the evidence should not have been allowed. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the court said the evidence should not have been allowed and that it was used to suggest that as she had agreed to sex in the past, she was more likely to agree on this occasion which is exactly what the “rape shield law” (section 276 of the Criminal Code (evidence of complainant’s sexual history)) is designed to protect. The Supreme Court said that the judge should have made the accused show that the evidence was useful for some other important reason. A new trial was ordered.

The Domestic Relations Law provides that the grounds for divorce are (1) inhuman treatment by the defendant-spouse that causes danger to the plaintiff-spouse’s physical and mental well-being, (2) desertion of the plaintiff-spouse by the defendant-spouse for a period of one or more years, (3) the defendant-spouse commits adultery, or (4) incompatibility of temper that results in danger to the plaintiff-spouse. The appellant husband filed for divorce for incompatibility of temperament. In the complaint, the husband alleged that his wife was quarrelsome and pugnacious, which the wife denied. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the defendant, and the plaintiff moved for a new trial. A final judgment was rendered confirming the original verdict. The appellant appealed to the Supreme Court and contended that a new trial should be awarded. The Supreme Court recited some of the testimony from the trial. In the trial, the defendant testified that the appellant had an intimate relationship with a third person and did not leave any food for the family. The Supreme Court stated that if the complaining spouse who filed for divorce was not responsible for the “incompatibility,” the trial court should grant the divorce. However, if the incompatibility arose from the misconduct of the complaining spouse, the trial court had the discretion to deny the divorce. The Supreme Court found the complaint by the appellant defective and affirmed the lower court’s decision.

Here, the employment judge found that the claimant was entitled to lost wages for the period between her resignation in December 2018 and the start of her new position in September 2019 on the grounds that the claimant “suffered a substantial reduction in her mental wellbeing” as a result of improper treatment and discrimination from her employer in relation to the claimant’s onset of menopause and was thereby entitled to damages emanating from injury to feelings. The claimant alleged that her store manager discriminated against her for being a woman of menopausal age. The claimant had a long work history in retail, had received multiple awards for her excellent performance, and had gotten along with her store manager until the claimant’s onset of menopause. At that point, the store manager would frequently harass and humiliate the claimant in front of her colleagues and customers, specifically commenting about her menopause. The store manager’s disparaging treatment of the claimant weakened her mental state, resulting in a nervous breakdown in November 2018 that required her to begin anti-depressant treatment. Her doctors recommended that she work reduced hours. The store manager ignored this request and told the claimant that if she could not work her full hours, she would be forced to use vacation and sick time to account for the remainder of time. The store manager continued his harassment of the claimant until she resigned on December 4, 2018. After her resignation, the claimant continued to suffer from severe mental distress and anxiety as a result of her treatment and could not find employment until she accepted a part-time position at a charity shop in September 2019. The respondent employer did not contest the evidence presented by the claimant and was absent from the proceedings. The Employment Judge “found it established on the facts that the respondent, by the actings of [the store manager] for whom they were liable, had treated the claimant less favourably than he would treat someone who was not a female of menopausal age.” Furthermore, while the claimant had not made a constructive dismissal claim, the Employment Judge accepted claimant’s position that she “resigned as a result of the discrimination against her.”

The accused pled guilty to one count of conducting a business involving sexual servitude, in contravention of section 270.6(2) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. Between August 2005 and March 2008, the accused recruited and facilitated the placement of 11 Thai women in brothels in various Australian cities. Each of the women (except for those who worked for one particular brothel) transferred a portion of their net earnings to the accused to repay the debts they were told they owed. She was sentenced to two years and three months imprisonment.

The case concerns the defendants, a married couple, who kept five Thai women as slaves in a secret room in the basement of their licensed brothel in Sydney. The defendants purchased the Thai women through contacts in Thailand (for between AUD 12,500 – 15,000). Upon arriving in Australia, four of the women were informed that they owed between AUD 35,000 and 45,000 that they had to repay by working in the brothel (one of the victims was told about the debt in Thailand). The defendants confiscated the women’s passports and kept them in locked confinement either at the brothel or at their residence. The women worked extremely long hours, seven days a week. The defendants were each found guilty of five counts of intentionally possessing a slave and five counts of intentionally exercising ownership authority over a slave, in violation of section 270.3(1)(a) of the Criminal Code Act 1995. The court sentenced Mr. McIvor to 12 years’ imprisonment and Ms. Tanuchit to 11 years’ imprisonment.

The proceedings concerned the plaintiff’s entitlement to an interest in seven properties purchased by the defendant in his name during and after their nine-year relationship. The plaintiff brought a claim under Part 9 of the Property Law Act 1958 (Vic), requesting that the Court adjust the interests in the properties on the basis of her financial and non-financial contributions to the relationship. While the parties were not married, the court was satisfied that on the balance of probabilities, they were in a genuine domestic relationship, considering factors such as their co-habitation, financial independence and the fact they had a child. In determining the contributions of each party to the relationship, the Court noted that “full value” must be given to the role of either party as homemaker. The plaintiff was not required to demonstrate a link between her contributions as homemaker or parent and the value of the properties in question. The Court acknowledged that the defendant had assumed the full burden of the mortgage commitments of the properties, but also acknowledged that the plaintiff had principal responsibility for the care of her three children. The Court was satisfied that the parties’ contributions were equal, and adjusted the interests in the properties on this basis.

The students enrolled at Castlemaine Steiner School Ltd (“Castlemaine”) for kindergarten and prep were originally approximately 75% boys and 25% girls. Castlemaine wished to offer more places to female students in order to maintain gender balance in their classes. Such conduct would constitute discrimination on the basis of gender in the provision of education and services under the Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) (“EO Act”), unless an exemption applies. Castlemaine sought an exemption under section 89 of the EO Act, contending that an exemption would enable it to promote social cohesion and gender balance, and would provide boys and girls opportunities to be with a meaningful number of children of their own gender. In assessing the application, the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (“VCAT”) noted that they were required to interpret the law, so far as it is possible to do so, compatibly with section 32(1) of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic). In addition, VCAT was required to consider whether the interests served by the exemption are sufficient to justify taking the relevant conduct out of the prohibitions of the EO Act. Ultimately, VCAT granted the exemption for the maximum period of five years, on the basis that the proposed exemption offered a reasonable chance of to achieving gender balance.

The plaintiff (under the pseudonym ‘Jane Doe’) brought proceedings to enforce the judgement of a United States district court against her former employers, Mr. and Mrs. Howard. The claims against them included involuntary servitude, forced labour, and human trafficking. Mr. Howard did not contest the claim and had since died. Mrs. Howard disputed the claim but failed to comply with court orders, then moved to Victoria and participated no further in the proceedings. The U.S. district court had found that the plaintiff was raped, sexually abused, and forced to work 80 hours or more per week, and entered a default judgment against Mr. and Mrs. Howard in the amount of US $3,306,468. The Supreme Court of Victoria held that all criteria for enforcing the U.S. judgment were satisfied. The fact that the U.S. judgment was a default judgment that could theoretically be set aside did not prevent it from being “final and conclusive.” While Mrs. Howard argued that the default judgment was procured by fraud and should not be enforced in Victoria, the Supreme Court found that Mrs. Howard had “no reasonable prospect of establishing” her defences, and entered summary judgment against Mrs. Howard for the equivalent of US $3,306,468, plus interest.

The respondent had previously been sentenced to 16 months’ imprisonment after pleading guilty to six charges relating to sexually assaulting, stalking, and threatening to kill his ex-wife, as well as attempting to pervert the course of justice (saying that he would kill himself if the victim did not drop the charges against him), and violating a family-violence intervention order. The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed this sentence, arguing that it was “manifestly inadequate.” Upon consideration of the gravity of the offending conduct, its effect on the victim, and aggravating features such as the existence of the intervention order, the Court of Appeal reversed the sentence. The court found that the previous decision gave too much weight to mitigating factors, some of which should not have been taken into account at all, such as the judge’s finding that the respondent regarded “now at least the relationship as [being] over.” He was re-sentenced to two years and 11 months imprisonment with a non-parole period of two years.

The applicant and his wife had been married for 24 years, but had been separated for approximately eight years at the time of the offense. The applicant was convicted of several charges, including aggravated burglary, breach of a family intervention order, making a threat to kill, and common assault. The applicant had entered the victim’s home, breaching a family-violence intervention order, and threatened to kill the victim verbally and by holding a knife to her throat. The applicant also threatened to shoot his estranged wife with a genuine-looking imitation firearm. Following a trial, the applicant was found guilty and sentenced to 10 years’ imprisonment. On appeal, the applicant argued that the trial judge erred in admitting tendency evidence, that the sentence was manifestly excessive, and that the trial judge failed to take into account the “crushing effect” of the sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and sentence, reasoning that “general deterrence is important in cases such as this of violence against domestic partners, so as to deter other like-minded individuals from similar offending.” The Court further reasoned that “sentences imposed for family violence should be set at a level which will send a message to those — predominantly men — who might offend violently against domestic partners or former partners or family members.” The Court also forwarded a copy of its decision to the Royal Commission on Family Violence, which was underway in Victoria at that time.

The defendant was charged with murder by stabbing the deceased woman. The prosecution presented evidence that the accused had stalked the deceased for days, at school and at home, and he had threatened to kill the deceased. Four days before the murder, the deceased, her father, and her brother visited the home of the defendant and his brother, with whom the defendant lived, about the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. Witnesses testified that the defendant became angry at the accusations and falsely accused the deceased of following him. After, the defendant’s brother agreed, as the defendant’s guardian, to stop the defendant’s harassment and stalking of the deceased. At the murder scene, a road near the entrance to the deceased’s school, the police recovered the murder weapon, a bloody knife. After the murder, the defendant attempted suicide and was taken to a hospital where doctors found photographs of the deceased and a note indicating that the accused had pledged himself to commit suicide and to cause the death of the deceased at the same time. Based on the evidence, the court found the defendant guilty of murder and sentenced him to death.

Baby “A” was born with both male and female genitalia. Kenyatta National Hospital issued the baby’s mother with various documents used in the process of carrying out genitogram tests, x-rays, and scans on the baby, and a question mark was entered in the column indicating the child’s sex. To date, the child has never been issued a birth certificate. The petitioners requested a declaration of the court that the Constitution protects and recognizes intersex children. The petitioners claimed that the entry of a question mark on the child’s medical treatment notes offended the child’s rights to legal recognition, eroded their dignity, and violated the right of the child not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. The petitioners argued that corrective surgery for intersex children was not necessary unless there was a therapeutic need to conduct the surgery. Finally, they argued that forced genital normalization, involuntary sterilization, unethical experimentation, medical display, reparative therapies, and conversion therapies often lead to irreversible changes to the body and interferes with a child’s right to family and reproductive health rights generally. The court, noting the “silent issues faced by intersex” people stated that an intersex children are “no different than any other” children with a constitutional right to legal recognition and the benefits of nationality, including the right not to face intersex discrimination. However, the court found that the respondent did not violate the petitioners’ fundamental rights and freedom because there was no evidence that the child’s mother had tried to obtain, and therefore had never been unlawfully denied, the child’s legal documents. The court first ordered the First Respondent to report to the court within 90 days about (i) the agency responsible for collecting data on intersex people, (ii) a legislative proposal for registering intersex people as a sexual category, and (iii) a legislative proposal for intersex “corrective surgery” regulations. Second, the court ordered the child’s mother to register the with the Third Respondent and file a copy of the approved registration with the court within 90 days.

The defendant appealed a lower court decision, arguing that it violated the principle of innocence until proven guilty. The defendant argued that the majority of the evidence against him was the testimony of the complainant, his wife, accusing him of domestic violence. The Supreme Court ruled that witness testimony can be in and of itself sufficient and that judges are free to rule based on the evidence presented before them. In this case, the witness testimony and corroborating evidence were sufficient for the Court to find that there had been habitual physical or psychological violence (Article 173 of the Criminal Code). As stated by the Court, this crime “punishes the aggressor’s imposition of a climate of violence and domination; of a psychological and moral toxic atmosphere, in which the victim is annulled and their free development as a person is inhibited, precisely due to the fear, humiliation, and anguish which are induced in such environment.”

El acusado apeló una decisión del tribunal inferior, argumentando que su condena violó el principio de inocencia hasta que se demuestre su culpabilidad. El acusado argumentó que la mayoría de las pruebas en su contra eran el testimonio de la demandante, su esposa, acusándolo de violencia doméstica. La Corte Suprema dictaminó que el testimonio de los testigos puede ser en sí mismo suficiente y que los jueces son libres de decidir sobre la base de la evidencia presentada ante ellos. En este caso, el testimonio de los testigos y las pruebas corroborantes fueron suficientes para que el Tribunal constatara que había habido violencia física o psicológica habitual (artículo 173 del Código Penal). Según lo declarado por el Tribunal, este delito “castiga la imposición del agresor de un clima de violencia y dominación; de una atmósfera tóxica psicológica y moral, en la que se anula a la víctima y se inhibe su libre desarrollo como persona, precisamente debido al miedo, la humillación y la angustia que se inducen en dicho entorno.”

The Swedish Equality Ombudsman ruled that separate opening hours in public swimming pools for women and men can constitute discrimination, but that separate opening hours can be legal if the discrimination is a result of achieving a permissible and legal purpose. As such, it is permissible for a public swimming pool to have female-only hours in the event that the group of women using the swimming pool do not bathe with men due to their religious beliefs, and would not be able to learn how to swim otherwise. In the decisions, the Swedish Equality Ombudsman stressed that such permissible discrimination justifications are exceedingly rare, and that the ground rule is that public swimming pools should be open to both women and men at all times.

A man, E.O., repeatedly physically assaulted his wife, S.M., and threatened to kill her. The Supreme Court ruled in favor of S.M. and expanded the definition of domestic violence in Sweden, stating that the victim’s entire situation is relevant when assessing gross violations of a person’s integrity, not just a single act. The court further ruled that the injurious acts must only be of a type that would typically lead to a serious injury to a person’s self-confidence, as opposed to having led to serious injury to this particular person’s self-confidence.

According to Chapter 5 Section 4 of the Swedish Marital Law, if only one of the spouses wishes to divorce, that spouse has the right to divorce only after a time for consideration. As an exception, spouses who have lived separately for at least two years have the right to divorce without prior time for consideration. In this case, the wife, E.J., wanted to divorce her husband, L-G.J., against his will. The spouses had only been married for one year, during which they lived separately. The question in the Supreme Court was whether time prior to the marriage can be included in the calculation of how long the spouses have lived separately, or if only time during which the spouses have been married can affect the time for consideration. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s judgement. The lower court had ruled that what is crucial is that they had in fact lived separately for at least two years. Thus, E.J. was allowed to divorce her husband, L-G.J., without time for consideration.

A Swedish dental student was during her dental clinic required to work with bare under-arms. Due to the student’s religious convictions, she asked for permission to wear disposable underarm protection, but her request was denied. The student filed a complaint with the Swedish Equality Ombudsman, who decided to bring an anti-discrimination case to civil court against the education provider Karolinska Institutet. Both parties agreed that working with bare underarms constituted a higher burden on Muslim women, and the case came down to conflicting expert testimony regarding how sanitary the arm covers were in practice. The court found that the education provider had the burden of proof to provide objective justification for an indirect discrimination and that both experts provided equally strong arguments. Therefore, the court ruled in favor of the student. The student was awarded SEK 5000 as compensatory damages.

A man, W.B.F., put his cell phone camera under a woman’s skirt and took pictures of her on an escalator in a subway station in Stockholm. The woman, F.L., did not notice the picture being taken, but was made aware of it shortly thereafter. Under Swedish law, taking insulting pictures of another person is prohibited only if the person being photographed is inside a house or in another location especially purposed for privacy. However, under Chapter 6 Section 10 of the Swedish Penal Code, one who by word or act molests another person in a sense that is intended to violate the person’s sexual integrity may be convicted for sexual molestation. The assessment must be made objectively. The Supreme Court found that the regulation must include situations where the offender does not physically touch the victim, and the victim does not notice the violation. If the act constitutes a clear offense of the victim’s right over his or her body, it should be equated with an act that involves physical touch. Hence, the Supreme Court ruled that W.B.F. should be convicted for sexual molestation and sentenced him to 60 daily fines of SEK 50 each, an amount which was based on his economic situation.

The court ruled that a person who was designated male at birth, but who had undergone sex reassignment therapy and who had changed their legal identity to female has the right to change their legal identity back to male, despite having female genitalia. The court further held that Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act can be applied in this situation (i.e., where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity after having undergone sex reassignment therapy). Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act provides the test for changing one’s gender identity as follows: (i) the person feels that they belong to the opposite sex, (ii) the person has been acting in accordance with the desired gender identity, (iii) the person can be expected to live with the chosen gender identity in the future, and (iv) the person is above 18 years old. The Swedish National Board of Health and Welfare and the Stockholm Administrative Court denied the petition, arguing that due to the applicant’s previous sex change it cannot be expected that the applicant will continue to live with the chosen identity. On appeal, the Stockholm Administrative Court of Appeal found (a) that it was possible to apply Section 1 of the Swedish Gender Identification Act in a case where a person would like to change his or her legal identity back to a previous legal identity, and (b) that the fact that the applicant had previously gone through a sex change did not indicate that the now-chosen gender identity will not be maintained in the future. Therefore, the Court of Appeal allowed the change of identity.

A Muslim woman refused to shake a male interviewer’s hand for religious reasons during a job interview. She placed her hand over her heart and explained her reasons. The recruitment process was then canceled, as the company had a policy which required employees to shake hands with both men and women. The Swedish Equality Ombudsman claimed that the cancellation was an indirect discrimination of Muslims who refuse to shake hand with a person of an opposite sex. The Swedish Labor Court first established that the right to refuse a handshake on religious grounds is protected by the European Convention on Human Rights. The court further found that the handshake policy was neither appropriate nor necessary to achieve its justified purpose (promoting gender equality at the workplace). The court ordered the company to pay the woman SEK 40,000 in damages.

A man was sentenced to nine years in prison in the Skane and Blekinge Court of Appeal for approximately 100 cases of rape and other sexual offenses against a child over the course of five years. The Swedish Supreme Court ruled that when assessing the penalty value for repeated serious sexual offenses against the same plaintiff, the court must weigh the connection between the crimes and their characteristics. When the perpetrator has committed crimes for a long time against the same person, the victim is often vulnerable and in a constrained situation. There is therefore particular reason to consider the effects of the crime on the victim. Considering these factors, the Supreme Court increased the sentence to 12 years' imprisonment.

In this case a doctor was held criminally liable under section 219a of the Criminal Code for publishing information about abortion services on the her website. The doctor argued that she was not "advertising" abortion (which is prohibited by law under section 219a) but merely providing information on abortions. The court disagreed, holding that the downloadable PDF on the doctor's website that contained information about abortions fell under the prohibited conduct of section 219a. The doctor was required to pay a fine of 6000 Euros (150 euros per day over the course of 40 days).

The accused appeared at his former girlfriend’s kitchen window from outside and poured an acid-like substance on her. The substance was later determined to be sulfuric acid. The victim suffered first and second degree burns over 60% of her body, which resulted in a complication in the form of pneumonia in both lungs and caused her death. The court found that the prosecution proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and convicted the accused of murder. The court decided not to impose the death penalty and instead sentenced the accused to 15 years imprisonment because he was a first-time offender, it was an “offence of passion”, he was 22 years old, and he had a one-month-old child.

This case held the Domestic Violence and Matrimonial Proceedings Act of 1976 allows the court to issue an injunction against a man to order him out of the home, even in a non-marital joint tenancy.

The respondent was employed by the appellant, Property Center Bienes Raíces, as the secretary of the owner, Taylan Ozdemir, for approximately four years. When the respondent was three months pregnant, she experienced a health issue threatening her pregnancy and presented a doctor’s note to her employer stating that she could not work for 10 days and had to rest at home. Four days later, she returned to her office to return a work laptop for the use of her co-worker who was filling in while she was absent. According to the co-worker’s testimony, the appellant-owner began to yell at the respondent, stating she was uneducated, that there was “too much risk” in having a pregnant employee, and that she was fired. When the respondent began to cry, informing the owner-appellant that he could not terminate a pregnant employee, he said that he did not care if he was brought before the courts because he had enough money to pay any penalty. He then practically dragged the respondent physically from the premises. The lower court found that the appellant and his business illegally discriminated against the respondent. The Supreme Court agreed and rejected the appeal. Article 233 of the Employment Code (Código de Trabajo) clearly states that a woman cannot be dismissed from her employment because of her pregnancy (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada.”). The Supreme Court found that witness testimony and medical documentation clearly established that 1) between the parties a contract of employment existed, 2) that the respondent was pregnant; and 3) that at the time of her dismissal, her pregnancy was known to her employer. The Supreme Court ordered the appellants to pay the costs of the legal proceeding and the appropriate back pay to the respondent.

La demandada era empleada del demandante, Property Center Bienes Raíces, como secretaria del propietario, Taylan Ozdemir, por aproximadamente cuatro años. Cuando la demandada tenía tres meses de embarazo, sufrió un problema de salud que amenazó su embarazo y presentó una nota del médico a su empleador indicando que no podía trabajar durante 10 días y tenía que descansar en casa por ese período. Cuatro días después, regresó a su oficina para devolver una computadora portátil del trabajo para que la usara su compañera de trabajo que la estaba reemplazando mientras ella estaba ausente. Según el testimonio de la compañera de trabajo, el apelante comenzó a gritarle a la demandada, diciendo que no tenía educación, que había "demasiado riesgo" en tener una empleada embarazada y la despidió. Cuando la demandada comenzó a llorar, informando a el apelante que no podía despedir a una empleada embarazada, éste le dijo que no le importaba si lo llevaban ante los tribunales porque tenía suficiente dinero para pagar cualquier multa. Luego, prácticamente arrastró físicamente a la demandada fuera del local. El tribunal de primera instancia determinó que el apelante y su negocio discriminaron ilegalmente a la demandada. La Corte Suprema estuvo de acuerdo y rechazó la apelación. El Artículo 233 del Código de Trabajo establece claramente que una mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo debido a su embarazo (“La mujer no puede ser despedida de su empleo por el hecho de estar embarazada”). La Corte Suprema determinó que el testimonio de testigos y la documentación médica establecían claramente que 1) existía un contrato de trabajo entre las partes, 2) que la demandada estaba embarazada; y 3) que al momento de su despido, su empleador tenía conocimiento de su embarazo. La Corte Suprema ordenó a los recurrentes que pagaran las costas del proceso judicial y el correspondiente pago atrasado a la demandada.

The appellant challenged a lower court ruling granting the respondent, his ex-partner, an equitable division of marital assets (bienes de la comunidad de hecho) upon the dissolution of their relationship. The appellant argued that 1) the court erroneously found the relationship to be a “common law marriage” (unión more uxurio) and 2) regardless of the character of the relationship, the appellant was the sole owner of the assets at issue as the respondent did not work outside the home. The appellant and the respondent had been in a monogamous, cohabiting relationship for 17 years and had three children together. The lower court found these facts supported by the testimony of witnesses through sworn affidavits, which the appellant challenged as insufficient to establish the character of the relationship. However, the Supreme Court rejected this argument, noting that a court may take into consideration such sworn testimony and that the birth of three children to the couple was indisputable and officially documented. The Supreme Court agreed that a stable, monogamous, familial relationship had been sufficiently established, giving rise to the presumption that the respondent was entitled to her share of the common assets, if proven that she contributed to their acquisition. The Supreme Court also rejected the appellant’s arguments that the respondent could not be entitled to common assets because she was not employed outside the home and thus did not contribute financially to the acquisition of the common assets. The Court cited the Fundamental Rights of the Family (number 11, article 55) recognizing that work in the home is also “economic activity that creates added value and produces wealth and societal wellbeing” (“actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social”). Following this principle, the Court stated that a partner working in the home and caring for the children sustained and supported the partner working outside the home. Accordingly, it affirmed the decision of the lower court.

El apelante discutió una decisión del tribunal inferior que le otorgaba a la demandada, su ex pareja, una división equitativa de los bienes de la comunidad de hecho al disolverse su relación. El apelante argumentó que 1) el tribunal consideró erróneamente que la relación era un “matrimonio de hecho“ o “unión libre“ (unión more uxurio) y 2) independientemente del carácter de la relación, el apelante era el único propietario de los bienes en cuestión porque la demandada nunca trabajó fuera de casa. El apelante y la demandada habían estado en una relación de convivencia monógama durante 17 años y tenían tres hijos juntos. El tribunal de primera instancia encontró estos hechos respaldados por el testimonio de testigos mediante declaraciones juradas, que el apelante impugnó como insuficientes para establecer el carácter de la relación. Sin embargo, la Corte Suprema rechazó este argumento, señalando que un tribunal puede tomar en consideración dichos testimonios jurados y que el nacimiento de tres hijos de la pareja era indiscutible y oficialmente documentado. La Corte Suprema acordó que se había establecido con suficiencia legal una relación familiar estable, monógama. La Corte continúo que este establecimiento daba lugar a la presunción de que la demandada tenía derecho a su parte de los bienes comunes, si se demostraba que contribuyó a su adquisición. La Corte Suprema también rechazó los argumentos de la recurrente de que la demandada no podía tener derecho a bienes comunes porque no estaba empleada fuera del hogar y, por lo tanto, no contribuía financieramente a la adquisición de los bienes comunes. La Corte citó los Derechos Fundamentales de la Familia (número 11, artículo 55) reconociendo que el trabajo en el hogar es también “actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social” (“actividad económica que crea valor agregado y produce riqueza y bienestar social ”). Siguiendo este principio, la Corte manifestó que un miembro de una pareja que trabajaba en el hogar y cuidaba a los niños sostenía y apoyaba al otro miembro que trabajaba fuera del hogar. En consecuencia, la decisión del tribunal inferior fue afirmada.

The petitioner filed for divorce, stating that only days after their wedding, the respondent began to subject her to aggressive verbal and psychological abuse that continued via telephone even after he emigrated to the United States. After the respondent returned to Ecuador, the abuse became physical. Once he severed a portion of her finger with a knife. The Provincial Court of Justice of Azuay declared their marriage dissolved. The respondent appealed, arguing that the court committed legal errors by failing to apply the correct evidentiary standard. The National Court of Justice affirmed the lower court’s decision, noting that such judgments are protected by a presumption of correctness. The Court noted that Ecuador is a signatory of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). With regard to the petitioner’s testimony detailing her abuse, the Court stated that the character of cyclical domestic violence makes it difficult for victims to detail every incident. The pattern of violence described by the petitioner was sufficient evidence for the court to grant her a divorce. (External link to search page of Ecuador National Court of Justice website.)

La demandante solicitó el divorcio, afirmando que solo días después de su boda, el demandado comenzó a someterla a agresivos abusos verbales y psicológicos que continuaron vía telefónica, incluso después de él que emigró a Estados Unidos. Después de que el demandado regresó a Ecuador, el abuso se volvió físico. Una vez le cortó una parte del dedo con un cuchillo. La Corte Provincial de Justicia del Azuay declaró disuelto su matrimonio. El demandado apeló, argumentando que el tribunal cometió errores legales al no aplicar el estándar probatorio correcto. La Corte Nacional de Justicia confirmó la decisión del tribunal de primera instancia, señalando que tales sentencias están protegidas por una presunción de corrección. La Corte señaló que Ecuador es signatario de la Convención sobre la Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación contra la Mujer (CEDAW). Con respecto al testimonio de la peticionaria que detalla su abuso, la Corte señaló que el carácter de la violencia doméstica cíclica dificulta que las víctimas detallen cada incidente con particularidad. El patrón de violencia descrito por la víctima fue prueba suficiente para que el tribunal le concediera el divorcio. (Enlace externo a la página de búsqueda del sitio web de la Corte Nacional de Justicia de Ecuador).

In the prosecution of an international human trafficking ring, B.D., a nightclub owner, was charged with Facilitating Prostitution in violation of Article 201 of the Provisional Criminal Code of Kosovo, for recruiting and organizing 16 Moldovan women for prostitution. His co-defendants B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were immigration officials charged with Abusing Official Position and Smuggling of Migrants in violation of Articles 339 and 138 of the Criminal Code, for enabling 35 illegal immigrants – mostly Moldovan women – to enter Kosovo, including by issuing fake identification documents to them, with the motive of obtaining unlawful material benefits for themselves. B.D. was found guilty by the District Court, while B.J., M.G., and S.Z. were acquitted. On appeal, the Supreme Court observed that the District Court based B.D.’s guilt exclusively on text messages sent to his mobile phone asking to make reservations to meet with various individuals identified only by nicknames. The challenged judgment did not clarify the identities of the persons behind the nicknames and did not assess whether they were indeed the alleged victims identified in the indictment. The lower court’s decision also made no reference to the statements of the alleged victims, particularly whether the statements corresponded to and corroborated the contents of the text messages. The court further held that the District Court’s judgment did not contain sufficient reasoning a proper assessment of the evidence regarding B.J., M.G., and S.Z’s alleged enabling of illegal immigration. The tribunal also faulted the lower court for failing to determine the complete facts, including the immigration registration system, movements of large sums in the defendants’ bank accounts, and transcripts of intercepted communications between the defendants. Accordingly, the Supreme Court annulled the District Court’s verdict and remanded for retrial. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was added to an expanded ongoing rape investigation against his associates, charged and convicted of rape in violation of Article 193 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and sentenced to three years of imprisonment. Following the Supreme Court’s affirmation of the first instance court’s judgment, the prosecutor filed a Request for Protection of Legality in favor of the defendant, claiming that the court of first instance failed to assess relevant evidence in favor of the defendant and based its decision on evidence which did not meet the requisite standard of “beyond any reasonable doubt.” In particular, the prosecutor argued that the conviction was based on the statement of the alleged victim in court, corroborated only by hearsay, that the victim in the immediate early stages of the police investigation did not claim the defendant had committed any crimes against her, and that her allegations against the defendant were evolving and increasing with time. The prosecutor noted that there was an absence of medical and physical evidence to support the conviction, and the police officers involved were not interviewed. The Supreme Court rejected the Request. The court first repudiated the notion that “beyond any reasonable doubt” was the requisite standard of proof under Kosovar law. It then noted that the hearsay was a direct confirmation that the victim had reported the rape to the witness. The tribunal dismissed the prosecutor’s argument that there was no physical evidence, because of the way the rape was committed – without physical violence as the victim surrendered under threat – it was meaningless to expect any trace of violence to be found. The court also saw no reason to discredit the victim on the basis that the victim only denounced the defendant one year after the commission of the rape, stating that it was “absolutely normal that a victim of rape finds the courage to denounce the aggressor only once the risk of revenge against the denouncer . . . has ceased.” Finally, the tribunal held that the defendant was investigated only at the end of the investigation against his associates, and that the details of the rape increased with time, were features common in many rape investigations and normally had no significance in the assessment of the evidence. (Also available in English.)

The defendant was arrested for being suspected of touching a female police officer’s shoulder and trying to kiss her, and charged with Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession pursuant to Article 200 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo, and attempt to commit such an offense, among other crimes. The municipal court found the defendant guilty, and sentenced him to two years and four months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for three years. The district court rejected the charge of Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession, and reduced the sentence to 12 months of imprisonment and prohibition of public service for two years. Thereafter, the defendant filed a Request for Protection of Legality against the lower courts’ decisions, arguing that the lower courts unlawfully convicted him of attempted Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession. The defendant argued that an attempt requires the offender to intentionally take immediate action toward the commission of the offense. Here, the commencing of the criminal offense was not proven because there was no action manifesting a sexual purpose behind his touching. The Supreme Court held the defendant’s claim was unfounded, pointing out that Article 200’s text states only “[w]hoever touches another person for a sexual purpose.” Here, the defendant not only touched the victim but also tried to kiss her, and was prevented from kissing her mouth only by the victim’s resistance. Hence, the defendant did not commit an attempt, but in fact completed the offense. The court, however, determined that the principle of reformatio in peius (prohibiting placing the appellant in a worse position after appeal) barred it from changing the lower courts’ qualification of the criminal offense. The court additionally rejected the defendant’s argument that the attempt in this case was not punishable, determining that an attempt to commit Sexual Abuse by Abusing Position, Authority or Profession was punishable under the Criminal Code. (Also available in English.)

The applicant was a judge on the Court of Appeals and was a candidate in the election for the President of the Court of Appeals. She received the highest number of points among the three candidates in the candidate evaluation commissioned by the Kosovo Judicial Council (KJC, the body which administers the judiciary). During the voting by the KJC, the applicant was voted on first, but did not receive the necessary majority of votes. The voting then moved on to the second-ranked candidate, who won the overwhelming share of votes and was elected. Upon losing, the applicant submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging various constitutional violations, including violation of the principle of gender equality under Article 24 (Equality before the Law) of the Constitution of Kosovo. The KJC responded that the principle of gender equality consisted of equal treatment of every candidate using the same standards, and that it had done so irrespective of the candidates’ gender or ethnic background. The Constitutional Court noted that Article 24 of the Constitution implies that general principles of equality of treatment apply to all actions of public authorities in their dealings with individuals. The tribunal explained that in a voting process, a fundamental aspect of the principle of equality is that each candidate shall benefit from the opportunity to be considered fairly and equally. The panel then held that the KJC’s vote did not provide equal opportunities to the candidates, because it did not provide for procedural safeguards pertinent to the guarantee of equality of treatment. Each candidate was voted on in succession, and so KJC members could vote in favor or against all three candidates. Members could also abstain from the voting selectively and arbitrarily. Thus, it was impossible to know which candidate actually had the support of the majority of the KJC. The court therefore declared the vote incompatible with the Constitution, and ordered the KJC to conduct a new vote. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The applicant (former husband) and his former wife purchased an apartment during their marriage, with the applicant’s father contributing to the purchase as well. The parties concluded an agreement stipulating that, in case of dispute, the parties agreed that the ownership of the apartment would be divided based on each party’s investment. After their divorce, the applicant filed a claim for the division of the property. The Municipal Court rejected the claim and, deeming the applicant’s father’s contribution to be an assistance to both spouses, ruled that the applicant and his former wife were co-owners, each owning half of the property. On appeal, the District Court quashed the Municipal Court’s decision and remanded, but the Municipal Court on remand reached the same decision (i.e., applicant and former wife each owned one-half of the property). The District Court then amended the Municipal Court’s judgment and ruled that the applicant owned 85.48% of the apartment, and his former wife 14.52%, according to their agreement. The applicant then litigated to execute the District Court’s judgment. The former wife filed a request for a revision with the Supreme Court, which granted the request and upheld the Municipal Court’s judgment, holding that the apartment was an asset created during the marital union, and the parties by law could not contract to the detriment of common assets acquired in marriage. The applicant appealed to the Constitutional Court, alleging violation of his right to the protection of property and right to a fair trial under the Constitution of Kosovo and the European Convention on Human Rights. The Constitutional Court emphasized that its task was not to act as a court of fourth instance or to deal with errors of fact or law unless it may have infringed on constitutional rights. The Supreme Court’s reasoning was clear and the proceedings below had not been unfair or arbitrary. Therefore, the Constitutional Court ruled inadmissible the applicant’s appeal from the Supreme Court’s judgment. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The applicant, a local employee of the UN mission in Kosovo, was arrested and charged with various criminal offenses, including facilitating or compelling prostitution (Article 241 of the Criminal Code of Kosovo). The Basic Court found him guilty and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment. The Court of Appeal affirmed the guilty verdict. The applicant filed a request for protection of legality with the Supreme Court, which rejected the request. The applicant then submitted a referral to the Constitutional Court, alleging, among other things, that he was discriminated against on the grounds of gender in violation of Article 24 of the Constitution because the trial court found credible the statement of a victim and a witness because they were women. The Constitutional Court explained that, in the applicant’s circumstance, equality before the law should be understood as a right of a party to impartial treatment and equal opportunity to exhaust legal remedies despite personal status. Under European Court of Human Rights case law interpreting Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, treatment is discriminatory if it has no objective and reasonable justification – that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim, or there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means and aim. The court dismissed the applicant’s allegation of gender discrimination as “manifestly ill-founded,” finding that he failed to prove how and why the trial court treated him in an unequal way in relation to the victim and witness at issue, only because they were women. The tribunal rejected the applicant’s other claims and concluded that he had not substantiated his allegations of a violation of the fundamental human rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution. Therefore, the applicant’s referral was declared inadmissible. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The applicant was registered as female at birth, but has always identified himself as male. He lived and appeared as a man in all areas of life, and had begun hormonal treatment to transition. The applicant filed a request with the Civil Status Office to change his name and gender marker to reflect his male gender identity, but the request was rejected. He appealed the decision to the Civil Registration Agency, which rejected the appeal on the grounds that the applicant provided no evidence that his current name prevented his integration in society, and no medical report supporting his request for a change of his gender marker. The applicant filed a claim with the Basic Court, and, only one week later and before a decision was rendered, referred the matter to the Constitutional Court. The applicant alleged the Civil Registration Agency’s decision violated his fundamental rights and freedoms, guaranteed by Articles 23 (Human Dignity), 24 (Equality Before the Law), and 36 (Right to Privacy) of the Constitution of Kosovo, and Article 8 (Right to Respect for Private and Family Life) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The applicant requested to be exempted from the legal obligation to exhaust all legal remedies before seeking a constitutional review on the grounds that the regular courts’ legal remedy would not be effective or sufficiently certain because of his special circumstances and the length of the proceedings. The Constitutional Court surveyed foreign constitutional courts via the Venice Commission for their respective relevant case law, confirming the general requirement for an applicant to exhaust his/her legal remedies before seeking constitutional review. The court noted the existence of a very similar and recently decided case, in which a person sued the Civil Status Office and Civil Registration Agency for their refusal to grant his request to change his name and gender marker from female to male after a successful gender reassignment surgery. The Basic Court ruled for the applicant and ordered the changes made, and the decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals. The Constitutional Court therefore determined that the regular courts could furnish an effective and sufficiently certain legal remedy for the applicant. Moreover, the court noted that the applicant was not seeking review of an already lengthy court proceeding, but merely of the possibility of one, and in any event the Basic Court and Court of Appeals disposed of the above mentioned precedent in reasonable time. Accordingly, the Constitutional Court ruled the applicant’s referral inadmissible because it was premature. (Also available in Srpski and English.)

The petitioners were found guilty of violating several provisions of the Austrian Criminal Code after the regional court found that they acted as a criminal organization to recruit victims by means of extortion, massive violence, penalties for not performing sex work, and threats, and arranged for the victims’ transfer and accommodation in brothels in Austria. After an appeal on procedural grounds, the Austrian Supreme Court upheld the convictions. The Regional Court Leoben’s decision from April 28, 2009 [13 Hv 122/08x-492] was not available at the time of publication.

Die Beschwerdeführer wurden vom Landgericht Loeben für schuldig befunden verschiedene Sexualstraftatbestände des Österreichischen Strafgesetzbuches verwirklicht zu haben. Hierbei haben sie als kriminelle Vereinigung gehandelt, um ihre Opfer als Prostituierte zu rekrutieren, die sie dann erpressten, massiver Gewalt aussetzten und bestraften, wenn sie der Sexarbeit nicht nachkamen. Sie haben ihre Opfer bedroht und bereits vor dem Transfer nach Österreich, den sie organisierten derartiger Gewalt ausgesetzt, dass sie in ihrer Entscheidungsfreiheit stark eingeschränkt waren. Gegen dieses Urteil gingen die Beschwerdeführer aufgrund von Verfahrensfehlern vor. Der Oberste Gerichtshof wies die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde zurück und hat die Verurteilungen aufrechterhalten.

The Court affirmed the decision of the lower court, which had prohibited the parents of a young daughter of Gambian nationality resident in Germany from determining her whereabouts and relocating her to Gambia due to a high risk to the girl of female genital mutilation or cutting.

Der Gerichtshof bestätigte die Entscheidung der Vorinstanz, die es der Mutter einer Minderjährigen mit gambischer Staatsangehörigkeit, wohnhaft in Deutschland, teilweise untersagt hatte, ihr Recht, den Aufenthaltsort ihrer Tochter zu bestimmen, auszuüben, insbesondere das Kind in den Urlaub nach Gambia zu bringen oder einen Wohnortwechsel dorthin zu veranlassen, da ein hohes Risiko bestehe, dass die Tochter während ihres Aufenthalts in Gambia einer Genitalverstümmelung unterzogen werde.

The claimant sued her employer on the grounds of discrimination after a male colleague received a promotion to a management role she had hoped for. The Court decided for the claimant, accepting statistical evidence showing that, while the majority of employees of the employer (69%) were women, no women were represented on the three most senior management levels. This was the first decision of a court accepting such statistical evidence of discrimination. This decision is now only available via subscription service. The Bundesarbeitsgericht (Federal Labor Court) overruled this decision (8 AZR 1012/08), but affirmed that statistical evidence is admissible in discrimination analyses.

The Court held that it was in breach of the right to equal treatment enshrined in the German constitution that periods of maternity leave (which affects women only) were not counted towards certain pension benefits whereas periods of sick leave (which affects both men and women) were. English translation of 1 BvR 1409/10 available here.)

Der Gerichtshof stellte fest, dass es gegen das im deutschen Grundgesetz verankerte Recht auf Gleichbehandlung verstößt, wenn Zeiten des Mutterschaftsurlaubs (der nur Frauen betrifft) nicht auf bestimmte Rentenleistungen angerechnet werden, längere Krankheitszeiten (die sowohl Männer als auch Frauen betreffen) hingegen schon.

The appellant was found guilty of raping his stepdaughter AAA six times by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. As a result, AAA gave birth to a baby in 2001. On appeal, the appellant argued that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, stating that (1) there was no sign that AAA was outraged and defended her honor with courage and (2) of the three instances of intercourse he admits to, such instances were consensual and between lovers. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal for the following reasons: (1) victim’s failure to shout or offer tenacious resistance does not mean the victim was consenting, and victim’s physical resistance is not an element of proving rape, and (2) a romantic relationship does not negate rape. The required elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, (I) accused had carnal knowledge of the victim and (II) accomplished the act through force or intimidation, or when the victim was deprived of reason or unconscious, or under age 12, or demented. The court found that the prosecution proved all elements by providing: AAA’s credible testimony, the results of AAA's medical examination, the appellant's use of a knife and bolo to threaten physical violence, and his moral influence as stepfather over AAA. The court sentenced the appellant to reclusión perpetua and ordered him to pay P225,000 in moral damages, civil indemnity, and exemplary damages to AAA.​

The respondent was married to a Japanese national. The couple filed for divorce in Japan. The respondent then petitioned to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, as she was no longer married to her Japanese husband. The Regional Trial Court denied the petition ruling that the divorce obtained by the respondent in Japan cannot be recognized, due to Article 15 of the New Civil Code, which “does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce, whether they are in the country or living abroad if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in another country.” In addition, unless Filipinos are naturalized citizens of another country, Philippines law controls matters of family rights and duties, including marriages. The Court of Appeals overturned the Regional Trial Court decision, holding that Article 26 of the Family Code of the Philippines is applicable, even if it was the respondent who filed for divorce. Because the Japanese husband is now no longer married to the respondent, it would be unjust to still consider the respondent to be married to him. The Supreme Court partially affirmed the Court of Appeals decision. The Court noted that the burden was on the respondent to prove the divorce was validated by Japanese law as well as her former husband’s capacity to legally remarry. Thus, the case was remanded to the court of origin for further proceedings and for consideration of evidence presented regarding Japanese law on divorce.

The appellant arrived at the respondent’s home armed with a pistol and raped her. The respondent, 16 years old at the time, was already 32 weeks pregnant with the appellant’s child due to multiple previous rapes. The respondent filed a suit against the appellant and gave birth to a daughter during the trial. The Trial Court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to 20 years of imprisonment, to which he appealed to the Lahore High Court. Under the criminal laws of Pakistan, it is rape when a man has sexual intercourse with a woman with or without her consent when she is 16 years old or under. It is also rape when a woman gives consent due to fear of death or being hurt. The appellant argued the lesser offence of fornication, which is a crime committed when two people have sexual intercourse outside of marriage. The appellant argued that the Trial Court should not have convicted him of rape as the respondent had consented to the sexual intercourse. The offence of fornication is only punishable by imprisonment for up to five years with a maximum fine of ten thousand rupees, whereas rape is punishable by imprisonment for up to 25 years and/or a fine. The High Court held that since the respondent was 16 years old at the time of rape, it qualified as rape irrespective of the respondent’s consent. The High Court also expressed its concern over the Trial Court’s failure to award compensation to the child. Notably, the High Court held that children born because of rape would suffer “mental anguish and psychological damage” for their entire life, and should, therefore, be entitled to compensation. The appellant was ordered to pay a fine of one million rupees to the child born as a result of the rape, in addition to the compensation payable to the respondent.

The petitioner was a mother who moved with her husband, the respondent, to Canada with their three minor children in 2009. The respondent moved back to Lahore, Pakistan and the children stayed with the petitioner in Canada. The respondent wanted the entire family to move back to Lahore. To this end, he approached the Guardian Court in Lahore and declared himself as the guardian of the person and property of his children. When they came to visit him, he refused to let the children go back to Canada. Under the Guardians & Wards Act of 1890, the Guardian Court is any lower court that can hear an application for custody and guardianship of children. The respondent proceeded to file an application for custody of the children before the Guardian Court. The petitioner was in Canada when she received the notice of the proceedings for custody and unable to immediately enter Pakistan as her visa had expired. In her absence, the Guardian Court passed an order giving the custody of the children to the respondent until the petitioner could appear before the Guardian Court. The petitioner filed an application to the High Court for custody of her children, which was dismissed as the matter was still pending before the Guardian Court. The High Court’s reasoning was that because the Guardian Court is where the evidence and witnesses are evaluated, it is the appropriate forum for the case to be heard for custody of children. The Supreme Court of Pakistan considered whether the High Court had jurisdiction to hear the petition on custody matters pending a final decision by the Guardian Court. The Supreme Court observed from previous case law that the Guardian Court is the final arbiter on questions of custody of a child. However, this should not disadvantage a person illegally deprived of custody of a minor child from a remedy to regain custody pending adjudication by the Guardian Court. On this basis, the Supreme Court held that the High Court has the right to pass orders where it would be in the best interest and welfare of the minor. The Supreme Court also held that the High Court has jurisdiction to restore custody to the person lawfully holding such custody while the Guardian Court gives its final orders. After considering that the children wanted to move back to Canada with their mother, the order was passed in her favor.

The defendant pleaded guilty to having sexual intercourse with his daughter, a minor. The daughter became pregnant as a result and the child was adopted.. The judge commended the daughter for reporting the offense, despite the defendant’s attempt to persuade her not to. The defendant was sentenced to six years and eight months in prison.

The plaintiff was a registered veterinary surgeon who had been found guilty of violating a provision of the Veterinary Surgeons Registration Ordinance after complaints that he had sent sexually inappropriate text messages to a co-worker. He argued that, because the co-worker was not a patient or customer of the clinic where they both worked, her complaints were not within the scope of the ordinance. The court dismissed his argument, finding that the ordinance was meant to be broad in scope and covered such misconduct.

The plaintiff, a gay man, challenged the government’s denial of spousal benefits to his husband. The couple had been married in New Zealand. The court observed that Hong Kong law does not recognize same-sex marriage; the Marriage Ordinance defines marriage as “the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman to the exclusion of all others.” The court concluded that the government’s denial of spousal benefits therefore did not violate the Basic Law, Bill of Rights, or common law. The plaintiff plans to appeal to Hong Kong’s highest court, the Court of Final Instance.

Plaintiff worked as a secretary for the defendant. The plaintiff was experienced and had a history of good performance reviews. However, her relationship with the defendant deteriorated after she became pregnant. The plaintiff shared her pregnancy news with human resource and one colleague only, but then more colleagues learned about her pregnancy. According to the plaintiff, colleagues threatened to force her to have an abortion and suggested that she take only a four-week maternity leave despite her preference for an eight-week maternity leave. Plaintiff later learned that the defendant had hired a permanent replacement for her during her maternity leave. Subsequently, the plaintiff was fired. The court found that the plaintiff had showed that, on a balance of probabilities, she had been discriminated against by the defendant on the basis of her pregnancy.

The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant along with her husband, who was her direct supervisor. The defendant fired the plaintiff’s husband. Subsequently, the defendant informed the plaintiff that because of her marital relationship with her husband, she would have to be fired too, despite the lack of any wrongdoing on her part. The defendant moved to dismiss the claim, but the Court refused to, finding that there were credible allegations of violations of the Family Status Discrimination Ordinance and the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.

The defendant was an employment consultancy company that worked on behalf of various Hong Kong government agencies. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant, who worked under a one-year contract. The plaintiff’s contract was renewed, with a start-date immediately following the end-date of the original contract. The plaintiff subsequently informed the defendant that she was pregnant. The defendant rescinded the renewal of the contract, on the grounds that the plaintiff had been dishonest in informing the employer of her pregnancy. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal Opportunities Commission, claiming that the defendant had violated the Sex Discrimination Ordinance. To resolve the complaint, the defendant proposed a new contract, which the plaintiff accepted. The plaintiff later applied for maternity leave, but was denied by the defendant, who informed her that she did not satisfy the requirement of continuous employment prior to the request (due to a one-day gap between the original contract’s end-date and the new contract’s start-date). The court found that the defendant’s imposition of a one-day gap was a discriminatory act that was prohibited by Sections 8 and 11 of the Sex Discrimination Ordinance.

The appellant and respondent were German nationals whose marriage was recognized in Hong Kong and who were initiating a divorce. Prior to their marriage, they had entered into a prenuptial agreement under German law. The court considered whether Hong Kong was the proper forum for the divorce proceedings, and whether a Hong Kong court should stay the divorce action at the request of one of the parties, due to ongoing divorce proceedings in Germany. The court adopted the principles of the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom decision in Radmacher v Granatino (2011) favoring prenuptial agreements. This reversed the previously long-held position that prenuptial agreements were against public policy and not to be enforced.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to 20 months in prison for crimes of domestic violence against his wife (BB). AA filed an appeal to the Appeals Court arguing that the scope of the law against domestic violence applied only to victims that were deemed to be defenseless. AA argued that the victim, BB was a member of the military and as such could not be deemed a defenseless person. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal affirming the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court determined that the fact that the victim was a member of the military was irrelevant and that the acts of violence were appropriately analyzed considering only the aggressor’s actions.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a 20 meses de prisión por delitos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). AA presentó una apelación ante el Tribunal de Apelaciones argumentando que el alcance de la ley contra la violencia doméstica se aplicaba solo a las víctimas que se consideraban indefensas. AA argumentó que la víctima, BB era miembro del ejército y, como tal, no podía considerarse una persona indefensa. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación afirmando la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que el hecho de que la víctima era miembro de las fuerzas armadas era irrelevante y que los actos de violencia se analizaron adecuadamente considerando solo las acciones del agresor.

The plaintiff sued the defendant in Civil Labor Court for damages suffered because of sexual harassment in the workplace. The plaintiff was an employee of the defendant for 13 years, always received good performance reviews, and was promoted. One of the company’s directors continuously harassed her in the workplace for over two years even though the plaintiff rejected his propositions. Over the course of those two years, the director sent several inappropriate text messages and emails to the plaintiff, to which she never responded. On one occasion, he sent an email with more than 70 pictures of sexual content to the plaintiff. After this incident, the plaintiff filed a formal complaint with one of the company’s executives who asked the director to apologize, but did not take any additional action. The plaintiff then quit her job and sued her employer for sexual harassment in the workplace. The Trial Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her UR$ 880.272 pesos and a 10% administrative fine against the defendant. The defendant appealed, arguing that there was insufficient evidence to find for the plaintiff and that, if anything, the plaintiff had consented to the director’s advances. The Appeals Court analyzed all the unanswered harassing emails and messages sent to the plaintiff and determined that the appeal had no basis. The court determined that the director’s conduct qualified as sexual harassment in the workplace per Law No. 18.561 and that his conduct had effectively created a hostile work environment for the plaintiff, which had forced her to quit her job. Therefore, The Appeals Court affirmed the Trial Court’s award.

La demandante demandó al acusado en el Tribunal de Trabajo Civil por los daños sufridos por el acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo. La demandante era empleada del acusado durante 13 años, siempre recibió buenas evaluaciones de desempeño y fue promovida. Uno de los directores de la compañía la acosó continuamente en el lugar de trabajo durante más de dos años, a pesar de que la demandante rechazó sus propuestas. En el transcurso de esos dos años, el director envió varios mensajes de texto y correos electrónicos inapropiados al la demandante, a lo que ella nunca respondió. En una ocasión, envió un correo electrónico con más de 70 imágenes de contenido sexual a la demandante. Después de este incidente, la demandante presentó una queja formal ante uno de los ejecutivos de la compañía que le pidió disculpas al director, pero no tomó ninguna medida adicional. La demandante luego renunció a su trabajo y demandó a su empleador por acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo. El Tribunal de Primera Instancia falló a favor de la demandante y le otorgó UR $ 880.272 pesos y una multa administrativa del 10% contra el acusado. El acusado apeló, argumentando que no había pruebas suficientes y que, en todo caso, la demandante había dado su consentimiento a los avances del director. El Tribunal de Apelaciones analizó todos los correos electrónicos y mensajes de acoso no respondidos enviados a la demandante y determinó que la apelación no tenía fundamento. El tribunal determinó que la conducta del director calificaba como acoso sexual en el lugar de trabajo según la Ley N ° 18.561 y que su conducta había creado efectivamente un ambiente de trabajo hostil para la demandante, lo que la había obligado a renunciar a su trabajo. Por lo tanto, el Tribunal de Apelaciones confirmó la conclusión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

The Trial Court sentenced the 28-year-old accused (AA) to seven years and six months in prison for the crimes of rape, kidnapping and robbery. On March 27, 2011, AA approached the 18-year-old victim (BB) at a bus station and threatened her with a knife. BB offered him money, but AA put a knife to her throat and took her to a nearby field where he sexually assaulted her several times during the night, hit her repeatedly, and videotaped the sexual assault with his cellphone. AA then tied up BB and, before leaving her in the field, used BB’s cellphone to text her mother the location where BB could be found. He stole the cellphone and sold it at a fair. On July 22, 2011, AA was arrested. The police found in his possession a memory card with pornography and the video of BB’s rape. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. The Appeals Court amended the qualification of the crimes to aggravated and rendered opinion that the sentence imposed by the Trial Court should have been more severe due to the proven dangerous nature of AA.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) de 28 años a siete años y seis meses de prisión por los delitos de violación, secuestro y robo. El 27 de marzo de 2011, AA se acercó a la víctima que tenía 18 años (BB) en una estación de autobuses y la amenazó con un cuchillo. BB le ofreció dinero, pero AA le puso un cuchillo en la garganta y la llevó a un campo cercano donde la agredió sexualmente varias veces durante la noche, la golpeó repetidamente y grabó en video la agresión sexual con su teléfono celular. AA luego ató a BB y, antes de dejarla en el campo, usó el teléfono celular de BB para enviarle un mensaje de texto a su madre sobre el lugar donde se podía encontrar a BB. Robó el teléfono celular y lo vendió en una feria. El 22 de julio de 2011, AA fue arrestado. La policía encontró en su poder una tarjeta de memoria con pornografía y el video de la violación de BB. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia. El Tribunal de Apelaciones modificó la calificación de los delitos a agravada y emitió una opinión de que la sentencia impuesta por el Tribunal de Primera Instancia debería haber sido más severa debido a la naturaleza peligrosa comprobada de AA.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to two years in prison for aggravated domestic violence. The court considered the aggravating circumstances to be the accused’s recidivism and the use of his strength to overpower his female victim. AA had a history of domestic violence against his wife (BB). Even though he had repeatedly assaulted BB and stabbed her once, BB refused to file a complaint against him. A family court judge imposed a restraining order against AA pursuant to which he could not get closer than 300 meters to BB and her children. However, BB on several occasions allowed AA back in her home and near the children. On October 7, 2008, AA came over to BB’s house with the intention of moving back in, but when BB declined, AA locked her and her children in a room for two hours. He did not physically assault them, but did threaten to kill them. BB filed a complaint and AA was convicted of domestic violence. AA appealed arguing that BB had subsequently withdrawn her criminal complaint against him, which constituted consent to his conduct. The Appeals Court determined that the victim’s withdrawal of her complaint was a consequence of “battered women’s syndrome,” and had no bearing on a criminal action. The Appeals Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a dos años de prisión por violencia doméstica agravada. El Tribunal consideró que las circunstancias agravantes eran la reincidencia del acusado y el uso de su fuerza para dominar a su víctima femenina. AA tenía antecedentes previos de violencia doméstica contra su esposa (BB). Aunque había asaltado repetidamente a BB y la apuñaló una vez, BB se negó a presentar una queja contra él. Un juez de un tribunal de familia impuso una orden de restricción contra AA en virtud de la cual no podía acercarse más de 300 metros a BB y sus hijos. Sin embargo, BB en varias ocasiones permitió que AA regresara a su casa y estuviera cerca de los niños. El 7 de octubre del 2008, AA vino a la casa de BB con la intención de regresar, pero cuando BB declinó, AA la encerró a ella y a sus hijos en una habitación durante dos horas. No los agredió físicamente, pero amenazó con matarlos. BB presentó una queja y AA fue condenado por violencia doméstica. AA apeló argumentando que BB había retirado posteriormente su denuncia penal contra él, lo que constituía un consentimiento para su conducta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones determinó que la retirada de la denuncia de la víctima fue una consecuencia del "síndrome de las mujeres maltratadas" y no tenía relación con una acción penal. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó el recurso y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia.

The Trial Court sentenced the accused (AA) to four years in prison for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor (BB). AA and the mother of BB had a common law marriage. AA had been sexually abusing BB since she was eight years old and started raping her when she turned 11. At age 14, BB became pregnant as a result of rape committed by AA. BB’s mother discovered AA’s abuse and filed the criminal complaint. AA confessed to being the victim’s “lover.” The court found aggravating circumstances including that AA had taken advantage of his domestic relationship with BB’s mother and that he had abused his victim during the night. AA’s confession constituted an attenuating circumstance, reducing the sentence imposed. The Appeals Court dismissed AA’s appeal and affirmed the Trial Court’s decision, ruling that there was enough evidence presented to establish the facts of the case.

El Tribunal de Primera Instancia condenó al acusado (AA) a cuatro años de prisión por abuso sexual agravado de un menor (BB). AA y la madre de BB tenían un matrimonio común. AA había abusado sexualmente de BB desde que tenía ocho años y comenzó a violarla cuando cumplió los 11. A los 14 años, BB quedó embarazada como resultado de una violación cometida por AA. La madre de BB descubrió el abuso de AA y presentó esta denuncia penal. AA confesó ser el "amante" de la víctima. El tribunal encontró circunstancias agravantes, incluyendo que AA se había aprovechado de su relación doméstica con la madre de BB y que había abusado de su víctima generalmente durante las noches. La confesión de AA constituyó una circunstancia atenuante, reduciendo la sentencia impuesta. El Tribunal de Apelaciones desestimó la apelación de AA y confirmó la decisión del Tribunal de Primera Instancia, dictaminando que se presentaron suficientes pruebas para establecer los hechos del caso.

The applicant was dismissed by her employer, the respondent, because of operational requirements. The applicant was employed by the respondent from 1 November 2007 until her dismissal on 24 October 2012. The applicant claimed that she was dismissed unfairly because she was pregnant. Prior to her dismissal, the applicant delivered a letter from the Qacha’s Nek Hospital stating that she was pregnant and would be required to attend monthly clinics until she delivered her baby. The respondent then dismissed the applicant, claiming that her employment could not continue because of her pregnancy. The Labour Court referred to subsection 3(d) of the Labour Code Order 24 of 1992, which provides that pregnancy, among others, does not constitute a valid reason for terminating employment. The court stated that this type of dismissal carried an element of discrimination, the freedom against which is protected by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Lesotho, the highest law of the land. The court held that the dismissal of the applicant was unfair, that the respondent must reinstate her to her former position, and that the respondent pay for her lost earnings following dismissal.

Here, the Court held that “having a child or children by the deceased is not enough to confer on the woman widowhood.” Consequently, the claimant was unable to inherit property from her deceased partner.

Here, the Court held that the termination of a marriage should lead to the division of matrimonial property between the two spouses. This rule applies when both spouses have contributed, financially or otherwise, toward the acquisition of the property. In this case, even though the marriage between the two partners was declared void, the Court held that the two matrimonial properties should be divided between the partners. The Court also held that custody arrangements should not excessively restrict the access of one parent to the child.

Here, the Court rejected defendant’s argument that his mistaken belief that the complainant was his wife was a sufficient defense against a conviction of rape. The Court, relying on Article 31 of the Constitution, stated that both husband and wife enjoy equal rights in marriage and stated that the complainant’s dignity was trampled upon. The Court thus extends access to justice by construing the existing law on rape through the reasoning that the constitutional provisions on equality in marriage and the recognition of the equal dignity of women and men had effectively amended Sections 9 and 123 of the Penal Code. These sections at face exclude husbands from being held criminally liable for marital rape.

The Court of Appeal held here that the Department of Civil and National Registration’s refusal to register Lesbians, Gays and Bisexuals of Botswana (LEGABIBO) was an unjustifiable limitation of its members’ rights. The Court of Appeal held that the right to form associations to advocate for legal change is a fundamental component of the right to freedom of assembly and association, and it dismissed the Department of Civil and National Registration’s argument that LEGABIBO’s objectives were contrary to public morality and would encourage the commission of criminal offenses. In its holding, the Court of Appeal protected the right of LEGABIBO and other LGBT advocacy groups to promote the rights of LGBT individuals and to lobby for legal reform.

Here, the High Court of Botswana held in a unanimous opinion that Section 164(a)/(c), 165, and 167 of the Botswanan Penal Code were unconstitutional. These sections criminalized same-sex relations. The Court held that 164(a)/(c), 165, and 167 violated Sections 3 (liberty, privacy, and dignity), 9 (privacy), and 15 (prohibiting discrimination) of the Botswanan Constitution. The Court modified Section 167, which criminalized the offence of gross indecency, to remove reference to private acts. The case overturned Kanane v State.

The defendant was convicted for the crimes of human trafficking and association to commit crimes on May 15, 2014 in the state of Nueva Esparta. In its decision, the lower court said that in cases of rape and trafficking of persons, anyone who has been accused of having a relationship or knowledge of such crime could be deprived of liberty during trial, if it is deemed appropriate by the authorities. In the defendant’s case, he was accused of seducing and luring the female victim into the island of Margarita, where she was subjected, tortured, drugged, and raped. The defendant appealed the decision, alleging that it violated his right to be judged in freedom. The Court of Appeal for Violence Against Women on January 8, 2016 dismissed the appeal action and ratified the decision of the lower court and determined that the apprehension of the accused before his conviction did not represent a violation of the law. The appellate court ratified the criteria of the lower court according to which those defendants who are linked to the act of people trafficking and gender violence can be arrested before issuing a conviction decision, if deemed appropriate by the authorities.

The female victim declared to the competent authorities that she worked as a motorcycle taxi driver in La Fria, Táchira State. On the morning of September 9, 2014, she transported a male passenger. During the journey, the passenger threatened and sexually assaulted her with an object. On November 18, 2014, the lower court convicted the defendant of the crime of sexual violence even though psychological or physical violence were not proven at the trial, which used to be one of the elements for such crime. The defendant requested a review of the court’s decision to the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (the “TSJ”) on the basis that neither physical nor psychological violence were confirmed by the lower court. The TSJ ratified the decision of the lower court and decided that it is no longer necessary to verify that physical or psychological violence occurred in order to determine the crime of sexual violence. As a result of this decision, each of the crimes of sexual, psychological, and physical violence can be committed separately, reinforcing the protection of women’s rights. This decision represents an improvement in rights for women in Venezuela.

The plaintiff, a female Venezuelan citizen married to a female Venezuelan citizen, got married in Argentina, where LGBT marriage rights are fully granted to homosexual couples. In the following years, they tried to validate their marriage in Venezuela through a judicial homologation process. Such homologation was denied on the basis that the marriage regulations in Argentina did not comply with the provisions of Article 44 of the Venezuelan Civil Code, which regulates marriage rights in Venezuela and provides that “marriage cannot be entered into except between one single man and one single woman.” Thereafter, the couple conceived a child through the assisted reproduction method in Argentina, who was born and presented for registration as their son in Argentina. Immediately after the baby was born, the couple moved back to Venezuela, where they tried to present the newborn as their son to the Venezuelan competent authorities, requiring that the baby carried the surnames of both mothers. The registration was denied. The couple introduced a complaint before the competent court and the judge decided the registration of the boy was inadmissible. The plaintiff appealed this decision until it reached the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Justice (“TSJ”), Venezuelan’s highest judicial body, which decided to annul the decision of the lower court. The TSJ overruled the lower court’s decision on the basis that the decision violated the plaintiff’s right to present the child as an LGBTIQ couple’s child. Likewise, the TSJ stated that this action violated the child’s constitutional right to have an identity. The TSJ final decision was to allow the registration of the child with both mothers’ surnames.

The decision of the tribunal was only in relation to whether to approve the respondent’s application to dismiss the complaint. The respondent’s application was denied because there were real factual issues in dispute. It appears that the substantive trial has not yet commenced (or alternatively a settlement was reached). In any case, this case is relevant as it illustrates the discrimination women may face in Australia when seeking to establish themselves in a secure environment and raise their children. The complainant was a single mother who sought to rent an apartment from the respondent. The complaint rested upon the allegation that the complainant’s tenancy application had been rejected (and she was not even allowed to see the property) as a result of the complainant intending on having her young son live with her in the rental property.

The complainant was a woman in an exclusive lesbian relationship for four years. The complainant and her partner wanted to have child but learned that donor insemination in Queensland would not be available for them, so the complainant traveled out of state to seek this treatment. She found the experience to be emotionally and financially draining, so she stopped the treatment. Thus, the complainant decided to try and ask the clinics in Queensland for the donor treatment. She found a clinic at which the respondent was a director. She obtained a referral from her general practitioner and scheduled an appointment with the respondent. At the appointment, the complainant informed the respondent that she was in a long-term lesbian relationship. The respondent’s position was clear that the clinic only provided treatment to heterosexual couples with infertility problems. Nevertheless, he requested blood tests of the complainant which showed that her ovaries were functioning normally and proceeded to give her a form to fill out and sign for herself and her “husband” in order to start the treatment. The complainant asked the respondent if she could fill only the wife part and sign, but he insisted that it should be signed by the husband. Since this was not possible in her case, the respondent refused to provide her with the treatment. The claimant then sought treatment outside Brisbane for a while without success. The claimant had a baby by private donation, ultimately bearing risks of possible HIV infection of the semen. The claimant suffered emotional distress from humiliation and discrimination based on her sexual orientation, in addition she had to defer her university degree for all the time she had to spend traveling to clinics outside Queensland. Subsequently, the claimant filed this claim before the Anti-Discrimination Tribunal seeking compensation from the respondent and his clinic. The respondent argued that there was an agreement with the government on artificial insemination by donation in relation to treatment of infertility, and that treatment is to be provided only to heterosexual couples. The Tribunal confirmed that there was no such agreement in place. The respondent also argued the definition of infertility only describes the incapability of heterosexual couples of conceiving because of medical reasons caused by one or both of them. The Tribunal also refused this limitation of the definition and held that the fact that scientifically two females are incapable of conceiving a child is a medical reason that makes them eligible for the same treatment as any heterosexual couple seeking this treatment. Accordingly, the Tribunal found the act of the respondent to be discriminatory against the complainant because she is a lesbian, which is unlawful under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, and ordered the clinic to pay the claimant a compensation sum for the humiliation and offence she suffered.

The complainant worked as a Reservations Manager at the Raging Thunder Pty where both respondents, Cole and Ariel, were directors. The complainant became pregnant and went on maternity leave in agreement with the directors that she would return to the company at the same position after her maternity leave. Closer to the date when the complainant was about to return back from her maternity leave, she contacted Mr. Cole and discussed the possibility of returning on a part-time basis, but Mr. Cole informed her it was not possible for a managerial position to be part-time. The complainant tried to contact Mr. Cole again to inform him that she was willing to work full-time, but could not reach him, so she sent him the message through the receptionist. After several calls with Mr. Cole and without a definitive answer on her return date to work, Mr. Ariel called the complainant to inform her of a company restructuring and that her position was no longer available and that the two newly introduced positions were already filled by her colleagues. The complainant asked if they were going to offer any similar positions, but Mr. Ariel told her they had no more positions and he would not create one for her. The complainant suffered emotional distress and financial loss due to becoming redundant, therefore filed for this complaint seeking compensation. The complainant alleged that, due to her pregnancy and maternity leave, the respondents (i) failed to discuss the terms of her returning to work; (ii) failed to discuss her offer to work part-time;(iii) failed to appoint her in the new position of Call Center Manager and appointed Ms. S. instead; (iv) failed to appoint her in the new created position of 2IC and appointed Ms. G.; and, (v) failed to offer her an alternative position. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal did not find the respondents liable for all of the complainant’s allegations, but ruled that the company and Mr. Ariel failed to offer the complainant the 2IC position after restructuring even though she was more experienced and familiar with this role than Ms. G., who was only covering for the complainant during her maternity leave. Thus, the Tribunal found that the reason for not offering this position to the complainant was due to her maternity leave. The company and Mr. Ariel also failed to offer the complainant any alternative position, again due to her maternity leave, and therefore her return was not considered while planning the restructuring of the company. The Tribunal found that respondents did not discriminate against complainant in conversations about her returning to work, in not discussing her offer to work part-time, in choosing to restructure, or in failing to appoint her in the Call Center Manager position under the Anti-Discriminatory Act 1991. However, the Tribunal did find that if complainant had not been on maternity leave at the time of the restructuring, she would have been offered the 2IC position, and that decision constituted pregnancy discrimination on the part of the first and third respondents. Also, the Tribunal found the failure to offer complainant a suitable alternative position constituted pregnancy discrimination. Therefore, the Tribunal ruled a compensation sum to be paid the complainant.

The appellant and the victim were married for 37 years. On 6 May 2010, the victim was struck at least 15 times on the head, face, and forearm with severe force, causing her death. When police arrived, they found the victim’s body doused in petrol in the garage near her car.. Police found the appellant lying on the floor in the lounge room in the house with a head injury and had a letter opener sticking out of his right hand. The appellant was taken to hospital and later interviewed by the doctors and police. The appellant told police that he got out of bed, walked into the lounge room, and was hit on the head by a man wearing a stocking over his head. Throughout this interview and later investigations by the police, the appellant maintained that there was an intruder who entered the house, assaulted him, and then killed his wife. At trial, the Crown’s case against the appellant included several pieces of circumstantial evidence: the victim was covered by appellant’s clothing, someone attempted to clean up the blood with towels, the victim was doused in petrol but not ignited, indicating that someone tried to destroy DNA, the footprints around the victim’s body matched footwear commonly worn by appellant, the appellant’s DNA was on a bloody metal bar found near the victim’s body, the metal bar appeared to come from the household, blood in and around the house matched victim’s and appellants, appellant had dried, flaky blood on him, the appellant gave inconsistent accounts of the events, appellant lied to officials, and appellant had the motive to kill her because he had financial difficulties and was the beneficiary of her life insurance. In light of the evidence, the appellant was convicted of murdering the victim.The appellant filed an appeal on the grounds that the trial judge erred in (i) directing the jury that they could use appellant’s lie in relation to the murder weapon belonging to him as implied admission of his guilt; (ii) directing the jury that they could use appellant’s lie about owning footwear similar to that which left footprints around the victim’s body as implied admission of his guilt; (iii) admitting the lack of reaction from the appellant when learning of his wife’s death as evidence of his guilt; (iv) failing to direct the jury in relation to evidence that the appellant did not ask how his wife died; (v) misdirecting the jury in relation to motive; and, (vi) failing to direct the jury in relation to evidence of DNA analysis. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the trial judge did not err in jury instructions or admissions.

The respondent was employed as an apprentice by the first appellant, the second appellant was her supervisor, and the third, fourth, and fifth appellants were her co-apprentices. Over the course of the respondent’s employment with the first appellant, she was subject to unlawful discrimination and sexual harassment by the third, fourth, and fifth appellants (among others). The complaint by the respondent included her receiving sexual comments and unequal treatment by her superiors and co-workers because she was a female, and many of her peers told her that she was not fit for her job because she was a female. Examples of these acts were a display of pictures and posters of half-dressed women in various parts of the workplace, addressing the respondent in the presence of others at a training with inappropriate comments, not giving the respondent the same work opportunities as her male peers, and providing her with unfavourable report cards that included clear comments against her as a female. The Anti-Discrimination Tribunal in the first instance found that the first appellant was negligent in providing the proper training to its employees on anti-discrimination and sexual harassment at the work place, subsequently allowing the other appellants to act in a discriminatory way towards the respondent because of her gender. Since these are considered unlawful acts under the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, the Tribunal ordered the appellants to pay the respondent compensation for damages caused by discrimination and sexual harassment. The appellants’ filed this appeal objecting to the Tribunal’s findings. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the orders of the Tribunal.

The Supreme Federal Court of Brazil (STF) revoked the pretrial detention order issued against staff and patients of a clinic that was alleged to have been performing clandestine abortions. The 2ND Panel of STF found that criminal laws against abortion were unconstitutional with respect to the case in hand, and the criminalization of voluntary termination of pregnancy during the first three months was incompatible with the protection of multiple fundamental rights of women. The decision set an important precedent for the sexual and reproductive rights of women in Brazil. The court also discussed that the criminalization of abortion disproportionately affected women living in poverty who do not have access to private or public abortion clinics. Justice Barroso stated that while the potential life of the fetus is important, the criminalization of abortion before the end of the first three months of pregnancy violated several fundamental rights of women granted by the Brazilian Constitution of 1988 (personal autonomy, physical and mental integrity, sexual and reproductive rights, and gender equality). This decision does not decriminalize abortion in all circumstances, and it is not bidding. This is perhaps a softening of the law regarding abortion in Brazil.

O Supremo Tribunal Federal – STF desconstitui prisão de ofício emitida contra funcionários e donos de clinica de aborto presos em flagrante em razão de suposta prática de aborto clandestinos. A 2ª turma do STF entendeu que as leis criminais contra a prática do aborto são inconstitucionais em relação ao caso em análise, estabelecendo ainda que a criminalização do aborto voluntário durante os 3 (três) primeiros meses de gravidez era incompatível com múltiplos direitos fundamentais garantidos às mulheres. Nesse aspecto, trata-se de um precedente importante para os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos das mulheres no Brasil. Ainda a 2 turma do STF discutiu que a criminalização do aborto afeta, desproporcionalmente, as mulheres pobres que não têm acesso a clínicas privadas ou públicas. Ainda, o Ministro Barroso, relator do caso, estabelece que, enquanto a vida potencial de um feto é importante, a criminalização do aborto realizado dentro dos 3 meses iniciais da gravidez viola diversos direitos fundamentais garantidos constitucionalmente, como a autonomia, o direito à integridade física e mental, os direitos sexuais e reprodutivos, além da igualdade de gênero. Ressalta-se que essa decisão não descriminaliza o aborto em todas as circunstâncias, bem como não vincula o STF a emitir decisões com o mesmo posicionamento, apesar de se tratar de decisão favorável às mulheres no tocante a realização de aborto no Brasil.

This case refers to a writ filed by the accused in order to not apply to his case Article 41 of Law 11.340/ 2006 (Maria da Penha Act). Article 41 states that the domestic crimes committed against women cannot be tried by the procedural rite of 9.099/1995 (Small Courts Act), which regulates the trial of petty offenses. The accused argued that his conduct did not fit into Article 41, and that applying this article would be unconstitutional for giving special treatment to women. The Supreme Court of Brazil denied the order and declared Article 41 constitutional. They found that the Constitution gave the legislator freedom to define which crimes will be considered petty offenses. The Court decided that the domestic crimes against women imply greater complexity because they are crimes against the family institution, for which the Constitution has established special protection.

O Habeas corpus 106.212 foi impetrado sob a justificativa de não aplicação do artigo 41 da Lei Maria da Penha – LMP ao caso em julgamento. Referido artigo 41 estabelece que os crimes domésticos cometidos contra as mulheres não podem ser processados e julgados pelos Juizados Especiais Criminais, que julgam infrações penais de menor potencial ofensivo. O acusado argumentou que sua conduta não se relacionava com o artigo 41 da LMP e que a aplicação desse artigo resultaria no tratamento especial as mulheres, o que seria inconstitucional. O STF indeferiu o HC, declarando a constitucionalidade do artigo 41 da LMP. O STF entendeu ainda que a Constituição Federal conferiu ao legislador competência para definir quais crimes são considerados como de “menor potencial ofensivo”. Por fim, o Tribunal decidiu que as práticas delituosas praticadas contra as mulheres implicam em crimes de alta complexidade, vez que são praticados contra a instituição familiar, a qual possui especial proteção constitucional.

The defendant pled guilty to rape and holding a woman at knifepoint until she was able to fight him off and escape. The defendant was before the court for sentencing. The court began by observing that “over the past few years the courts have been disposed to sentence persons convicted of rape to terms of imprisonment of between 7-10 years.” Here, the only mitigating factor was the defendant’s guilty plea. The aggravating factors included physical and psychological harm, use of a weapon and violence, and prior convictions. Considering these factors, the court sentenced the defendant to a term of eight years imprisonment.

El acusado se declaró culpable de violar y sujetar a una mujer a punta de cuchillo y por la fuerza hasta que ella luchó contra él y escapó. El acusado se apareció ante el tribunal para dictar sentencia. El tribunal comenzó observando que "en los últimos años, los tribunales han estado dispuestos a condenar a las personas condenadas por violación a penas de prisión de entre 7 y 10 años". Aquí, el único factor atenuante fue la declaración de culpabilidad del acusado. Los hechos agravantes incluyeron daño físico y psicológico, uso de arma y violencia, y condenas previas. Teniendo en cuenta estos factores, el tribunal condenó al acusado a una pena de ocho años de prisión.

This was a domestic violence case where the male appellant was in a long-term relationship with the female respondent. The appellant allegedly physically assaulted the respondent’s sister, accosted a second person, and threatened the lives of the members of the household with a cutlass. The appellant denied these allegations. The appellate issue was whether to overturn the trial judge’s injunction against the appellant, requiring him to refrain “from committing any acts of violence.” The appellate court upheld the injunction, explaining that the injunction was “sensible” and “a person cannot complain of prejudice or inconvenience because he is restrained from committing acts of violence.”

Este fue un caso de violencia doméstica en el que el apelante masculino había tenido una relación a largo plazo con la demandada. El apelante supuestamente agredió físicamente a la hermana del demandado, agredió a una segunda persona y amenazó la vida de los miembros del hogar con un cuchillo. El apelante negó estas acusaciones. La cuestión de la apelación era si los hechos ameritaban revocar la orden judicial del juez de primera instancia contra el apelante, solamente exigiéndole que no "cometiera actos de violencia en un futuro." El tribunal de apelaciones confirmó la medida de la corte inferior, explicando que la medida era "sensata" y que "una persona no puede quejarse de prejuicios o inconvenientes sencillamente porque se le haya prohibido cometer actos de violencia."

The defendant pled guilty to wounding and causing grievous harm to an adult female after dragging her into the bushes and attacking her with a piece of wood and cutlass, leaving deep lacerations and abrasions. The defendant also pled guilty to the rape and robbery of a 16-year-old female, which occurred just two days later. The defendant was before the court for sentencing. Analyzing the aggravating factors, the court observed that defendant had a criminal history, was not remorseful, preferred violence, and presented a danger to the community. The court also recognized that the victims were not only physically hurt, but had “been severely traumatized by their experiences.” The only mitigating factor was the guilty plea. Accordingly, the court sentenced the defendant to 14 years and three months imprisonment.

El acusado se declaró culpable de herir y causar graves daños a una mujer adulta después de arrastrarla hacia los arbustos y golpearla con un trozo de madera y un alfanje, dejando profundas laceraciones y abrasiones. El acusado también se declaró culpable de la violación y robo de una joven de 16 años, lo cual ocurrió solo dos días después. El acusado compareció ante el tribunal para dictar sentencia. Al analizar los agravantes, el tribunal observó que el acusado tenía antecedentes penales, no tenía remordimientos, prefería la violencia como medio de resolución a conflictos y representaba un peligro para la comunidad. El tribunal también reconoció que las víctimas no solo estaban heridas físicamente, sino que habían "sido gravemente traumatizadas por sus experiencias." El único factor atenuante fue que el acusado se declaró culpable. En consecuencia, el tribunal condenó al acusado a 14 años y tres meses de prisión.

The two accused were prosecuted for invading the home of the two victims and assaulting them, which temporarily prevented the victims from being able to work. The first accused organized the crime because she could neither accept the breakup with one of the victims nor the fact that the victim was in a relationship with a man. Additionally, the first accused created a false Facebook profile to make fun of one victim’s sexual orientation and to convince one victim to break up with the other. The Court found that the motive of the crime was, among others, the sexual orientation of the victims, which is an aggravating circumstance of the assault. The Court found that the facts regarding the first accused had been clearly established. However, the interrogation and the investigation did not provide the court with enough evidence to hold the second accused criminally liable. The Court convicted the first accused and imposed a sentence of three years imprisonment and a fine of EUR 100.00 (increased with the multiplication factor of 50, i.e., in total EUR 5000), but suspended for five years if the accused complied with the terms of probation.

The applicant appealed a decision denying her a protection visa. The applicant demonstrated evidence that if she returned to Uganda, she would be forced to undergo FGM. The applicant was a member of the Sabiny tribe, meaning her father’s family had the right under Ugandan law to take her away from her mother and compel her to obey traditional practices, including FGM. She further testified that if she returned to Uganda there would be a risk of abuse as she was a Christian, which was not accepted in her family village. Furthermore, when she was 12, her family found a potential husband for her, a witchdoctor who believed in Satan and professed sacrificing people to achieve a particular objective. She was therefore afraid that if she returned to Uganda, she would be forced to marry this individual, who believed that sacrificing people could bring him power and money. The tribunal found that the applicant was a person to whom Australia owed protection obligations.

This domestic violence case involved an appeal against a sentencing decision. The defendant set fire to the victim when she was 12 weeks pregnant and caused serious injury. After the attack, she terminated her pregnancy due to the permanent nature of her injuries. The trial court sentenced him to 15 years imprisonment. On appeal by the defendant, the Court of Appeal decided that this was “manifestly excessive” compared to other cases of serious injury by fire and resentenced the defendant to 10 years and six months imprisonment. On appeal by the prosecution, the High Court of Australia held that the Court of Appeal had erred in decreasing the sentence and pointed out that there were not enough comparable cases of intentionally causing serious injury by fire and the few cases mentioned could not establish a sentencing pattern.

The court held that the applicants, as joint guardians of a 14-year-old child with a severe mental disability, were allowed to authorize the sterilization of the child without a court order, provided that (i) the circumstances were so compelling that the welfare of the child justified such an invasive procedure and (ii) there was no possibility of the child acquiring the capacity to decide for herself. Generally, it was established that children with the maturity and intelligence to fully understand proposed treatment can make such a decision even though they have not reached the age of adulthood. Parents or guardians of children who do not have sufficient capacity or maturity or intelligence to decide, can make such a decision on behalf of their children, provided that the treatment is in the child’s best interest. However, the parental ability to consent to sterilization is limited to circumstances in which sterilization is required to treat some malfunction or disease. In relation to non-therapeutic purposes, a court order is required to authorize sterilization.

In 2015, the appellant was charged and convicted for committing five sexual offenses against his sister. The had purportedly occurred over years,. Most of the charged offenses, sexual exploitation of a child and two rapes, occurred when the appellant was an adult, but prosecutors also charged him with an indecent assault committed when he was 11 or 12 years old and thus presumed to be incapable of the offense. To rebut this presumption, the prosecution offered evidence of the appellant’s earlier, uncharged acts of sexual violence against his sister beginning when he was five or six years old. In the first appeal, the Court of Criminal Appeal found that the prosecution’s rebuttal evidence was insufficient to overcome the doli incapax presumption for the indecent assault charge and the evidence was “too sparse” to sustain a conviction for the third count in the indictment. The court upheld the other three convictions. In this appeal, the High Court examined whether it was permissible for the prosecution to use evidence of the dismissed charges for “contextual” purposes related to the remaining three charges, each of which the appellant was convicted. In dismissing this appeal, the High Court found unanimously that the evidence was relevant because it illustrated the family background in which the appellant and his sister were raised and that it was admissible “relationship evidence.” The court found that without such contextual evidence, the sexual abuse claims could easily have been seen as implausible.

The Court held that it was not empowered to impose measures that guaranteed the physical and psychological integrity of domestic violence victims when other tribunals and bodies established for that purpose were competent. However, plaintiffs have the right to make the requests from the competent courts to take necessary measures in order to enforce its orders, using persuasive or coercive means.

La Corte sostuvo que no estaba facultada para imponer medidas que garantizaran la integridad física y psicológica de las víctimas de violencia doméstica donde otros tribunales y organismos establecidos con ese fin eran competentes. Sin embargo, los demandantes tienen el derecho de hacer las solicitudes de los tribunales competentes para tomar las medidas necesarias para hacer cumplir sus órdenes, utilizando medios persuasivos o coercitivos.

The Constitutional Tribunal held that the conduct of the municipal authorities forcing a victim of gender violence to reconcile with her aggressor under the threat of taking her children to a shelter violates the right of women to live free from violence. The Tribunal held that this conduct constituted undue harassment.

El Tribunal Constitucional sostuvo que la conducta de las autoridades municipales, obligando a una víctima de violencia de género a reconciliarse con su agresor bajo la amenaza de llevar a sus hijos a un refugio es contra el derecho de las mujeres a vivir libres de violencia. El Tribunal sostuvo que esta conducta constituía indebida acoso.

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, a member of the Bolivian Parliament, challenged the constitutionality of several articles of the Criminal Code on the basis that they discriminated against women. The Court held that some of the challenged articles were unconstitutional and upheld others. On the grounds of gender discrimination, the Court found unconstitutional Article 56, which prevented imprisoned women from being employed outside of prisons while allowing imprisoned men outside employment, and Article 245, which recognized as a defense to the offense of falsifying a birth record the motive of protecting the honor of one’s wife, mother, daughter, or sister. The Court declared unconstitutional the words “fragility” and “dishonor” in Article 258 regarding infanticide also due to gender discrimination, although this did not affect the operation of the offense. The final unconstitutional issue was that Article 250 criminalized an unmarried man abandoning a woman who became pregnant with him, but did not criminalize a married father’s abandonment of his pregnant wife. The Court was unwilling to hold restrictions on abortion unconstitutional. As such, receiving an abortion remains prohibited under Articles 263 and 264, and the performance of abortion is prohibited under Article 269. However, the Court did declare unconstitutional the requirements in Article 266 that a woman inform the police and obtain judicial authorization in order to obtain an abortion in the case of rape or incest (article 266).

Patricia Mansilla Martínez, quien es miembro del Parlamento boliviano, cuestionó la constitucionalidad de varios artículos del Código Penal sobre la base de que eran discriminatorios contra las mujeres. El Tribunal sostuvo que varios de los artículos impugnados eran inconstitucionales: el Artículo 56, que impedía que las mujeres encarceladas fueran empleadas fuera de las cárceles mientras que los hombres encarcelados, por otro lado, podían tener empleo y el Artículo 245, que reconocía la protección del honor de la esposa, la madre, la hija o la hermana de uno como defensa al delito de falsificar un registro de nacimiento. Ambos Artículos se consideraron inconstitucionales sobre la base de la discriminación de género. La Corte declaró que las palabras "fragilidad" y "deshonra" contenidas en el Artículo 258 en asociación con el infanticidio eran inconstitucionales por la misma base, aunque esto no afecta el funcionamiento del delito. Además, la distinción dentro del Artículo 250 que penalizaba el abandono por parte de un padre de una mujer que no es su esposa después de dejarla embarazada pero que no se aplicaba a la esposa de un padre también se consideró inconstitucional. La Corte no estaba dispuesta a mantener las restricciones sobre el aborto como inconstitucionales. Como tal, recibir un aborto sigue prohibido según los Artículos 263 y 264, y el aborto está prohibido según el Artículo 269. Sin embargo, la Corte declaró inconstitucional los requisitos del Artículo 266 de que una mujer informe a la policía y obtenga la autorización judicial para obtener un aborto en caso de violación o incesto (artículo 266).

The Court established a unified standard of the legal meaning of a “factual union” (unión de hecho). This term is used in the Law of Criminalization of Violence against Women (Ley de Penalización de Violencia contra la Mujer) and in the Family Code (Código de Familia). However, the definition is composed of different elements under each of these legislations. For example, in the Family Code’s definition, the requirement for the marital union to have lasted for a three-year term is considered unnecessary in order to protect the life, free will, physical integrity, and the woman’s dignity in a marriage or factual union. In the unified standard, the Court established that the necessary elements of a factual union are the following: (1) stability (which excludes periodic relationships); (2) publicity (which excludes furtive relationships); (3) cohabitation (which excludes superficial relationships); and (4) singularity (which excludes multiplicity). The Court recognized these elements and acknowledged that they were also recognized by the Convention of Belém do Pará, establishing that it is also considered domestic violence when the aggressor lives with the victim (cohabitation).

El Tribunal estableció una definición legal unificada del significado de una “unión de hecho.” Dicho término se utiliza en la Ley de Penalización de la Violencia contra la Mujer y en el Código de la Familia. Sin embargo, la definición se compone de diferentes elementos en cada una de estas legislaciones. Por ejemplo, en la definición del Código de la Familia, el requisito de que la unión matrimonial haya durado un período de tres años se considera innecesario para proteger la vida, el libre albedrío, la integridad física y la dignidad de la mujer en un matrimonio o en una unión de hecho. En la norma unificada, la Corte estableció que los elementos necesarios de una unión de hecho son los siguientes: (1) estabilidad (lo cual excluye las relaciones periódicas); (2) publicidad (lo cual excluye relaciones furtivas); (3) la cohabitación (lo cual excluye las relaciones superficiales); y (4) la singularidad (lo cual excluye la multiplicidad). La Corte reconoció estos elementos y reconoció que también fueron reconocidos por la Convención de Belém do Pará, estableciendo que también se considera violencia doméstica cuando el agresor vive con la víctima (convivencia).

The applicant was a woman married according to Hindu rites. Accordingly, when her husband died intestate, his parents stood to inherit his estate. The applicant sought a declaratory judgment that the word “spouse” as used in the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 includes a surviving partner to a monogamous Hindu marriage. The Court granted the declaratory judgment and held that the applicant was entitled to inherit from her deceased husband.

Die aansoeker was 'n vrou wat volgens Hindoe tradisie getroud is. Haar man het intestaat gesterf en gevolglik het sy ouers die reg gestaan om sy boedel te erf. Die applikant het 'n verklarende uitspraak aangevra dat die woord "gade" ingesluit word soos in die Intestaat se Erfreg Wet 81 van 1987, as 'n oorlewende vennoot vir 'n monogame Hindoe-huwelik. Die hof het die verklarende uitspraak toegestaan dat die aansoeker geregtig was om van haar oorlede man te erf.

The applicant was in a polygamous Muslim marriage. After her husband died intestate, the respondent, the executor of the deceased’s estate, refused the applicant’s claims on the basis that polygynous Muslim marriages were not legally recognised under the Intestate Succession Act. The court held that precluding the applicant from an inheritance unfairly discriminated on the grounds of religion, marital status, and gender, and was therefore inconsistent with section 9 of the Constitution. The court found that section 1 of the Intestate Succession Act was inconsistent with the Constitution and invalid to the extent that it did not include more than one spouse in a polygynous Muslim marriage in the protection afforded to “a spouse.” Accordingly, the applicant could inherit from her late husband’s estate.

Die applikant was in ‘n poligame Moslem-huwelik. Nadat haar man intestaat gesterf het, het die respondent, die eksekuteur van die oorledene se boedel, die applikant se eise geweier op grond daarvan dat poligame Moslem huwelike nie wettiglik erken word onder die Intestate Erfreg Wetgewing nie. Die hof het bevind dat daar onbillik gediskrimineer was teen die applikant op grond van godsdiens, huwelikstatus en geslag, was dus strydig met Artikel 9 van die Grondwet. Die hof het bevind dat Artikel 1 van die Intestate Wet strydig was met die konstitusie (Grondwet) en ongeldig is tot die mate dat dit nie meer as een gade in ‘n poligame Moslem-huwelik insluit tot die beskerming wat aan ‘n eggenoot gegee word nie. Gevolglik kon die applikant uit die boedel van haar oorlede man erf.

This judgment constituted three related cases (Bhe, Shibi and SAHRC), which were decided together and concerned the African customary law rule of primogeniture. In Bhe, a mother brought an action to secure the property of her deceased husband for her daughters. In Shibi, the applicant was denied the right to inherit from her deceased brother’s intestate estate under African customary law. In SAHRC, the South African Human Rights Commission and the Women’s Legal Centre Trust brought an action in the public interest to declare the rule of male primogeniture contained within section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 invalid. The Constitutional Court declared section 23 invalid, meaning that all deceased estates were to be governed by the Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987, under which widows and children can benefit regardless of their gender or legitimacy. The Court also ordered the division of estates in circumstances where the deceased person was in a polygamous marriage and was survived by more than one spouse and ordered that, in such instances, a surviving spouse shall inherit a child’s share of the intestate estate or so much of the intestate estate as does not exceed in value the amount fixed by the Minister for Justice and Constitutional Development by notice in the Gazette.

Hierdie uitspraak het bestaan uit drie verwante sake (BHE, Shibi en SARK) wat saam beslis is en het betrekking op die Afrika gebruiks regsreël van eersgeboortereg. In BHE het 'n moeder 'n saak gemaak om die eiendom van haar oorlede man vir haar dogters te verseker. In Shibi is die applikant volgens die Afrika gewoontereg, die reg ontsê om van die intestate boedel van haar broer te erf. In SAHRC het die Suid-Afrikaanse Menseregte Kommissie en die "Women’s Legal Centre Trust" 'n saak in die openbare belang gebring om die reël van manlike eersgeboortereg wat in artikel 23 van die Swart Administrasie Wet 38 van 1927 ongeldig te verklaar. Die Konstitusionele Hof het artikel 23 ongeldig verklaar wat beteken dat alle boedels van oorledenes onderworpe sal wees aan die Intestaat Opvolgwet 81 van 1987 waaronder weduwees en kinders voordeel kan trek ongeag hul geslag of wettigheid. Die Hof het ook gelas dat boedels onderverdeel word in omstandighede waar die oorledene in ’n poligame huwelik was en deur meer as een eggenoot oorleef word. In welke geval ’n oorlewende eggenoot ’n kind se deel van die intestate boedel erf of ’n waarde van die intestate boedel wat nie die bedrag wat deur die Minister vir Justisie en Grondwetlike Ontwikkeling vasgesteld is, oorskry word soos die kennisgewing in die Staatskoerant nie.

The plaintiff attempted to bring a charge of assault against her former husband under the Domestic Violence Act of 1998 (“the DVA”). She was incorrectly advised by a police officer that she required a protection order from the Magistrate Court before she could receive police assistance. She was then told by a second officer that her former husband would bring a similar charge of assault against her if she persisted. The plaintiff, along with her former husband, was arrested. She filed a claim for damages against, inter alia, the Minister of Police, arguing that (i) the officials involved were acting in the course and within the scope of their employment and (ii) the Minister of Police was vicariously liable for failing to comply with the DVA. The court agreed that the DVA requires the police to assist and provide the maximum protection possible to victims of domestic abuse.

Die eiseres het probeer om 'n klag van aanranding teen haar voormalige man onder die Wet op Huishoudelike Geweld van 1998 ("Die DVA") te bring. 'n Polisiebeampte het haar verkeerdelik aanbeveel dat sy 'n beskermingsbevel van die Landdroshof moes kry voordat sy polisiehulp kon ontvang. 'n Tweede polisiebeampte het vir haar gesê dat haar voormalige man 'n soortgelyke klag van aanranding teen haar sou bring as sy aanhou met haar klagte. Die eiseres, asook haar voormalige man, was gearresteer. Sy het 'n eis vir skadevergoeding teen, onder andere, die Minister van Polisie ingedien en het aangvoer dat (i) die betrokke beamptes volgens en binne die bestek van hul werk opgetree het en (ii) die Minister van Polisie onmiddellik aanspreeklik was vir die versuiming om die DVA te volg. Die hof het saamgestem dat die DVA vereis dat die polisie hulp en die maksimum moontlike beskerming vir slagoffers van huishoudelike mishandeling moet gee.

The appellant-wife appealed to the Intermediate People’s Court of Wuxi Municipality, Jiangsu Province in relation to the lower court’s refusal to grant a divorce. The appellant alleged that her marriage with the appellee was irreparably broken and that he had committed domestic violence against her. The appellant alleged that the domestic violence was corroborated by their daughter’s testimony and photographic evidence. The court held that even though the appellee might have beaten the appellant on at least one occasion, under the legal definition, domestic violence must constitute continuous multiple-time battery rather than [one occasional][1] conduct. Since the evidence submitted by the appellant was insufficient to demonstrate that the appellee’s conduct caused harmful consequences to the appellant, the court refused to grant their divorce. The court also admonished the appellee to fulfill his responsibility as a husband and to stop his "bad habits."

离婚、家庭暴力

上诉人周某因与被上诉人杨某1离婚纠纷一案，不服无锡市惠山区不准予双方离婚的判决，向江苏省无锡市中级人民法院提起上诉。周某称双方感情确已破裂，并且杨某1对其存在家暴行为。上诉人称双方女儿的证言与照片证据证明了家暴行为的存在。法院认为，根据证据，虽然不排除杨某1有打过周某的可能性，但家庭暴力不只是一次偶然性的行为，而是持续性多次施暴的行为。因为周某提交的证据不足以证明被上诉人的行为对周某造成了伤害，法院拒绝了周某的上诉请求。法院同时要求杨某1作为丈夫有所担当，戒除生活中的不良习惯。

[1] Note to draft: This concept is unclear. The exact translation of the Mandarin phrase would be “one occasional conduct.” From the context of the opinion, it appears that this means that occasional conduct, even if more than once, may not be sufficient if it is not indicative of a pattern of abuse.

The plaintiff sued the defendants for infringing upon her right to employment equality. The plaintiff alleged that the online advertisement posted by the defendants, to which Liang responded, required kitchen apprentices to be “men between the ages of 18 and 25.” The plaintiff further alleged that when she went to the restaurant, the receptionist informed her of the restaurant’s policy that “all employees in the kitchen should be men, even if a woman possesses the qualifications of a chef.” The plaintiff alleged that the defendants’ behavior violates Articles XII and XIII of the People’s Republic of China’s Employment Law, which provide that potential employees should not be discriminated against on the bases of ethnicity, race, sex, and religious beliefs. As relief, the plaintiff requested (1) an official apology from the defendants; (2) 21 Chinese yuan in damages for costs incurred by responding to the advertisement; and (3) 40,800 Chinese yuan in damages for emotional distress. The court of first instance held that the defendants’ actions constituted gender-based discrimination against the plaintiff. However, it found insufficient evidence for the plaintiff’s emotional distress and awarded 2,000 Chinese yuan in damages. It also denied Liang’s request for an official apology. Both the plaintiff and defendants appealed. Relying on the explicit requirement in the advertisement and the receptionist’s explanations that the candidate be a man, the Intermediate People’s Court held that the defendants’ exclusion based on the plaintiff’s gender was unlawful and unreasonable and constituted gender-based employment discrimination. With respect to relief, the Intermediate People’s Court held that under the Supreme People’s Court’s interpretations, emotional distress normally should not be compensated in monetary terms unless there are severe consequences. The Intermediate People’s Court held that compensation of 2,000 Chinese yuan was within the discretion of the lower court, and thus upheld the amount. The Intermediate People’s Court, however ordered the defendants to issue an official apology to the plaintiff in newspapers in the Guangzhou area.

就业歧视、性别歧视

原告诉称被告侵犯了她与男子平等的就业权利。原告称自己对被告的网上招聘广告进行了应聘。招聘广告要求厨房学徒须为“男性，18-25岁”。原告称在她去被告酒楼时，被告知公司规定厨房不找女工，即使具备厨师证也不行。原告称被告违反了《中华人民共和国劳动法》第十二条和第十三条的规定。法律规定，劳动者就业，不因民族、种族、性别、宗教信仰不同而受歧视。原告的诉讼请求包括（1）判决被告书面赔礼道歉；（2）判决被告连带赔偿原告因应聘产生的经济损失21元；（3）判决被告赔偿原告精神损害抚慰金40800元。原审法院判决被告的行为构成了对被告的性别歧视，但原告提交的证据不足以支持原告精神损害抚慰金的诉讼请求，并判决被告支付原告经济损失2000元。原审法院还驳回了原告要求被告书面赔礼道歉的诉讼请求。原告与被告均不服原审判决并提起上诉。根据被告招聘广告和前台工作人员对只招聘男性厨师的解释，中级人民法院认定被告对原告进行限制及排斥的行为不具有合法性，并且损害了女性应聘者的就业平等权。就赔偿问题，中级人民法院判决，在最高法院的解释下，因侵权致人精神损害，但未造成严重后果，受害人请求精神损害赔偿的，一般不予支持。原审法院酌情由被告赔偿原告精神损害2000元，属于原审法院自由裁量权范围，中级人民法院予以维持。中级人民法院判决被告向原告作出书面赔礼道歉。

Yang sued China PLA Hospital No. 458 for violation of his reproductive rights. The plaintiff alleged that his wife sought an abortion at the defendant-hospital and lied that she was unmarried. The plaintiff also alleged that the defendant did not meet its obligation to investigate Peng’s marital status and chose to believe Peng’s lie. The Court held that under Article 51 of the Law on Protection of Women’s Rights and Interests, “women have the right to reproduce and not to reproduce under the relevant state regulations.” Therefore, Peng’s right to voluntarily terminate pregnancy is protected by law. Moreover, according to the Supreme People’s Court’s authoritative interpretations of the Marriage Law, “courts should not support husbands’ damage claims based on infringement of their reproductive rights due to their wives’ termination of pregnancy.” Therefore, the defendant’s actions were not unlawful.

堕胎与生育权

原告杨江山诉称中国人民解放军第四五八医院损害了自己的生育权。原告称他的妻子于被告医院进行了终止妊娠手术并谎称自己未婚。原告还称被告没有尽到查清自己妻子婚姻状况的义务并轻信其妻子的谎言。法院认为，根据《中华人民共和国妇女权益保障法》,妇女有按照国家有关规定生育子女的权利，也有不生育的自由。因此，原告的妻子有自愿终止妊娠的法定权利。另外，根据《最高人民法院关于适用<中华人民共和国婚姻法>若干问题的解释》，夫以妻擅自终止妊娠侵犯其生育权为由请求损害赔偿的，人民法院不予支持。因此，被告无需承担侵权责任。